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Abstract 
This thesis examines the argument that creating a 'regional identity' that embraces 
entrepreneurship, innovation and change also serves to create an environment that 
supports economic growth. This thesis constructs a broad, multi-disciplinary 
framework by which the relationship between the key variables of 'identity', 'power' 
and 'prosperity' is explored using Richard Florida's concept of the 'creative class.' 
Florida argues that 'creative' people drive regional economic growth. Furthermore, 
these people are increasingly mobile, and are attracted to regions that embrace a 
particular set of lifestyle values. Florida identifies six themes or factors that influence 
the locational decisions of members of the 'creative class.' This thesis uses Florida's 
six factors in locational decision-making to form the basis of six criteria by which 
regional identities can be evaluated — competitive advantages, thick labour markets 
and innovation, lifestyle, diversity, authenticity and identity/status. This thesis also 
places the work of Florida in the context of broader regional development theories. 
This thesis shows that the 'creative class' approach can also be used to explain how 
regional identity affects regional economic performance — or why image matters in 
regional economic development. Furthermore, the 'creative class' approach can also 
be used prescriptively to develop a framework for the redefinition of regional 
identities in order to improve economic outcomes over time. Florida's approach is 
still a relatively recent addition to regional economic development theory, and the 
extension of Florida's analysis to the broader concept of regional identity represents a 
new contribution to the field. 
The analytical framework is applied to two regional case studies — Tasmania and 
Wales. In recent years, both regions have undertaken extensive community 
consultation programs to define their respective regional identities, and to identify 
causes of their respective economic disadvantages. These programs - Tasmania 
Together and Better Wales — are analysed in light of the six criteria, and strengths and 
weaknesses of the two regional identities are highlighted. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The field of regional development is one of the most contentious and widely debated 
areas of political and economic discourse. Moreover, it is one that affects everyone — 
and is a topic of kitchen table debates around the world. Michael Porter expressed the 
basic question of regional economic development in the preface to The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations: 
Why do some social groups, economic institutions, and nations advance and prosper?' 
American satirist PJ 0' Rourke phrased the same question in a similar, but slightly 
more memorable fashion in the introduction to Eat the Rich: 
Why do some places prosper and thrive while others just suck? 2 
The regional development question has no easy answers, and has spawned a wide 
range of theories and approaches. This thesis will attempt to build on the existing 
literature by examining the linkages between regional identity and economic 
development. Essentially, it will be argued that regional identity serves a particular 
function in the economic system — either stimulating entrepreneurship, innovation and 
development in successful regions, or acting to deter entrepreneurship, innovation and 
development in economically disadvantaged regions. In particular, this thesis will 
examine the argument that creating a regional identity that embraces innovation, 
entrepreneurship and change serves to create an environment that supports economic 
growth. 
Implicit in this hypothesis is the reverse argument - that a regional identity which 
embraces conservatism and opposes change will foster an environment that hinders 
economic growth. The obvious difficulty with testing the hypothesis lies in isolating 
the key variables. The relationship between power, regional identity and economic 
development is complex and difficult to unpack. This thesis will not attempt to do the 
Michael Porter. The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p xxiii. 
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impossible - it will, however, attempt to construct a broad, multi-disciplinary 
analytical framework in which the relationship between the key variables can be 
explored. The framework will then be applied to two regional case studies — 
Tasmania and Wales. 3 The case studies have been chosen as examples of regions 
where economic disparities are clear, and issues of regional identity are well 
documented. In recent years, both regions have also undertaken extensive community 
consultation programs to define their respective regional identities, and have set 
targets and objectives for their economic and social development. If image does 
matter, then these programs must be considered as having potentially significant 
consequences for economic development in the respective regions. 
1.1 	Case Studies — Tasmania and Wales 
In Tasmania, a Government-initiated program called Tasmania Together4 sought to 
draw a picture of what the local community wants the State to be like by the year 
2020. After a comprehensive community consultation process, a board made up of 
community representatives prepared a series of social and economic goals and 
benchmarks for the State to achieve. Underneath the broad vision statement of 
making Tasmania 
an icon for the rest of the world by creating a proud and confident society where our 
people live in harmony and prosperity.' 
Tasmania Together set out goals and benchmarks relating to health, education, the 
environment, business and the political process. 
2 PJ O'Rourke. Eat the Rich (Sydney: Pan Macmillan Australia, 1998), pl. 
3 There is a rich literature on comparative methodology and case study analysis. The purpose of 
comparison is to highlight similarities or, more importantly, differences. Tasmania and Wales share 
similarities as 'peripheral' regions but have distinct differences relating to population, political 
structure and history. Se, for example, Tom Mackie and David Marsh, "The Comparative Method," in 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), pp 173-188. 
4 Tasmania Together, Community Leaders Group, September 2001. Note — The Tasmania Together 
documents are titled with the word 'Together' italicised (and 'Tasmania' not italicised) for stylistic 
effect. For the sake of consistency, however, the body text of this thesis italicises both words when 
referring to the Tasmania Together program. Similarly, references to Better Wales and other 
government programs are italicised. 
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Similarly, Wales has undergone a process of goal-setting under the banner of the 
Better Wales 6 plan. The Better Wales plan signalled an important shift in Welsh 
nationhood and national identity. The process of political 'devolution' in the United 
Kingdom has contributed to (and resulted from) a resurgent sense of nationalism in 
both Wales and Scotland. Importantly, the creation of an independent Welsh 
parliament has given Wales a new level of political autonomy and a specific Welsh 
political voice. The Better Wales plan set out to establish a series of objectives and 
priorities for the Welsh parliament, and in the process developed a picture of how the 
Welsh people wanted their region to evolve. Like Tasmania Together, Better Wales 
established a series of economic, environmental and social targets or benchmarks for 
the region to achieve over a period of around 20 years. 
Ostensibly, both Tasmania Together and Better Wales were established to provide a 
framework for policy development in their respective regions, and to stimulate 
community engagement in the policy development process. They also, however, can 
be seen as attempts to redefine regional identities of Tasmania and Wales. 
1.2 The Problem of Regional Economic Development 
Regional development is a field where prevailing wisdom changes regularly with 
political currents of the day. As Donald Savoie noted in the preface to the second 
edition of Regional Economic Development: Canada's Search for Solutions, "There is 
probably no other policy field that lends itself to such dramatic shifts in direction as 
regional development policy."7 Savoie also noted the broad intellectual canvas upon 
which regional development theorists express their ideas: 
5 'bid, p 1. 
6 Better Wales see http://www.wales.gov.uk/themesbetterwales/about-e.htm,  accessed 23/5/2004. Note 
the original Better Wales document was located at http://wwwbetterwales.com . The plan has since 
been updated under the title Plan for Wales, however the original document has been archived on the 
Welsh National Assembly web site. This paper will refer to the original Better Wales plan of 1999. 
" Donald Savoie. Regional Economic Development: Canada's Search for Solutions (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1992), p vii. 
10 
It is of interest to students of economics, public policy, public administration, political 
science, sociology, geography and demography. 8 
Because the field does not fit directly into any of these disciplines, Savoie argues that 
it has suffered from neglect. Furthermore, the attention it has received has generally 
involved analysis from within a specific discipline: 
There are understandable reasons why regional development has not received the kind 
of attention one would expect from the academic community. The subject falls 
naturally into no single discipline ... A number of specialised studies on specific issues 
in regional development have been carried out, but, most have failed to look at regional 
development from a broad perspective. 9 
1.3 	Neo-Classical Approach 
The field of regional development has evolved in essentially two conflicting 
directions, or in Hettne's phrase 'development ideologies'. Nigel Harris noted that 
the 'orthodox' approach to development was based on the principles and assumptions 
of neo-classical economics, in which different countries build on areas of 
specialisation, thus creating a global economy based on interdependency. To 
orthodox theorists, therefore 
economic development could only mean working towards a given level of income, 
since each national economy would be different, depending upon its specialisation.' ° 
According to Savoie, the neo-classical approach applied the basic principles of market 
economics to regional problems. Neo-classical economics thus saw market 
imperfections as the cause of regional disparities, and problems such as 
unemployment could be overcome by allowing market forces the freedom to act, 
unencumbered by Government intervention. Government development programs 
8 Ibid, p5. 
9 Ibid, p 5. 
19 Nigel Harris. The End of the Third World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), p 14. 
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were therefore considered undesirable, not only because they are ineffective, but 
because they create additional barriers to the operation of market forces. I1 
Nom Hettne noted that the neo-classical paradigm operates in its most typical form in 
the sphere of international trade. The neo-classical approach argued that the 
principles of free trade served to spread the benefits of 'development' through the 
global economy, with competition as the driving force behind the division of labour 
and specialisation. Indeed, Hettne stated that "in the neo-classical world 
underdevelopment does not exist except as a lack of entrepreneurial spirit." I2 
1.4 	Keynesianism and the Conservative Reformers 
The great depression, which began in 1929, led to a general acknowledgement that 
neo-classical or laissez-faire economics itself could not solve the problems of 
underdeveloped economies. Attention was turned to perceived market failures within 
broad revisions of the neo-classical thesis — leading to the development of Keynesian 
economics, which advocated Government intervention in the market to smooth out the 
extremes of the business cycle. In the post second world war period, Governments 
became more interventionist as they engaged in reconstruction and 'nation building' 
activities. Hettne noted that: 
on the whole the Keynesian interventionist line of thinking became dominant in the 
field of development economics, whereas the neo-classical view was relegated to the 
backbenches.' 3 
Harris noted that the new orthodoxy in the post-war period was that of the 
'conservative reformers'. Under the 'new orthodoxy', investment was seen as the key 
to stimulating development and growth, with the role of government being to 
encourage savings and investment in industry. This could be done through taxation 
measures, which would then be invested into public infrastructure and industrial 
I I Savoie, Regional Economic Development, p 9. 
12 Bjorn Hettne. Development Theory and the Three Worlds (Harlow: Longman Group UK, 1990), p 
48. 
13 Ibid, p 48. 
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projects. A second important role for Government was in protecting the development 
of domestic industry through the application of tariffs on imports and subsidies for 
local products. I4 WA Lewis summed up this approach to economic management: 
The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the 
process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per 
cent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary 
saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent of national income or more." 
1.5 Neo-Marxist Approach 
The second stream of regional development theory is the neo-Marxist or dependency 
approach. Savoie noted that the neo-classical strand has generally placed little 
emphasis on regions or 'space', focusing instead on the system in its totality. I6 Neo-
Marxist theorists, however, generally explained regional disparities in terms of 
relationships between a centre, where monopoly capitalists have their headquarters, 
and a periphery, which is systematically exploited by the centre." The dependency 
approach is therefore 'structuralist', in that regional economic disparities are 
explained by relative positions in an economic structure. Or, as Hettne stated: 
Development for one unit could therefore lead to under-development for another, 
depending on how the two units were structurally linked." 
1.6 	Alternative Approaches 
Alternative approaches to these two major strands of development theory can 
generally be seen as variants of either, or combinations of both. The 'growth pole' 
thesis, for example, posited that regional growth can occur around a catalyst. This 
theory was developed by French economist Francois Perroux, who argued that 
economic activity tended to concentrate around certain focal points, rather than 
14 Harris, The End of the Third World, p 20. 
15 WA Lewis (1954), cited in Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds, p 52. 
16 Savoie, Regional Economic Development, p 9. 
17 Ibid p 10. 
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spreading itself throughout a region consistently. I9 Regional development can 
therefore be stimulated by strengthening these focal points, or growth poles. 
More recently, neo-classical revisionists focused on the mechanics of trade between 
regions. In a variant on the neo-classical approach, trade theory identified 
comparative advantage and specialisation as crucial to development. The focus of 
this approach, however, is on trade between regions rather than on the internal 
structure of an economy. 2° 
Other theorists have focused on the role of 'human capital' in driving economic 
growth. Richard Florida, for example, argued that innovative (or 'creative') people 
drive regional economic growth. As Chapter 2 will explain in more detail, Florida 
argued that these people are increasingly mobile, and are attracted to regions, which 
embrace a particular set of lifestyle values and options. Florida in fact identifies six 
themes or factors which members of the 'creative class' look for when making 
decision about where to live: 
• Thick labour markets; 
• Lifestyle; 
• Social Interaction; 
• Diversity; 
• Authenticity; and 
• Identity.2I 
These six factors will form the basis for the analytical framework analysis of this 
thesis. Florida's most significant insight is the recognition that the locational 
decisions made by 'creative' people are essential to creating economic growth. This 
is a major reason why image is important: if a place has an image that is attractive to 
the 'creative class' then it will attract more business leaders and develop a culture that 
is more conducive to economic growth. 
18 Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds, p 5. 
19 Francois Perroux, L'Economie du xxe siecle, p179, cited in Savoie, Regional Economic 
Development, p 6. 
20  Savoie, Regional Economic Development, p 8. 
21 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp 223-231. 
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1.7 	Thesis Outline 
In order to construct a theoretical framework that can explain the linkages between 
the concepts of identity, power and prosperity, Chapter 2 begins with a broad 
overview of selected writers on those topics. The overview of power relationships 
serves to place economic development theories into a broader context, and provides a 
link between the two key variables of identity and prosperity. The discussion of 
regional development includes reference to the work of Richard White, 22 who 
examined the changing nature of the Australian 'identity', the role that this 'identity' 
played, and the forces that created and manipulated it. White's analysis of the 
Australian national identity shows how regional identities are constructed and 
malleable, and serve to reinforce and promote the interests of certain groups. 
White's analysis raised the question of the role of power relationships in creating 
regional identities. The work of writers such as Steven Lukes 23 and John Gaventa24 
are examined to demonstrate how structural forces shape values, beliefs and 
expectations. The role of power relationships can also be seen in the context of the 
dependency school approach to regional economic development. Chapter 2 examines 
the principles of dependency theory, and considers the role of regional identity in 
supporting the 'world system', and in keeping peripheral or semi-peripheral regions in 
dependency relationships with core regions. After considering these structural 
elements, Chapter 2 will then focus on role of entrepreneurship and innovation in the 
economy. The work of a number of writers will be examined, including Max 
Weber,25 Joseph Schumpeter,26 Thorstein Veblen27 and Michael Porter. 28 Finally, 
Chapter 2 outlines Richard Florida's concept of the 'creative class', and brings 
together the various theoretical strands discussed into a broad analytical framework. 
Florida's work on the location choices of members of the 'creative class' will be 
22 Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688-1980 (Sydney: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1981). 
23 Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1974). 
24 John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1980) 
25 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1958). 
26 Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (London: Penguin Books, 1986), pp 288-310. 
27 Ibid, pp 213-248. 
28 Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations. 
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particularly important in providing the basis for a set of six criteria that can be used to 
evaluate and compare regional identities. 
The third and fourth chapters outline the two case studies - Tasmania and Wales. The 
case studies will focus on defining the 'identities' of the two regions. This will be 
achieved through examining secondary sources, such as writers who have discussed 
issues relating to regional identity in either Tasmania or Wales, and also by examining 
primary sources — in particular the Tasmania Together and Better Wales projects. 
Chapter 3 begins by examining the industrial base of the Tasmanian economy, and its 
relative economic disadvantage compared to the nearby metropolitan regions of 
continental Australia. The Tasmanian 'identity' will be considered in light of two 
distinct intellectual traditions — described as 'romantic' and 'progressive'. The 
'progressive' identity sees Tasmania as a place where industry and business can 
prosper, while the 'romantic' identity focuses on Tasmania as a refuge from the 
pollution, commercialism and hectic pace of major metropolitan centres. Chapter 3 
also argues that the Tasmania Together process attempted to find an accommodation 
between the 'romantic' and 'progressive' images. 
Chapter 4 follows a similar structure to the preceding chapter, beginning by 
examining the industrial basis of the Welsh economy, and the economic disparities 
between Wales and its regional neighbours — particularly England. Unlike Tasmania, 
the Welsh identity reflects a long historical tradition. Nevertheless, it can be seen that 
the cultural and political dominance of England, and the resulting lack of a uniquely 
Welsh political voice, has thwarted the development of Welsh nationalism and 
contributed to intra-regional differences within Wales. Chapter 4 argues that central 
components of the Welsh identity include Welsh industrial heritage, a tradition of 
'classlessness' and the associated traditional concept of the gwerin' , the rural Welsh 
environment and the Welsh language. This chapter argues that the Better Wales plan 
can be seen as an attempt to redefine the historical Welsh identity to reflect a more 
modern, autonomous Wales — a region that considers itself as a member of the New 
Europe rather than as a British Principality. It is also argued that Better Wales 
attempts to overcome Welsh intra-regional differences, and thus promotes a greater 
sense of Welsh nationalism. Better Wales also identified some of the causes of Welsh 
16 
economic dependency, and highlighted the need for the development of a more 
entrepreneurial culture. 
The fifth chapter applies the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter to 
the two case studies. By applying the six criteria derived from Florida, this chapter 
evaluates how successfully the Tasmanian and Welsh identities have embraced the 
concepts of innovation, entrepreneurship and change. For Tasmania, data from the 
Australian Local Government Association's State of the Regions29 report is used to 
analyse the Tasmanian identity in relation to the six criteria highlighted by Florida 
and used as the basis of the analytical framework. Chapter 5 also identifies strengths 
and weaknesses in the regional identities of the two case studies, and briefly discusses 
the types of policy measures that could be developed to capitalise on those strengths 
or address the weaknesses. Furthermore, Chapter 5 also considers the strengths and 
weaknesses of the analytical framework, such as an apparent 'urban bias' in Florida's 
creative class approach. 
The conclusion returns to the central themes of the thesis and discusses how the 
theoretical framework adds to the field of regional economic development. 
Furthermore, the conclusion discusses whether or not the framework and case studies 
support the argument that regions that embrace innovation, change and 
entrepreneurship are more likely to achieve positive economic outcomes. The 
conclusion also addresses the relevance of PJ O'Rourke's irreverent question about 
the causes of economic disparity, and considers lessons learnt from the case studies. 
29 National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report 2002- 
03. 
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Chapter 2 - Constructing Regional 
Identities: An Analytical Framework 
This chapter examines the concepts of regional identity, power and economic 
development. Firstly, this chapter will show that regional identities are constructed 
through the interplay of a number of forces. It will show that regional identities are 
malleable, and tend to reflect power interests. Secondly, this chapter will examine the 
concept of power and power relationships, and the role of power relationships in the 
global economic system. Thirdly, this chapter will examine role of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in economic development, with specific reference to Richard 
Florida's concept of the 'creative class'. Finally, this chapter will draw together these 
various theoretical strands to show the links between the three concepts, and to outline 
a number of criteria that can be used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a 
region's identity. 
2.1 	Regional Identity 
Richard White, in his study of the Australian national identity Inventing Australia, 
stated that "a national identity is an invention." 30 Moreover, White argued that 
national identities were a product of the interplay of various forces acting to influence 
public perceptions, and explained the role that identities play in shaping the values 
and expectations that people associate with a specific place. In relation to Australia, 
White argued that the Australian national identity has been invented and reinvented 
constantly since before European colonisation: 
There is no point asking whether one version of this essential Australia is truer than 
another because they are all intellectual constructs, neat, tidy, comprehensible — and 
necessarily false. They have all been artificially imposed on a diverse landscape and 
population, and a variety of untidy social relationships, attitudes and emotions. When 
30 Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1788-1980 (Sydney: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1981), p viii. 
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we look at ideas about national identity, we need to ask, not whether they are true of 
false, but what their function is, whose creation they are, and whose interests they 
serve.31 
White stated that Australian national identity is the product of three forces. Firstly, 
the national identity is developed "within a framework of modern western ideas about 
science, nature, race, society, [and] nationality." 32 The second force that influences 
the development of the national identity is "the intelligentsia, or that class of people — 
writers, artists, journalists, historians, critics — most part responsible for its 
definition."33 The third force, according to White, is "those groups in society which 
wield economic power."34 
These forces, according to White, are not united - in fact they often compete to define 
the national identity. This contest requires the various players to cloak their own 
interests in the guise of the national interest: 
In this view of the world there is no room for class conflicts, and sexual and racial 
exploitations are obscured. The 'national interest' must appear to work for the good of 
al1.35 
Furthermore, this competition becomes one of the major reasons for the changing 
nature of national identities — "the result is that the national identity is continually 
being fractured, questioned and redefined."36 
To demonstrate, White's analysis of Australia's national identity starts with the image 
of Botany Bay as 'hell on earth' - the image that created to deter crime in eighteenth 
century Britain: 
an image of exaggerated horror was an essential element in the penal system of the day, 
which was based on the belief that the severity of the punishment, rather than the 
Ibid, p viii. 
32 Ibid p ix. 
33 Ibid, p ix. 
34 Ibid, p ix. 
35 	• 	• p 1X. 
36 Jbid pp ix-x. 
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likelihood of being caught, was the most effective deterrent to crime... Along with 
Hell and the gallows, Botany Bay was used to frighten children into being good and 
displaying the great virtue of the day, industry, temperance and humility. 37 
White noted that stories of Botany Bay achieved notoriety in popular British culture 
of the time. Building on public demand for stories of lewd or titillating subject 
matter, tales of thieves and prostitutes thrived, but with the offenders ultimately facing 
the sanction of transportation for their crimes. For example, White stated that: 
books were pandering to a taste of the low life in London and of violence in Botany 
Bay, and were published in the hope of commercial success. Yet they reinforced the 
moral and economic function of Botany Bay as a weapon in the control of working 
class crime in Britain. 38 
This image was soon challenged by one that served a different function, and presented 
a radically different version of the antipodean penal colony: the new image was of the 
'workingman's paradise' - a land of plenty and of opportunity, where virtually anyone 
could find prosperity. White stated that "no longer a land of convicts and kangaroos, 
Australia was now depicted as the land of the emigrant." 39 
The transformation of Australia from hell to paradise reflected the colony's new-
found wealth and status from the success of its wool industry. To many einancipists 
and free settlers, Australia was a land of opportunity - not only for wealth, but for 
achievement of social status. With the rapid growth of the colony came a pressing 
problem however: an increasing demand for labour that could no longer be met purely 
by the convict system. The solution was clear - attract people to migrate of their own 
free will. Thus the rags-to-riches stories of the English failure turned colonial 
magnate assumed the status of mythology, and served to attract thousands of people to 
the colony. Australia became a beacon of hope for many who dreamed of a more 
egalitarian, poverty-less, or agrarian society. In effect, Australia took on an Arcadian 
image that was 'other' to the grime, pollution and poverty of the newly industrialised 
England. 
37 [bid, p 17. 
Ibid, p 20. 
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To reinforce this image, and to remove the stigma of the earlier 'hell on earth' image, 
colonial authorities sought to replace the existing nomenclature. At the suggestion of 
Matthew Flinders, the name Australia became accepted for the continent as a whole, 
while the colonial outposts of Moreton Bay and Van Diemen's Land became known 
as Queensland and Tasmania respectively. The Gold Rush of the 1850s added further 
to the image of Australia as a land of hope and upward social mobility. White states 
that 
From the 1830s until the 1890s, the image of Australia as a land of opportunity for all-
comers remained the popular, and it was one which was encouraged by colonial 
employers seeking labour.4° 
White argued that as the 19th century progressed, the colony sought to distance itself 
from the mother country and establish an image of `Australianness.' The driving 
force behind the establishment of a distinctive Australian identity in this period was, 
according to White, the local manufacturing industry, which sought to promote the 
consumption of locally-made goods. This was essentially the first 'buy Australian' 
campaign - but before an appeal to nationalism could be pitched, a sense of 
nationalism had to be developed in the community: 
From the 1870s on, a self-confessed local patriotism developed, often linked with the 
emergence of local manufacturing, which had an obvious interest in endorsing the 
product. In 1871 the Australian Natives Association was formed, partly in opposition 
to the idea that all colonial men of mark were immigrants. Led by young businessmen, 
it became more influential in the 1880s, when it supported Australia's own imperialist 
adventures in New Guinea and the Pacific, and introduced the slogan 'Australia for 
Australians.4 ' 
Ibid, p 29. 
40 Ibid, pp 35-36. 
41 Ibid, pp 73-75. 
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By developing a new sense of Australian nationalism therefore, local manufacturers 
were able to consolidate their domestic markets, and even charge a price premium for 
their products. The national identity therefore involved more than simply pride in 
being Australian, however, as it had to also engender a sense that Australians, and 
Australian products, were in some way superior. 
White noted that the notion of the 'brave diggers' in World War I assisted in the 
construction of the national identity, and gave the Australian identity a sense of 
hardiness, strength and resilience. At the same time as the legend of the Australian 
digger was being formed, similar processes were at work in other countries, such as 
Canada. Indeed, many countries in the 'new world' that were settled during the same 
period as Australia followed similar paths with the development of their own national 
identities: 
It was accepted, both in Europe and in the new societies themselves, that they all — the 
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, southern Africa, occasionally 
Argentina, Uruguay and other parts of South America — had much in common. Words 
such as brash, young, egalitarian, materialistic, provincial, braggart, were applied to all 
of them. They were commonly thought of as children of Britain or Europe, as strapping 
sons, dutiful daughters or juvenile delinquents. Politically they were considered 'in 
advance' of Europe or the 'Old World': oppressive and decadent, but also sophisticated 
and intellectually intimidating, the old world could be sentimentalised or identified with 
poverty and privilege. 42 
James Jupp also recognised the forces at play in the development of Australian 
mythologies. Jupp noted that "Australia did not share the ancient (if often imaginary) 
ethnic histories of Europe not the heroic traditions of the French and American 
revolutions:43  Without these historical traditions, Jupp argued that the Australian 
national identity "had to be created out of less inspiring material than was true for 
most nation-states in the northern hemisphere."'" 
42 Ibid, p 48. 
43 James Jupp, "Does Australia Need a National Identity", in David Day (Ed) Australian Identities 
(Kew, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1998), p 225. 
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While White found that national identities are constructed are serve important 
economic and social roles, Jupp argued that national identities are today coming under 
increasing pressures from a number of global trends, such as increasing international 
migration, increasing free trade and the growth of the global media. Jupp stated that 
There is vast literature pointing out that the nation-state, nationalism and national 
identity are all creations of the eighteenth century, while ethnic distinctiveness is much 
older. Much debate in Europe and North America is now moving towards the position 
that the nation-state era is drawing to a close and that national boundaries are crumbling 
under the influence of globalisation and of such regional arrangements as the European 
Union or the North America Free Trade Association. 45 
Jupp argued that under this pressure, ethnic and regional identities have taken on 
greater significance. Furthermore, Jupp stated that while the notion of the 'nation 
state' was under challenge — 
At the same, minority nationalisms have become increasingly vocal, especially in the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe where they challenge the successor states of the pre-1914 
empires. As the nation-state declines, ethnic distinctiveness becomes more vocal. 
Britain is sinking back into an orgy of xenophobia as Europe protects itself from British 
beef. The United States has just built a wall at San Diego to keep out the Mexicans 
with whom it is supposed to be trading freely. Meanwhile, in the southern hemisphere, 
Australia dithers over whether it is 'part of Asia' while a recent school survey showed 
that a majority of secondary school students could not identify a single Asian country 
on a world map.46 
Paul James identified two conflicting international trends acting on national identities. 
According to James, the immediacy of the electronic media has given rise to renewed 
levels of patriotism. For example: 
When our sporting heroes cover the nation with reflected glory, or when our defence 
forces carry the national flag into somebody else's territory, we can all 'be there', on 
45 Ibid, p 224. 
46 Ibid, p 225. 
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the wings of the television. Over the past few decades, this media of immediacy has 
underscored a new nationalism.'" 
Like Jupp, however, James also saw challenges to the nation state in the effects of 
`globalisation' and the revival of regional and ethnic identities. James stated that this 
"new nationalism" had a "febrile fragility": 
The long-term, uneven thinning out of day-to-day life has, in conjunction with other 
factors sharpened by the capitalist mode of production and exchange, such as regional 
economic disparities and cultural divisions of labour, contributed to a 'new' emphasis 
on ethnicity, local culture, regional difference and the existence of hitherto politically 
"unrealised nations" within the hinterlands of existing nation-states. 48 
In this changing global environment, the discussion of identity is therefore not just 
confined to nation states, but is equally important to regions within nation states. 
Furthermore, the role of institutions such as the media, and particularly the electronic 
media, are crucial in shaping both national and regional identities. Jupp argued that 
The definition of a national identity rests with several agents: the media, the educational 
system, governments, intellectuals, special interests and groups. Each of these operates 
within an intellectual climate created in the past, upon a public opinion that is often 
poorly informed, and within ideological parameters which are often invisible to even 
the well-informed. 49 
Indeed, the 'intellectual climate' and the 'ideological parameters' surrounding a 
national or regional identity need to be explored in order to understand how regional 
identities are formed and why. These issues were explored by a numbers of writers 
on the subject of 'power' — such as Steven Lukes and Robert Gaventa, who explored 
how power shapes value, beliefs and expectations in communities. 
47 Paul James, "National Form and Popular Culture," in Stephen Alomes and Dirk den Hartog (Eds), 
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2.2 The Three Dimensions of Power 
The word power can mean a number of different things in conversation, and also has 
been used to describe different things in sociology and political science. Many 
theorists have found defining the concept to be problematic. Indeed, William E 
Connolly identified power as an "essentially contested concept". 5° According to 
Gallie, such contested concepts "essentially involve endless disputes about their 
proper uses on the part of their users."5I 
The concept of power has also been used interchangeably with concepts such as force, 
influence and authority. 52 Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby established a 
straightforward definition, which Lukes later termed the 'one-dimensional' approach 
to power. Dahl stated that: 
My intuitive idea of power is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. 53 
Writers such as Dahl and Polsby, who specifically developed their theories to explain 
the 'pluralist' American political system, saw power as being diffused and dispersed. 
The pluralists argued that, while some people may have more of it than some others, 
power is contestable and not necessarily restricted to a given elite. The focus of the 
pluralists is on observable actions rather than more subtle aspects of power, for, as 
Lukes noted, "how can one study, let alone explain, what does not happen." 54 The 
study of observable behaviour enabled the pluralists to utilise operational definitions 
and cite observable evidence. The down-side of this approach, however, was the 
pluralist's inability to account for less visible uses of power. 
50 William E Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1974), 
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Following the pluralists, theorists such as Peter Bachrach and Morton l3aratz 
attempted to go beyond the analysis of observable behaviour to include the 
phenomenon of 'non-decisions'. Bachrach and Baratz also explored related concepts 
such as influence, force and authority. While retaining the core concept of a 'conflict 
of values' between A and B, Bachrach and Baratz's view of power included the tacit 
threat of sanction to motivate B's compliance with A. Power in this sense is distinct 
from force which involves the actual use of a sanction to achieve A's will over B in 
the face of non-compliance. Force is therefore used when power has failed. 55 
Bachrach and Baratz also stated that "the other side of the coin is non-decision 
making."56 Non-decision making differs from deciding not to act, as it refers to a 
situation where a 'mobilisation of bias' acts to keep an issue off the public agenda, 
and therefore no decision is to be made. The mobilisation of bias is used to keep an 
issue 'latent', and therefore disregarded by decision makers. The presence of a 
mobilisation of bias suggests some level of activity by an elite to ensure that the 
interests of the elite are suppressed. Lukes, however believed that Bachrach and 
Baratz's analysis did not go far enough, as it did not reveal how institutions can 
prevent interests from being articulated (or even formulated) without requiring an 
elite to act. 
Matthew Crenson, in his study The Un-Politics of Air Pollution, noted that "the 
reputation for power may have been more important than its exercise." 57 Similarly, 
Michael Parenti noted that 
One of the most important aspects of power is not to prevail in a struggle - [but] to 
determine whether certain questions ever reach the competition stage.58 
Steven Lukes sought to take the subject of power further into the field of political 
sociology, using Crenson's argument as a starting point. Lukes redefined power by 
55 Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions, p636. 
56 Ibid, p641. 
57 Matthew A Crenson, The Un-politics ofAir Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision kraking in Cities 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971), pp 130-180. 
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arguing that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner that is contrary 
to B's interests. 59 Here Lukes entered potentially dangerous epistemological territory, 
for how can it be possible to determine what the unarticulated interests of an 
individual are? To suggest that an individual is unaware of his or her own true 
interest seems to invoke the notion of a 'false consciousness', or at least suggests that 
the intellectual occupies a privileged position in determining such interests. 
Lukes stated that 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he 
also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. 6° 
By shaping the wants of B, A effectively avoids a conflict of interest with B. Lukes, 
however, still considered the notion of conflict of interest as being integral to the 
power relationship. He argued that the elite was able to, in Milliband's terms, 
"engineer consent" by shaping the needs and wants of the non-elite. 
John Gaventa, 61 a student of Lukes, took the proposition that elites are able to shape 
perceptions of interests to explain the observable phenomenon of quiescence among 
non-elites in the face of considerable adversity. Gaventa's study of quiesence in 
Appalachian mining communities also demonstrated how power and identity can be 
linked through the first, second, and third dimensions of power. 
According to Gaventa, the third dimension of power approach suggested that a 
conflict of interests between local non-elites and absentee elites was the principal 
factor behind the quiescence of the Appalachian community to the economic and 
social disadvantages they faced. For example, Gaventa argued that 
58 Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View From the Bottom," in Journal of Politics, 32 
(1970), pp 501-530. 
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61 John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1980), 
p 15. 
27 
Power serves to maintain prevailing order of inequality not only through institutional 
barriers but also through the shaping of beliefs about the order's legitimacy or 
immutability. 62 
In Gaventa's Appalachian case study, the traditional identity of the local workers was 
seen as an impediment to economic and social development, as it became a symbol of 
backwardness, lack of sophistication, and in itself a symbol of powerlessness. Citing 
Coleman McCalister, Gaventa succinctly defined the image of the Appalachian miner: 
Historically, in fact, the miners of the region in comparison with other American miners 
have had the image of 'docile diggers' 63 
According to Gaventa, the identity of Appalachia and its residents was significantly 
different prior to the beginning of the coal mining boom of the 1890s. Gaventa states 
that the initial influxes of American settlers were 'frontiersmen', looking for new land 
and opportunities for rural industry and lifestyle. 64 With the industrial boom in 
Appalachia, however, the frontier agrarian identity was subsumed by a new identity, 
characterised by hard work, technological progress and the triumph of a new breed of 
mountain men over nature. 
The displacement of the old identity placed the local communities at a disadvantage, 
as they were seen as members of a past order that no longer had relevance or utility. 
The future of Appalachia was seen to be in the new investors, and the existing 
Appalachian communities were therefore seen as redundant. The new identity also 
promoted the ethic of hard physical labour, and promoted the lifestyle of the hard-
working miner as a virtuous. Gaventa noted that 
The exaggerated attractiveness of the industrial order, on one hand, carried with it the 
degradation of the culture and society of the mountaineers, on the other ... For instance, 
while the new Middleboro was said to represent 'true social enjoyments', 'health', a 
Tine climate, natural beauty' and 'good things', the older culture was said to consist of 
62 ,, • ,, p 42. 
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64 Ibid, p 49. 
28 
'wilder mountaineers', who were 'usually not attractive', but were 'rather yellow and 
cadaverous looking, owing to their idle an shiftless ways, and the bad food upon which 
they subsist, and perhaps also to their considerable consumption of moonshine 
whiskey' 65 
Gaventa found that the new Appalachian identity encouraged men to take on the role 
of the hardworking miner, and equally deterred them from reverting to the 
'backwardness' of the non-mining community. This change in perceptions echoes 
what White found in Australia - not only that identities change over time, but that 
prevailing power interests can effectively rewrite history by redefining previous 
identities. 
Gaventa also cited a study into the uptake of health care service by Couto to 
demonstrate that the acceptance of myths about identity and role affected the 
behaviour of individuals: 
Couto suggests that not only are myths used to defer grievances about health care, but 
they also may affect beliefs on the non-elite about their roles in relationship to the 
medical professionals: 'acceptance of attributed identity instils myth with its greatest 
power, the power to go unquestioned' •66 
Like White, Gaventa thus recognised that identity can be manipulated and 
manufactured - and is not inherent in a community or a region. Because identity is 
shaped by the third dimension of power, the community accepts identity as inherent, 
and does question how it came to be, or why. In the case of the Appalachian miners, 
the accepted identity of 'docile diggers' was shown by Gaventa to be a major factor in 
their quiescence to under-development and poverty. 
A range of theorists broadly referred to as post-structuralist or post-modernist also 
took up the concept of power. These included writers such as Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault and Edward Said. Said focussed much of his work on the concept of 
Ibid, p65. 
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the 'orient' and `orientalism' as a representation of non-western culture and 
civilisation.67 In essence, Said argued that the 'orient' was defined by the 'west' (or 
'occident') as representing the 'other' to itself. Said stated that 
The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe, it is also the place of Europe's greatest and 
richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilisations and languages, its cultural 
contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, 
the Orient helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, 
personality, experience. 68 
As a result of the creation of an 'oriental discourse,' Said argued that "European 
culture gained in strength and identity by selling itself off against the Orient as a sort 
of surrogate and even underground self." 69 Nevertheless, Said tempered his 
construction of the orientalism by stating that it was not "representative and 
expressive of some nefarious 'Western' imperialist plot to hold down the 'Oriental' 
world,"7° and was "a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding 
relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an 
uneven exchange with various kinds of power ..." 71 
2.3 	Structural Approaches 
The work of Lukes and Gaventa shows how the third dimension of power acts to 
shape and define regional identity. Moreover, Gaventa shows how social structures 
and institutions play an important role in facilitating the exercise of the third 
dimension of power. This focus on structural elements in the use of power shares 
similarities with the structural approach taken by dependency school writers into the 
causes of regional economic disparities. The fundamental concepts behind these 
structural approaches developed from the Marxist explanation of the conflict inherent 
in the capitalist system. While Marx did not write about power explicitly, the concept 
67 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 1995 [c1978]). 
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69 Ibid,p2. 
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is nevertheless central to his work. To Marx, power was seated in material 
possessions - those who have access to scarce resources, such as capital and land, 
have the power to control the actions of those without such access. This economic 
power enables A to exploit B for further material gain, thus consolidating and 
perpetuating the power relationship. 72 
John McGowan highlighted the link between Marx and Lukes in relation to the third 
dimension of power: 
Marx shows little interest in Lukes' second dimension, but his notion of 'ruling ideas' 
involves a jump from the first to third. This notion of an imposed ideology, which 
explains the 'false consciousness' of a non-revolutionary working class, has proved a 
useful way for twentieth-century Marxism to explain the proletariat's lack of 
enthusiasm for socialism. 73 
Furthermore, Lukes also noted the utility of Marx's notion of false consciousness in 
relation to explaining the third dimension of power. Lukes stated that a problem with 
the second dimension was that "to assume that the absence of grievance equals 
genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat."74 Moreover, Lukes identified a the concept of "latent 
conflict" within the third dimension of power: 
What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between 
the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. 
These latter may not express of even be conscious of their interests ... 75 
There are two particular elements of the Marxist framework that are important in the 
context of this thesis. Firstly, Marx identified power as an economic relationship, and 
drew a picture of how the economically-powerful exploit the economically-weak. 
Secondly, he exposed the role social institutions play in establishing a 'false 
71 Ibid, p 12. 
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consciousness'. Marx's notion of false consciousness (in a class) is comparable to the 
notion of collective identity in a region, particularly if a region can be defined by 
economic class as well as geography. 76 
The Marxist model has been developed and refined in different ways by many `neo-
Marxist' theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein. 77 Wallerstein's core-periphery or 
dependency model focused on the relationship between colonial powers and their 
colonised states. Wallerstein's model, which he developed to explain how capitalism 
became the dominant in the 17th century, described 'four stages of growth' through 
which northwest Europe was able to forge a new global economic system. 
Wallerstein also identified four types of region reflecting different positions in 
relation to the global economic system — core, periphery, semi-periphery and 
external:78 
According to Wallerstein core regions (or metropoles) are the hub of the system. 
Core regions contain large bureaucracies, effective military organisations, and a 
bourgeoisie that controls the mechanisms of international commerce. Peripheral 
regions lack strong governments and military strength, and often are, or were, 
controlled by core regions as colonies. They also export raw materials to the core, 
and have lower labour costs than the core (historically through the use of slavery or 
other exploitative arrangements). 79 As core regions historically controlled 
international trade, they were able to establish unequal trading relations with 
peripheral regions. Subsequently, wealthy aristocracies grew in peripheral regions out 
of the trading relationship with the core. This aristocracy consolidated the system, 
and therefore its own privileged position by consolidating local exploitative labour 
arrangements. 
Semi-peripheries lie, as the name suggests, between the core and peripheral regions 
on this economic 'ladder'. Wallerstein saw these regions as either cores in decline, 
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peripheries attempting to improve their position, or buffer zones between the two 
extremes. The role of the semi-peripheries, according to Wallerstein, is essentially a 
political one, in that it exists to maintain the stability of the overall system. 
Essentially, Wallerstein argues that semi-peripheries act as a buffer zone between 
cores and peripheries, diffusing the natural tendency towards a polarised economic 
order of haves and have-nots: 
The existence of the third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced 
with the unified opposition of all the others because the middle stratum is both exploited 
and exploiter. 80 
The fourth category, external areas, describes nations that have managed to stay 
outside the global capitalist system. For example, aboriginal societies in North 
America, South America and Australia and Asia were outside the world-system prior 
to the extension of colonialism into those areas. 81 
The notion of cores and peripheries in the global economy is now widely accepted. 
For example, billionaire financier George Soros used the core-periphery analogy to 
depict the international financial system, and to describe the disadvantages faced by 
developing nations: 
Global financial markets work like a gigantic circulatory system, sucking up capital into 
the financial institutions and markets at the centre, then pumping it out to the periphery 
either directly, in the form of credits and portfolio investments, or indirectly through 
multinational corporations... But the system is subject to breakdown. Financial crises 
affect the centre and the periphery very differently. When a breakdown endangers the 
international financial system, action will be taken to protect it. This gives countries at 
the centre a large measure of protection. The same does not apply to countries at the 
periphery; they may suffer catastrophic consequences. 82 
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The world-system approach provides an alternative explanation to the nature of 
economic problems in third-world countries, but also has implications for the study of 
power and its role in framing the economic system. Wallerstein's three-tiered system 
can be applied to the world economy as a whole without regard to national borders. 
According to Wallerstein, economic cores, semi-peripheries and peripheries can all 
exist within nation-states. The common problems of so-called 'regional areas' can be 
explained as the results of core-periphery relationships, as regional areas are by 
definition peripheral to economic metropoles. Essentially, peripheries are 
disadvantaged in an economic power relationship with the 'core'. 
Wallerstein's model also has implications for the study of regional identity, as he 
recognised the importance of culture in maintaining the system in equilibrium. In 
explaining the framework behind his world-systems analysis, Wallerstein defined 
'culture' as the traits that mark a particular 'group' of individuals as connected to each 
other, yet apart from the whole: 
The basic model is that each person may be described in three ways: the universal 
characteristic of the specie, the sets of characteristics that define that person as a 
member of a series of groups, that person's idiosyncratic characteristics. When we talk 
of traits which are neither universal nor idiosyncratic we often use the term 'culture'. 
To describe the collection of such traits, or of such behaviours, or of such values, or of 
such beliefs. In short, in this usage, eaeh 'group' has its specific 'culture' ... 
[Furthermore] each person participates in many cultures. 83 
In the capitalist system, however, Wallerstein identified a crucial cultural value that is 
necessary to maintain the economic system - a demand for 'newness'. Wallerstein 
argued that the engine of the capitalist system was the accumulation of capital — and 
this demands constant change within the system. Goods, capital and manpower need 
to circulate, and production needs to evolve to meet the continual demand of returns 
against the threat of competition. Wallerstein stated that: 
83 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modem World System," in 
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One principal consequence of this reality is the enormous emphasis placed within the 
modern world-system on the virtues of 'newness'. No previous historical system has 
ever been based on a theory of progress, indeed a theory of inevitable progress." 
This demand for newness can also be described as an imperative for innovation. The 
need for change Wallerstein's model places pressure on people to constantly revise 
existing ways of doing things, and places a low value on traditional behaviour, in 
especially in regard to commerce. It also implies that conservative cultures, or groups 
that do not embrace innovation as a way of life, are at an economic disadvantage to 
those who do fulfil the systemic imperative for newness. 
According to Wallerstein, the capitalist system requires a supporting culture to 
prevent the inherent contradictions and complexities within it from pulling it apart. 
The supporting culture therefore has a specific purpose, and cannot be considered as 
impartial or as disconnected form the economic system: 
Since it is obvious that interests fundamentally diverge, it follows that such 
constructions of 'culture' are scarcely neutral. Therefore, the very construction of 
cultures becomes a battleground, the key ideological battleground in fact of the 
opposing interests within this historical system. 85 
The essential point is that culture is constructed by power interests, and in particular 
by groups wielding economic power. If culture is the battleground, the winners are 
those who best bend culture in their own interests. Furthermore, cultures that 
recognise that the demand for 'newness' or change is central to the economic system 
are better placed to prosper within the world system. 
84 Ibid, p 264. 
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2.4 	Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Change 
Wallerstein was not the first theorist to draw a link between to culture and economic 
development. Max Weber's 1905 essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism86 ascribed the rise of European capitalism during the reformation period to 
changes in the cultural landscape of the time. Specifically, Weber argued that Roman 
Catholicism was antagonistic towards the accumulation of capital. Protestantism 
however, and more so Calvinism, encouraged both thrift and dedication to a 'calling' 
(or `beruf'). Weber noted that largely Protestant countries recorded better economic 
results than largely Catholic countries during and after the reformation. 
According to Sandra Pierotti, Weber saw capitalism as more than simply the 
accumulation of wealth: 
In fact, Weber insisted that capitalism was the triumph of rationality over tradition. 
Explicit in his view of capitalism were a disciplined labor force and the regularized 
investment of capital. Weber asserted that this combination took place only in Europe 
and most strongly in Protestant nations, such as England, Holland, and Germany, where 
there were influential groups of protestant sects. 87 
The two key elements to the success of Protestant countries were the 'work-and-save' 
ethic, and the notion of 'calling'. Weber claimed that a dedication to pride in one's 
work was essential to developing productive attitudes in workers. The Calvinist ethic 
of 'godliness', through the humble dedication to one's calling, meant that economic 
productivity was consequently higher in Protestant communities. In contrast, the 
upward-mobility that was possible in hierachial Catholic societies meant people 
approached their jobs only as stepping stones to higher and better positions. 
Furthermore, people in Catholic communities tended to dedicate minimal attention to 
tasks they considered to be beneath their dignity. Consequently, Catholic 
communities were less productive. 88 
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According to Weber, Catholic communities were more willing to tolerate the 'sins' of 
wealth and of displaying earthly good. Protestant communities took the virtue of 
thrift more seriously than their Catholic counterparts, as the Protestant Church had no 
power to forgive earthly sins. The higher productivity of the Protestants essentially 
meant that they earned more than the Catholics, and they saved more as wel1. 89 
Higgins and Savoie stated that, according to Weber, Calvinism then turned the 
making of money into something that was not only humble, but Godly: 
The net result was to justify the pursuit of wealth, provided that happened to be one's 
'calling'. Poverty was not required, but the pursuit of riches of riches must not lead one 
to reckless enjoyment. Profits are as holy as wages, and interest is not wrong unless 
wrung from the poor. The cardinal sin is idleness." 
The Weberian thesis may have many shortcomings, and clearly cannot be considered 
the definitive explanation of the rise of capitalism. 9I Weber did however, identify the 
crucial role of culture in shaping the economic behaviour of groups. Weber explains 
how a system of beliefs, forming a shared culture (and hence an identity) can dictate 
patterns of spending, saving, and of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Higgins and Savoie drew lessons from Weber and others such as RH Tawney and 
applied them to the development of capitalism in recent times. While it was 
acknowledged that formal religion alone cannot explain discrepancies in prosperity 
and income between regions, Higgins and Savoie noted the Weber-Tawney, arguing 
that 
there remains a rough rank correlation between dominant religion and per capita 
incomes (Protestant, Catholic, Communist, Muslim, Hindu-Buddhist, Animist and 
Pagan, etc).92 
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Higgins and Savoie argued that religion could be seen as part of broader picture, in 
which cultural factors influence prosperity. Higgins and Savoie stated that 
many social scientists believe that development is aided and abetted by a generally-held 
ideology of a sort that provides a unifying force and encourages entrepreneurship - as 
the Communist ideology did yesterday and as the 18th-19th century liberal ideology has 
done in the past. 93 
Joseph Schumpeter built on Weber's theoretical links between culture and economic 
growth. In his first major work, The Theory of Economic Development, 94 Schumpeter 
identified entrepreneurship as a key driver of economic growth. Schumpeter argued 
that in a model of a static capitalist system, where no profits were made and the value 
of production flowed back to the factors of production, there was no force to drive the 
development of capitalism. The missing ingredient in such a model, according to 
Schumpeter, was innovation, which redirected the flow of capital in the otherwise 
static system. 95 
Robert Heilboner, himself a student of Schumpeter at Harvard University, noted that 
the introduction of innovation into the system enabled an innovating capitalist to 
produce the same goods as his competitors, but at a cheaper cost. 96 Advantages 
gained through innovation, however, could only be temporary, as competitors are able 
to imitate and also innovate. To continue to receive profits, therefore, the capitalist 
must continue to innovate. This is a constant pressure, forcing change and newness 
and driving growth in the economy. 
Schumpeter went further to examine and describe the role of the entrepreneur as a 
member of an intellectual elite, although not necessarily a member of the bourgeoisie. 
According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is a special type of leader, but 
92 Ibid, p 36. 
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nevertheless an unpopular character. The entrepreneur is ambitious, a social climber, 
not born into an elite group, but a person who makes his own wealth. As such he or 
she moves beyond the social scene of the less-wealthy, but does not find acceptance 
in the ranks of the already-wealthy. 97 
The Schumpeterian entrepreneur, which Heilbroner called a 'romantic figure', aspires 
to membership of the bourgeoisie, but does not fit comfortably, and may not even 
benefit personally from the profit he creates. Without the entrepreneur, however, the 
economic system stagnates. Indeed, innovations are quickly followed by imitations, 
so the need for new innovations to keep the system moving is imperative. 98 
Higgins and Savioe noted that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur was a product of a 
complex socio-economic system. 
In Schumpeter's system the supply of entrepreneurship is the ultimate determining 
factor of the rate of economic growth. This supply in turn depends on the 'social 
climate', a complex phenomenon reflecting the whole social, political, socio-
psychological atmosphere within which entrepreneurs must operate. It would include 
the social values of a particular country at a particular time, the class structure, the 
educational system, the attitude of society toward business success, and the nature and 
extent of the prestige and other social rewards, apart from profit, which accompany 
business success in the society. 99 
Schumpeter, like Wallerstein, thus identified innovation as the key factor in 
maintenance of the capitalist economy. He logically then identified the 
entrepreneurial innovator as the key actor in the system. Beyond that, Schumpeter 
also highlighted the role of culture, or 'social climate' in producing entrepreneurs. 
The complex interplay of social relations not only produces such entrepreneurs, it 
motivated their behaviour by providing appropriate rewards. If the social climate was 
unstable, or the rules of the game were unclear or changeable, then insufficient reward 
would exist to motivate innovation and the system would stagnate. 
97 Ibid, p 295. 
98 Ibid, p 295. 
99 Ben Higgins and Donald Savoie, Regional Development Theories and the Application, p 37. 
39 
The 'Institutionalist School', led by Thorstein Veblen, approached the issue of 
economic development from a slightly different perspective that valued scientific 
innovation and downplayed the role of culture. In fact, Veblen saw cultural factors as 
a being a hindering rather than an enabling factor in the economic system. Veblen 
formed his thesis from observations of the American economic system at the turn of 
the century, which had been dominated by the lawless capitalism of the so-called 
'robber barons'. I°° 
Higgins and Savoie noted that 
For Veblen as for the Classical School the rate of economic progress was also the 
outcome of a contest ... between technological progress and irrational, magical, and 
ceremonial resistance to technological change - socio-cultural obstacles, if one chooses. 
Here Veblen identifies one of today's major development problems: science and 
technology are the forces of progress; cultural lags, superstitious fears, ceremonial 
patterns, ingrown conservatism of thought and action are the opponents of progress.' ° ' 
Veblen's distinction between technological progress and its antithesis, cultural 
resistance to change, presents a simple answer to the development problem. But 
Veblen did not pretend that it could be so simple, for technological progress was at 
the mercy of an even more basic human motivation - greed. To Veblen, the real 
villains of the system were not the conservative, change-resisting public, but greedy 
businessman, appropriating all they could for themselves, and stifling technological 
progress. Heilbroner also noted that Veblen considered businessmen to be essentially 
predators - "however much they or their apologists might drape their activities in the 
elaborate rationale of supply or demand." 1°2 
Like both Schumpeter and Wallerstein, Veblen identified innovation as a central 
driver of the economic system, but essentially saw people as a hindrance to 
innovation. Given that Veblen was observing the actual behaviour of actors in 
particular temporal and physical setting, that is late 19th century America, his 
negative view of entrepreneurs is perhaps understandable. What Veblen failed to take 
'°° Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, p 239. 
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account of, however, was the surrounding 'social climate', which was very much a 
frontier culture, without the social and institutional framework to temper its brutality. 
As the social climate changed, the age of the 'robber baron' passed, and contrary to 
Veblen's thesis, the age of the technocrat or the engineer did not replace 
entrepreneurial capitalism. 103 
The value of Veblen's analysis should not be discounted. Veblen provides an incisive 
account of the economic system at a point in time. Indeed, Veblen's analysis can be 
taken as further evidence of the role that the social climate, or culture plays in shaping 
an economy. The peculiar cultural climate prevailing in the world's first truly free 
market society created an economic 'wild west', in which Veblen's 'leisure-class' 
acted without constraint. In other economies of that time with more developed 
economic and social institutions, such as in Europe, these problems were not so 
evident. The social climates of European countries may not have been as supportive 
to business entrepreneurs, but neither did they support the aggressive and fraudulent 
behaviour of 'robber barons'. The European economies also facilitated greater 
acceptance of technological change, not necessarily by overcoming conservatism, but 
by maintaining a social infrastructure that rewarded people for innovating. 104 
The linkages between entrepreneurship, innovation and culture were also explored by 
Higgins and Savoie. Higgins and Savoie focused on the role of an entrepreneurial 
culture in regional economic development. According to Higgins and Savoie, 
entrepreneurship is the key element that leads to economic prosperity, and therefore 
its absence can explain regional economic disparities. 105 
Higgins and Savoie defined entrepreneurship as 
the capacity to introduce new technologies and new products, to develop new resources, 
improve business organization and management; the ability to bring to life innovations 
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of all kinds; and to bring together the required land, labour, capital and management in 
an efficient and dynamic enterprise to make innovations succeed. m6 
Furthermore, Higgins and Savoie identified the 'rules of the game' as a crucial factor 
in the level of entrepreneurship and innovation in society. These rules give the 
system stability, ensuring that sufficient prospect of reward exists to motivate 
entrepreneurial behaviour: 
Sudden changes in the rules of the game are particularly deleterious to an increasing 
flow of enterprise. In general, the climate is appropriate when entrepreneurial success 
is amply rewarded, and where there are good chances of success. There must be a risk 
and a challenge to bring forth true entrepreneurial endeavour, but there must be some 
chance of high rewards. 1°7 
Higgins and Savoie highlighted 'frontier theory' as an example of the link between 
culture and economic development. Frontier theory posits that 'frontier' communities 
experience greater levels of economic development because they lack the cultural 
conservatism of older communities. This leads to a more aggressive entrepreneurial 
spirit, and to a more effective regional economy. 108 Higgins and Savoie referred to 
Clarence Ayres when defining a 'frontier' as 
a region into which people come from an older centre of civilisation, bringing with 
them the tools and materials of their older life; and while they also bring their 
traditional values and folkways, these are weakened by a frontier environment. 
'Existence on the frontier is, as we say, free and easy. Meticulous observation of the 
Sabbath and the rules of the grammar are somehow less important on the frontier than 
back home'. 1°9 
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According to this theory, frontier societies experience rapid economic growth because 
they are not restricted by the "social arteriosclerosis associated with traditional 
institutional power."' I° It can be seen that there is a clear connection between this 
explanation of economic growth and Veblen's view of cultural forces holding back 
technologically-driven economic progress. Higgins and Savoie also cite the 
comparative economic underdevelopment of the Francophile community of Quebec 
as an example of how cultural factors can encourage or discourage the development 
of entrepreneurship in a community. They argued that Canadians, as a whole, had 
less 'frontier spirit' than Americans: 
Americans are more enterprising, more adventurous, more mobile, more individualistic, 
more suspicious of government and more trusting of free private enterprise and 'the 
market' than their Canadian neighbours." 
Within Canada itself, Higgins and Savoie argued that Francophile Quebeckers had a 
culture that is even less attuned to entrepreneurship. They claimed that after the 
French were defeated by the British in Quebec, French Quebec took on the 
characteristics of a frontier society. The defeated French, however, reacted by 
withdrawing from the spirited commercialism of the victors: 
No longer in control of their own land, and finding themselves for one reason or 
another at a disadvantage in competition with the British conquerors, the French seem 
to have withdrawn from competition as American southerners were to do a century 
later. Like them, they withdrew into their traditions and cultivated a local 
nationalism, consoling themselves for the failure to participate fully in the economic 
life of the province by assuring themselves that they did not wish to do so anyway. 
They preferred the gentility and humanity of their own life, their own faith, values 
and culture to the vulgar materialism of the victors. As time went by, these attitudes 
became formalised and ritualized. Ideologically, if not in fact, there was a 'return to 
the land'. 112 
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According to Higgins and Savoie, frontier theorists argued that the French Canadians 
developed a strong sense of nationalism, based on the 'superiority' of their less 
aggressive and less entrepreneurial values. They maintained their traditional agrarian 
lifestyle, eschewing the vulgar commercialism of the 'barbarian' invaders. Higgins 
and Savoie cited Monsignor Paquet, who wrote in 1902: 
Our mission is less to manage capital than to preserve ideals; it consists less of lighting 
the fires of factories than of maintaining and spreading the luminous fires of religion 
and thought." 3 
In this sense Quebec lacked 'indigenous entrepreneurship'. Investment and 
industrialisation was led by other national groups such as British and Americans, 
forming a 'sub-dominate elite' in French Canada. Higgins and Savoie argued that: 
Projecting this analysis, we would conclude that this lag could only when conditions 
were such as to change French Canadian attitudes, so that French Canadians themselves 
carry out a larger share of the entrepreneurial function in Quebec.' 14 
Higgins and Savoie argued, however, this transformation did take place in the 1980s, 
triggering a rise in entrepreneurial activity and greater economic growth in Quebec. 
Nevertheless, Higgins and Savoie acknowledged a major problem inherent to any 
such discussion of culture and development in this context: 
There is an element of hen-and-egg circularity in much of the discussion of 
entrepreneurship. Do entrepreneurs bring development of does development bring forth 
entrepreneurs? 115 
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Gunnar Myrdal also recognised the issue of circularity in economic development, 
albeit in a different context. Myrdal claimed that economic disparities between 
nations (or regions or ethnic groups) were not, as neoclassical economists would 
argue, the result of temporary disequilibrium in a self-correcting system. 116 Rather, 
Myrdal argued that economic disparities were often reinforced and exacerbated by the 
existence of 'circular causation.' Myrdal argued that 
The system is by itself not moving toward any sort of balance between forces but is 
constantly on the move away from such a situation. In the normal case a change does 
not call forth countervailing changes, but, instead, supporting changes, which move the 
system in the same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such 
circular causation a social process tends to become cumulative and often to gather 
speed at an accelerating rate. 117 
Myrdal also highlights the role of 'non-economic' factors in economic development. 
For example, Myrdal examined the role of collective identity in influencing economic 
outcomes for the African-American population in the USA. In particular, Myrdal 
cited a 'circular causation' involving established prejudices about black communities 
and existing levels of relative economic disadvantage: 
In its simplest form, the explanatory model can be reduced to two factors: 'white' 
prejudice,' causing discrimination against Negroes in various respects, and the 'low 
plane of living' of the Negro population. These two factors are mutually interrelated: 
the Negroes low plane of living is kept down by discrimination from whites while, on 
the other side, the Negroes poverty ... stimulate and feed the antipathy of the Whites 
for the Negroes.' 18 
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2.5 Porter — Competitive Advantage 
Donald Savoie noted that more recent theorists have tended to concentrate on the role 
of trade in stimulating economic development. According to Savoie, trade theory 
"suggests that a region will maximise its economic potential by concentrating its 
efforts on its economic strengths." 19 Michael Porter was one writer who followed a 
trade-based approach, however he also acknowledged the notion of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Porter noted that traditional economic approaches to explaining 
regional disparities stemmed from the basic texts of modern economics , such as 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 12° Smith described the notion of 'absolute 
advantage', whereby a nation - or region - produces goods in which it is the lowest 
cost producer. Ricardo then elaborated the notion of 'comparative advantage', which 
explained that a region specialised in producing goods that cost less to produce 
relative to the other goods that it could produce. The concept of comparative 
advantage was further developed by economic theorists to encompass four key 
'factors of production' - land, labour, capital and natural resources. 
Porter stated that government regional development policies have generally focused 
on isolating and improving comparative advantage in certain industry sectors through 
intervening to reduce the cost of one or more factors of production. According to 
Porter: 
Development programs often target new industries based on factor cost advantages, 
with no strategy for moving beyond them. Nations in this situation will face a continual 
threat of losing competitive position and chronic problems in supporting attractive 
wages and returns to capital. Their ability to earn even modest profits is at the mercy of 
economic fluctuations. I21 
Porter's research, however, focussed on the question of why some economies develop 
advantages in certain industries. Porter's analysis was based on the principle of 
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competitive advantage — which involved an expanded understanding of the principle 
of comparative advantage. Porter stressed that the notion of comparative advantage is 
insufficient to explain why and how regions specialise and succeed in certain areas of 
economic activity in the modern global economy. The concept of competitive 
advantage, as used by Porter, incorporates the dimensions of product differentiation 
and technology. Porter identified two basic types of competitive advantage - lower 
costs and product differentiation. By establishing a point of difference, therefore, 
some producers are able to command price premiums and therefore achieve 
profitability even if other regions can produce the same good at a lower cost. I22 
Porter identified four determinants of national competitive advantage in an industry 
sector: 
1.Factor conditions. the nation's position in factors of production, such as skilled 
labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. 
2. Demand conditions. The nature of home demand for the industry's product or 
service. 
3. Related and supporting industries. The presence or absence in the nation of supplier 
industries and related industries that are internationally competitive. 
4. Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how 
companies are created, organised, and managed, and the nature of domestic rivalry' . 123 
Porter noted that companies or regional industries that succeed often do not have 
advantages across all determinants. Indeed, he argued that advantages in factor 
conditions can lead to complacency and therefore hinder competitiveness. Higgins 
and Savoie also stressed this point, citing Helen Hughes, then Director of the 
Australian National University's National Centre for Development Studies, who 
reportedly made the following comment on the so-called miracle of the 'Asian 
122 Ibid, pp 12-30. 
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Tigers': "That is no miracle! Singapore is not cursed with rich natural resources and 
a vast hinterland! i24 
Porter argued that the presence of competition was integral to stimulating productivity 
improvements (through innovation) and hence stimulating economic growth: 
Companies that manage to overcome inertia and the barriers to changing and upgrading 
advantage are most often those that have been stimulated by competitive pressure, 
buyer demands or technical threats. Few companies make significant improvements 
and strategy changes voluntarily; most are forced to. The pressure to change is often 
more environmental than internal. 125 
Furthermore, Porter argued that "the management of companies that sustain 
competitive advantage always run a little scared." 126 Porter thus nominated 
competitive pressure as a key driver in economic development. Moreover, the 
presence of competitors, and cultural expectations that drive the individual (or firm) 
to keep competing, lead to a constant drive for newness or innovation. 
Significantly, Porter also recognised the important of place in economic development. 
Porter noted that industries often tend to form 'clusters' around one particular city or 
region. Within that 'cluster' exist a variety of horizontal and vertical relationships 
between suppliers, customers and competitors. Porter argued that "the phenomenon 
of industry clustering is so pervasive that it appears to be a central feature of advanced 
national economies," I27 and cited examples such as a pulp and paper manufacturing in 
Sweden, fashion in Italy, agriculture in Israel, health in Denmark, chemicals in 
Germany and consumer electronics in Japan. 128 
Porter stated that clusters are important because 
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One competitive industry helps to create another in a mutually reinforcing process ... 
Its presence in a nation becomes important to developing competitive advantages in 
supplier industries.' 29 
Porter also nominated clustering alongside competition as crucial to driving 
innovation and change: 
A concentration of rivals, customers and suppliers will promote efficiency and 
specialisation. More important, however, is the influence of geographic concentration 
on improvement and innovation." ° 
Furthermore, Porter identifies the role of clusters in attracting 'talent' and shaping the 
image or 'international reputation' of a region: 
The presence of an entire cluster of industries magnifies and accelerates the process 
of factor creation that is present where there is a group of domestic rivals. Firms 
from an entire group of interconnected industries all invest in specialised but related 
technologies, information, infrastructure and human resources, and numerous 
spillovers occur. The scale of the entire cluster encourages greater investment and 
specialisation. Joint projects by trade associations involving firms from different 
industries are common. Government and university attention is heightened. The pull 
of size and prestige in attracting talent to the cluster grows stronger. The nation's 
international reputation in the field grows."' 
2.6 	Florida and the Rise of the Creative Class 
Richard Florida argued that attracting 'talent' has become, in fact, the crucial variable 
in the regional development equation. Florida based his argument on the 'human 
capital' approach, which identified people as the driving force behind regional 
growth. Essentially, this approach argued that regions with high levels of 'human 
capital' — that is, a population with a large proportion of skilled and educated workers 
129 Ibid, p 149. 
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— will prosper above regions with lower levels of human capital. Investment in 
education is thus seen as being more important to a region than investment in physical 
capital or infrastructure such as freeways or airports. I32 
According to Florida, 
Economists and geographers have always accepted that economic growth is regional — 
that it is driven by and spreads from specific regions, cities and even neighbourhoods. 
The traditional view, however, is that places grow either because they are located on 
transportation routes or because they have endowments of natural resources that 
encourage firms to locate there. 133 
Florida, however, cited the work of economist such as Paul Romer as an example of 
the new 'human capital' approach to explaining regional economic disparities. Romer 
stated that: 
What is important for growth is integration not into an economy with a large number of 
people, but rather into one with a large amount of human capita1. 134 
Florida equated human capital with the concept of talent, and examines the forces that 
attract human capital, or talent, to a particular region. By examining the question of 
regional development in terms of what attracts talented people, Florida made a 
significant shift in regional development theory away from explanations of what 
attracts business and investment. 
Florida's analysis of the economic geography of talent has achieved most attention for 
its notion of a 'creative class' of educated employees and entrepreneurs. It is this 
growing 'class' of people, according to Florida, which are now driving economic 
growth. Florida used the term 'class' deliberately, with its unmistakeable reference to 
Marx, because he argued that members of this group not only have certain shared 
attributes, but play a vital economic role. Florida stated that 
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The Creative Class consists of people who add economic value through their creativity. 
It thus includes a great many knowledge workers, symbolic analysts and professional 
and technical workers, but emphasises their true role in the economy. 135 
This role is essentially to drive innovation and change — the same forces identified by 
Schumpeter as being at the core of the capitalist system. Florida also recognised the 
connection between his 'creative class' and Schumpeter's entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs, as Schumpeter noted, are people with both ideas and money, and have 
the capacity to turn ideas into business propositions. A significant reason behind the 
success of the American economy, according to Florida, is that it has developed a 
sophisticated and effective system of institutions to support entrepreneurs and to 
facilitate the development of ideas. The growth of research and development 
investment and the establishment of venture capital networks underpin this system, 
and gives the United States economy an advantage over others with less sophisticated 
systems. 
The 'creative class,' however, is a more expansive concept than the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur, and encompasses a much broader range of people. Florida argued that 
while the role of creativity in the capitalist economy has always been significant, the 
formation of the 'creative class' was a relatively recent phenomenon. He argued that 
the 'organisational age' has been replaced by a culture of work and leisure that 
celebrates creativity and individualism. As competitive forces continue to exert 
pressure, businesses are seeing the benefits of embracing creativity in all its forms, 
and are being encouraged to be more creative in how they perform their work tasks. 
Innovation, therefore, no longer comes from just the isolated, maverick entrepreneur, 
but from creative people right through the economic system. 
Nevertheless, Florida did place a loosely defined boundary around the 'creative class'. 
According to Florida, 
The distinguishing characteristic of the Creative Class is that its members engage in 
work whose function it is to 'create meaningful new forms'. I defme the Creative Class 
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as consisting of two components. The Super Creative Core of this new class includes 
scientists and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, architects, as well as the 
thought leadership of modem society: non-fiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think 
tank researchers, analysts and other opinion-makers ... 
Beyond this core group, the Creative Class also includes 'creative professionals' who 
work in a wide range of knowledge-intensive industries such as high-tech sectors, 
financial services, the legal and health care professions and business management. 136 
This new type of economic actor can be seen as distinct from the traditional 'working 
class' employee - who performs specific, highly controlled tasks - and service sector 
employees — who generally perform services such as cooking, cleaning or retailing. 
Florida noted that, generally speaking, creative class positions were the most highly 
paid, while the size of the working class is diminishing relative to both the creative 
class and the service sector. Florida argued that the commonality between people 
performing these various roles lies in the intellectual tasks they are required to 
perform, as "these people engage in creative problem solving, drawing on complex 
bodies of knowledge to solve specific problems." 137 
Having set a broad definition of the 'creative class', Florida then ranked American 
cities and regions in terms of their relative creative class populations. Florida also 
conducted extensive research into the mobility of the creative class, and specifically 
asked why they chose to live in certain regions over others. Contrary to the standard 
explanation of worker mobility — that is the availability of suitable employment — 
Florida found that many creative class members chose to locations for a range of 
lifestyle-related factors. Furthermore, Florida's research showed that the lifestyle 
factors that were considered most attractive by creative class members were not 
necessarily the same lifestyle factors that are often encouraged and promoted by 
governments and development agencies in the name of regional development. Florida 
noted that: 
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Creative people are not moving to these places for traditional reasons. The physical 
attractions that most cities focus on building — sport stadiums, freeways, urban malls 
and tourism-and-entertainment districts that resemble theme parks — are irrelevant, 
insufficient or actually unattractive to many creative class people. What they look for 
in communities are abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, an openness to 
diversity of all kinds, and above all else the opportunity to validate their identities as 
creative people. 38 
The development of an economic 'creative class' has simultaneously led to the 
development of a creative culture, where diversity and individuality are not just 
tolerated, but encouraged. Such a culture is, according to Florida, essential for a 
region if it is to attract the talented people who drive economic growth. Florida stated 
that 
Essentially my theory says that regional economic growth is driven by location choices 
of creative people — the holders of creative capital — who prefer places that are diverse, 
tolerant and open to new ideas.' 39 
Beneath the broad desire for diversity and openness to new ideas, Florida's research 
into the location decisions of people in his creative class found a number of recurring 
themes. Florida identified six of these themes: thick labour markets, lifestyle, social 
interaction, diversity, authenticity, and identity. These themes can be examined as a 
set of criteria for a 'creative community', against which a region can be evaluated, 
and therefore its potential for economic growth assessed. 
2.7 Thick Labour Markets 
While conventional economic theory assumes that labour is mobile, and will move to 
where employment opportunities exist, Florida's research found that members of the 
'creative class' were looking for a particular type of labour market. Florida found that 
his subjects were less concerned with issues of job security and length of tenure, and 
138 Ibid, p 218. 
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in fact expect to be changing jobs regularly. Opportunities to climb up corporate 
ladders were less valued than opportunities to pick and choose between jobs or 
'projects'. In this sense, Florida argued that the creative class seek 'thick' or 
horizontal labour markets with many opportunities at the same level, rather than 
'vertical' labour markets with opportunities to progress within organisational 
structures. 
Florida stated that this type of labour market is essential to the operation of a 
successful 'creative' regional economy. Furthermore, the existence of 'creative' 
communities or regions is essential to driving growth in the broader economy and 
avoiding economic stagnation: 
In this way, place solves a basic puzzle of our economic order: it facilitates the 
matching of creative people to economic opportunities. Place thus provides a labour 
pool for companies who need people, and thick labour market for people who need 
jobs. The gathering of people, companies and resources into particular places with 
particular specialities and capabilities generates efficiencies that power economic 
growth.'" 
2.8 	Lifestyle 
Despite the obvious need for a suitable labour market, Florida stated that "the people 
in my focus groups tell me that lifestyle frequently trumps employment when they're 
choosing where to live." 14I In part, this is a result of the increased confidence that 
comes with having skills that are in demand. Florida argued that for the creative 
class, this confidence affords them the luxury of choosing places to live that suit their 
own lifestyle preferences. In particular, they seek places that enable them to express 
their own individual sense of identity and self. 
139 	• Ibtd, p 223. 
140 Ibid, p 224. 
141 Ibid, p 224. 
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Florida maintained that "people today expect more from the places they live." 142 This 
is because, according to Florida, people now have more demanding and flexible 
employment pressures, which have blurred the boundaries between work time and 
recreation time. Where previously people lived and worked in one place, and spent 
holiday and recreation time in another, now people do not have the luxury of time to 
keep work and recreation compartmentalised and separate: 
Of course people still go away at times, but given their flexible and unpredictable work 
schedules, they want ready access to recreation on a just-in-time' basis. 143 
The type of recreation that people seek is also changing. Florida argued that people 
today are seeking more 'experiential' activities that they can actively participate in, as 
opposed to activities in which they are spectators. The nature of modern work 
schedules also means that people are less likely to seek structure, organised and 
regular team activities, and more likely to do individual activities such as jogging or 
bike riding that can be enjoyed at any time and are not affected by irregular working 
arrangements. To this end, Florida noted that in successful creative communities, 
public infraitructure such as parks and bike tracks are important, but major stadiums 
for passive activities such as watching sport are less important. 
Florida also noted the significance of a region's 'nightlife'. He stated that "a vibrant, 
varied nightlife was viewed by many as another signal that a city 'gets it', even by 
those who infrequently partake in nightlife." By nightlife, Florida referred to more 
than just nightclubs, but to amenities such as theatres, restaurants, art galleries, cafés, 
bars and so on. 
2.9 	Social Interaction 
In Florida's open and diverse creative community, social interaction takes on a new 
flavour. As people tend to come and go, traditional networks and social orders are 
142 	• , • now p 224. 
143 Ibid, p 224. 
144 Ibid, p 225. 
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supplanted by ones that support less formal and structured forms of social interaction. 
Florida argued that Ray Oldenburg's concept of 'third places' was important to 
understanding the social interaction habits of the creative class. Florida stated that 
these 'third places' were "neither home nor work — the first two places — but venues 
like coffee shops, bookstores and cafes in which we find less formal 
acquaintances." I45 According to Florida, third places are the hubs of social interaction 
for the creative class. Detached from traditional family, clan and community 
networks, third places "fill a void by providing a ready venue for acquaintance and 
human interaction" 146 for the creative class. 
2.10 Diversity 
Florida argued that the broad concept of 'diversity' is essential to the 'creative 
community', because it reflects the individuality and creativity of its members. 
Importantly, a diverse community is seen as one where people of different 
backgrounds, cultures and tastes can easily fit in, or at least do not stand out as being 
different. Diversity in this context also refers to more than just cultural and ethnic 
diversity. Florida stated that subjects from his research focus groups "were drawn to 
places known for diversity of thought and open-mindedness." 147 Diversity is valued 
as not only an indicator of a place being open to outsiders, but also because it is 
considered an indicator if a place that possesses excitement and energy. 148 Florida 
argued that creative class people enjoy a mix of influences: 
They want different kinds of music and try different kinds of food. They want to meet 
and socialise with people unlike themselves, to trade views and spar over issues. A 
person's circle of closest friends may not resemble the Rainbow Coalition- in fact it 
usually does not - but he or she wants the rainbow to be available.' 49 
Diversity, for Florida, is thus seen as a vital ingredient of the successful creative 
community, stimulating the creative process behind the formation of new ideas. 
145 Ibid, pp 225-226. 
146 v. • . 9 p226. 
147 Ibid, p 226. 
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Florida cites Bonnie Menes Kahn to support his argument — noting that a 'great city' 
had two hallmarks: "tolerance for strangers and intolerance for mediocrity." I50 
These are precisely the qualities that appeal to the creative class — and they also happen 
to be qualities conducive to innovation, risk taking and the formation of new 
business.' 
2.11 Authenticity 
Florida also highlighted the concept of 'authenticity' as an important factor in the 
locational decisions of the 'creative class'. In this context, authenticity is used to 
describe a sense of originality and difference - a sense that a place is real and 
individual rather than homogenous or an imitation of somewhere else. Florida argued 
that: 
Authenticity comes from several aspects of a community — historic buildings, 
established neighbourhoods, a unique music scene or specific cultural attributes. It 
comes from the mix — from urban grit alongside renovated buildings, from the 
commingling of young and old, long-time neighbourhood characters and yuppies, 
fashion models and bag ladies.' 52 
Florida paid special attention to the role of a region's musical culture and heritage as a 
component of its 'authenticity'. He stated that music "plays a central role in the 
creation of identity and the formation of real communities." 153 Moreover, he argued 
that "it is hard to think of a major high-tech region that doesn't have a distinct audio 
identity." 154 Examples such as the 'flower power' music scene that is associated with 
San Francisco, the `gnmge' music scene that spawned groups such as Nirvana in 
Seattle, and the strong musical culture in Dublin can be seen as supportive of the 
nexus between music and creative communities. 
15° Bonnie Menes Kahn, cited in Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, p 227. 
151 Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, p 227. 
152 	• p 228. 
153 Ibid, p 228. 
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2.12 Identity 
Finally, Florida argued that place has become a more important dimension of a 
person's individual identity — especially for members of the 'creative class'. As such, 
people wish to identify with a place which reflects what they see in themselves, and as 
members of the creative class, they generally wish to identify with things that are 
associated with creativity. Florida contrasted this with associating one's identity with 
one's place of employment. For example, Florida stated that 
Forty years ago, some would likely identify themselves by saying 'I work for General 
Motors' or 'I work for IBM'. Today our tattooed friend is more likely to identify 
himself by saying 'I'm a software developer and I live in Austin' rather than saying 'I 
work for Trilogy'. 155 
The connection between place and individual identity has another significance in the 
context of horizontal labour markets and the decline of the career job. Florida argued 
that status is decreasingly associated with one's position in a company, especially 
considering that fewer people are choosing to focus their efforts on climbing 
corporate ladders. Instead, people now tend to associate status increasingly with place 
of residence: 
To some extent, this has always been true. Places like Paris, London and New York 
City have always been high on the status order. But now the people in my focus groups 
and interviews tell me they are more likely to move to places that convey high status. 156 
2.13 Extending the Creative Class Model 
Florida himself noted that simply encouraging more creative class people into a 
region does not in itself produce a more prosperous and harmonious place. Indeed, a 
strong creative class population often corresponds with a high population of poorly- 
154 Ibid, p 228. 
155 Ibid, p 229. 
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paid service sector workers performing menial tasks for their more highly-paid 
'creative class' neighbours. This can result in a stark inequality of wealth, with a 
community divided along income and employment lines. Florida was acutely aware 
of this problem and identified it as one of the challenges of the 'creative economy': 
Affluent Creative Class people who move into racially, ethnically, or economically 
diverse regions cannot simply assume that their presence automatically 'revitalises' 
these places. For many Working Class and Service Class residents, it doesn't. Instead, 
all it usually does is raise their rents and perhaps create more low-end service jobs for 
waiters, house cleaners and the like.'" 
A number of critics have attacked Florida's thesis — questioning both the premises of 
his arguments and his empirical data. Steven Malanga, for example, argued that 
Florida's thesis was a new rational for old 'leftist' policies: 
A generation of leftish policy-makers and urban planners is rushing to implement 
Florida's vision, while an admiring host of uncritical journalists touts it. But there is 
just one problem: the basic economics behind his ideas don't work. Far from being 
economic powerhouses, a number of cities the professor identifies as creative-age 
winners have chronically underperformed the American economy. And, although 
Florida is fond of saying that, today, "place matters" in attracting workers and 
businesses, some of his top creative cities don't even do a good job at attracting — or 
keeping — residents.' 58 
Considering Florida's creative class thesis in light of the work of other writers, 
however, can extend the breadth of the six factors that Florida identified as important 
to the locational decisions of members of the 'creative class'. Firstly, the criterion of 
'social interaction' can be extended by incorporating elements of Porter's work on 
comparative advantage. Given that firms are attracted to regions where they can 
benefit from 'clustering', it is reasonable to assume that creative people in these 
156 Ibid, p 230. 
157 Ibid, p 325. 
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industry sectors are also attracted to regions for the same reasons. Not only can they 
benefit from interacting with people in the same field, they can access a greater range 
of employment and research opportunities that are made available by the critical mass 
that an industry cluster creates. Indeed, it could be argued that industry clusters are 
far more important in this respect than the presence of 'third places'. As Porter stated, 
the development of industry clusters adds prestige to a region and serves to attract 
talent. 159 Industry clusters, therefore, can be seen to be play a vital role in attracting 
human capital, and can provide a more robust unit of analysis than 'social 
interaction'. 
Florida himself noted the importance of clustering by citing the work of Robert Axtell 
and himself16° into the development of cities. Axtell and Florida's model was based 
on three key points: 
• Creative agents cluster around other creative agents, reinforcing each other's 
productivity. 
• Creative agents then come together to form larger economic units or firms. 
• These firms then locate in cities where they grow and develop as locations for 
creative agents and firms. 161 
Secondly, greater levels of entrepreneurship and higher levels of research and 
development are considered to be positive factors in the creation of new businesses 
and new jobs, especially in the creative sector, and hence lead to thicker labour 
markets. Florida included indicators for innovation as part of his 'high-tech' index, 
which measures the number of patents per capita in a region. The Australian Local 
Government Association's State of the Regions Report 162 also used measures of 
innovation as an indicator for the criterion of 'thick labour markets'. Extending the 
criterion of 'thick labour markets' to incorporate the level of innovation and 
158 Steven Malanga, "The Curse of the Creative Class," City Journal, Winter 2004, www.city-
iournal.orehtm/14 1 the curse.html, accessed 25/5/04. 
159 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, p 151. 
16° Robert Axtell and Richard Florida, "Emergent Cities: A Microeconomic Explanation," (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, April 2001.), cited in Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, p 265. 
161 Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, p 265. 
162 National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report, 2002. 
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entrepreneurship in a regional economy, therefore, would provide a more robust 
indicator of the underlying strength of a regional labour market. 
2.14 An Analytical Framework 
This chapter has discussed the work of a range of theorists and writers on the subjects 
of identity, power and regional development. While the discussion is far from 
comprehensive, a number of important insights can be taken from these writers. 
When considered together, these insights underpin a broad analytical framework that 
demonstrates the linkages between the three subjects. 
As Richard White showed, regional identities are constructed, malleable and 
contestable. 163 White also showed that regional identities play an important social 
and economic role in shaping community values and expectations. 164 Furthermore, 
regional identity, therefore, is not only subject to the operation of power, it also acts 
as a mechanism through which power is exercised. Other writers on regional identity, 
such as James Jupp 165 and Paul Jarnes, 166 have noted that the trends often labelled 
under the term `globalisation' are also having a significant effect in the development 
and role of national and regional identities. These writers have argued that 
`globalisation' is bringing challenges to the existing conceptions of nation-states, 
while at the same time underpinning a resurgent interest in regional and ethnic 
identities. The declining importance of national boundaries can, in this context, be 
seen as reinforcing the notion of a single 'world-system', in which case the study of 
'regional identity' is, arguably, more important and relevant than studying the 
'identity' of nation-states. Furthermore, the changing structure and reach of the 
global electronic media has changed the way in which identities can be shaped and 
manipulated through the exercise of power. 
163 Richard White, Inventing Australia. 
164 Ibid. 
165 James Jupp, "Does Australia Need an Identity," in David Day (Ed), Australian Identities. 
I " Paul James, "National Form and Popular Culture," in Stephen Alomes and Dirk den Hartog (Eds), 
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LlikeS 167 and Gaventa 168 examined the way power is used to shape the interests of 
groups. Power networks perpetuate and strengthen themselves through the application 
of the three dimensions of power, particularly the third dimension of power. Gaventa 
applied this approach to the Appalachian region to explain the apparent quiescence of 
the local population, which was evident in low levels of political participation despite 
significant economic disadvantages. 
The notion of power is important in the context of the dependency school theorists 
such as Wallerstein, I69 in that power theories show how core regions can maintain 
their pre-eminent economic position by shaping the values and expectations of people 
in peripheral regions. The core-periphery model also recognises patterns in economic 
disparities between regions, and identifies a structural explanation for these 
disparities. Furthermore, Wallerstein identified change, or 'demand for newness', as 
being a key driver of growth in the economic system, and culture as being the 
battleground for the contest of power. I7° The definition of regional identity can, 
therefore be considered one part of this contest. 
A number of writers, such as Weber"' and Schumpeter 172 identified entrepreneurship 
as an important cultural element in economic development, while Veblen 173 identified 
the importance of innovation. It is crucial, therefore, that a region has an 
entrepreneurial culture, and sees itself as being entrepreneurial. Higgins and 
Savoie174 noted the example of the French Canadians who rejected the entrepreneurial 
culture (or identity) which they associated with the conquering British, and opted to 
associate themselves with an identity based on the rural idyll and moral or intellectual 
superiority. This identity was considered by Higgins and Savoie as a causal factor in 
economic disparities between French Canadian communities in Quebec and their 
more-entrepreneurial English-speaking neighbours. 175 
167 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View. 
168 John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness. 
169 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Essential Wallerstein. 
170 rb • •, p in 270. 
171 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. 
172 Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, pp 288-311. 
173 Ibid, pp 213-249. 
174 Ben Higgins and Donald Savoie, Regional Development Theories and Their Application. 
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Michael Porter 176 noted the role of competition in stimulating innovation and 
punishing inefficiency, and therefore driving economic growth. Porter argued 
national governments need to act as a "pusher and a challenger" 177 to stimulate the 
required level of innovation or change. Successful firms and industries with 
competitive advantages, which can be seen to enjoy appropriate rewards, provide an 
example for other to emulate. At the same time, the forces of competition punish 
firms that fail to innovate. 
Porter also demonstrated how successful regional economies are built around industry 
clusters. I78 Industries are attracted to cluster in certain regions in order to benefit 
from economies of scale, to share information and to do with business with firms in 
complementary sectors. Furthermore, competition between firms within the industry 
cluster stimulates innovation and drives competitive advantages. Porter described 
how competitive advantages often become synonymous with nations. 179 For example, 
it is common to think of Swiss precision, Swedish reliability, Italian sophistication 
and Japanese efficiency. In these examples, the competitive advantages developed 
within industry clusters are now important elements of the regional identities 
associated with those places. 
A number of common themes can be seen through all of these different theoretical 
approaches. It can be seen, for example, that regions need to adopt cultural traits such 
as innovation and entrepreneurship, freedom from conservative thinking, and 
acceptance of technological change in order to stimulate economic development. A 
region also needs to adopt leadership in certain key industries where it can develop 
competitive advantages. Once an industry sector has achieved the status of leader, 
complementary industries are encouraged, and the benefits of innovation are 
demonstrated for firms in other industries. 
While taking a markedly different approach to the question of economic development, 
the 'creative class' approach of Richard Florida 180 is not inconsistent with these 
176 Porter, The Competitive Advantages of Nations. 
177 Ibid, p681: 
178 Ibid, p 148. 
179 Ibid, p 277. 
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arguments. Florida also recognised the significance of entrepreneurship, innovation 
and change to the economic system. Instead of focusing on structural forces to drive 
innovation, however, Florida sought a cultural solution, focusing on 'human capital'. 
Florida demonstrated clear correlations between the regions with high results on the 
'creative indexes' and indicators of economic growth. 181 It may therefore be assumed 
that these regions have become part of the economic core, or are at least moving in 
that direction. Equally, Florida showed how regions that suffer from economic 
disadvantages, and those showing signs of economic decline, tend to also score poorly 
on the 'creative indexes'. I82 It would appear reasonable therefore to equate Florida's 
creative communities with core regions or metropoles in Wallerstein's world system 
model. This thesis argues, therefore that structural forces in the global economic 
system act to promote certain values in core regions, and different values in non-core 
regions. It follows that non-core regions which successfully adopt the values of 
'creative' communities may be able to challenge structural power relationships and 
address economic dependency. 
Core regions, by nature of the fact that they are the most successful and powerful 
regions in the capitalist system, are more likely to adopt this creative ethos. 
Conversely, structural pressure on peripheral and semi-peripheral regions acts to deter 
the development of this ethos, and therefore creative people tend to regard these 
regions as unattractive places to live. As a result, peripheral regions do not develop a 
business climate that supports innovation, and do not experience the same level of 
economic growth. 
The regional identity of core regions can be characterised, therefore, by the six criteria 
developed from Florida's analysis. Hallmarks of successful core regions thus include 
• Well-defined competitive advantages in key 'growth' industries, and have 
developed clusters around those advantages; 
• High levels of innovation and business start-ups, leading to thick labour 
markets, employment opportunities, and the development a strong local 
business culture; 
181 Ibid, pp 249-266. 
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• Openness to diversity and tolerance of difference; 
• A lifestyle that provides '24/7' recreational opportunities, and has a strong 
local cultural scene, such as live music; 
• An 'authentic' local culture, as opposed to generic cultural icons, which make 
the region in some way unique; 
• An identity that confers status as a desirable place to live. 
Furthermore, core regions must have a critical mass of people in order to create a 
vibrant local economy, support a '24/7' lifestyle and to create a broad labour market. 
Equally, core regions require access to physical and economic infrastructure and the 
institutional frameworks that support a modern, vibrant market economy. 
Conversely, the hallmarks of non-core regions can be seen as the antithesis of those 
for core regions. Hallmarks of disadvantaged or non-core regions thus include 
• Few identified competitive strengths, particularly in 'growth' industries, and 
an inability to develop competitive industry clusters around those strengths; 
• Low levels of innovation and new business start-ups, leading to an under-
developed local business culture and a 'branch-office' economy; 
• Resistance to change and difference, leading to low levels of diversity; 
• A regimented lifestyle that does not provide flexible recreational 
opportunities, and does not have a strong local cultural scene; 
• No discernable local culture that is unique or available to the region; and 
• Low status as a place to live compared with other regions. 
These hallmarks can form a framework with which to analyse regional identities, and 
can also be used to underpin development strategies for non-core regions. By 
redefining their regional identities, non-core regions can turn around the 'brain drain' 
of creative class people who choose to locate elsewhere. This would encourage 
innovation and enable peripheral and semi-peripheral regions to develop new 
knowledge-based industries, lessening their dependence on traditional resource 
processing and basic manufacturing industries. 
182 ib • . pp la, 	249-266. 
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In order to test this framework, the following chapters will examine the regional 
identities of Tasmania and Wales. As Richard White noted, the Tasmanian identity, 
for example, underwent a dramatic transformation in the early 19 th century from the 
penal colony hell-hole of Van Diemen's Land to the serene, pastoral arcadia of 
Tasmania. 183 Since then, the Tasmanian identity has been contested, with two distinct 
themes emerging. Chapter 3 will discuss these themes, and will examine recent 
attempts to redefine the State's regional identity by finding an accommodation 
between the contesting images of Tasmania. 
183 Richard White, Inventing Australia. 
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Chapter 3 - Tasmania 
The Callaghan Report into the structure of industry and the employment situation in 
Tasmania in 1977 summarised the Tasmanian identity in three pithy sentences: 
Tasmania is beautiful. Tasmania is tranquil. Tasmania is economically vulnerable!" 
Sir Bede Callaghan not only identified Tasmania's vulnerability as an economic 
periphery, but also touched on the State's image as a place of peace and beautiful 
natural wilderness. These qualities have been integral to the Tasmanian regional 
identity since the penal imagery of Van Diemen's Land was abandoned in the mid 
19th century, and continue to be its most enduring symbols. Tasmania, however, can 
also seen as example of how a region's identity is contestable. Two clear themes have 
emerged in this contest, and the quest to define the Tasmanian identity is continuing. 
Dr Bruce Felmingham highlighted the link between Tasmania's regional identity and 
its economy in a weekly column for Hobart newspaper The Mercury in 1999. Dr 
Felmingham stated that "there is plenty of evidence around suggesting that cultural 
beliefs produce economic outcomes." 185 Considering this connection, Felmingham 
surmised that 
the economic imperatives are such that the island's people must form a cohesive 
response if our economic malaise is to improve. We cannot have that until we 
understand the cultural beliefs underpinning a local identity. 186 
This chapter discusses the structure of the Tasmanian economy, and consider how the 
State's economy and identity interact. As Chapter 2 noted, the Australian national 
identity developed in the absence of a strong historical tradition. Clearly, as a region 
of Australia, Tasmania also has developed an identity from 'the ground up' or - as 
184 Sir Bede Callaghan, Report into the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in 
Tasmania (Canberra: AGPS, 1977), p 3. 
185 Bruce Felmingham, The Mercury, 21 March 1999, p 16. 
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Jupp stated of Australia — "out of less inspiring material than was true for most 
nation-states in the northern hemisphere." 187 
3.1 Tasmania - Its Community and Economy 
Tasmania is the smallest state of Australia, with population of approximately 480,000, 
representing about 2.4 per cent of the total Australian population. I88 The capital city, 
Hobart, is the tenth-largest city in Australia. Significantly, Tasmania is an island, 
geographically isolated from mainland Australia, creating a physical sense of 
dislocation and isolation. This island status is also a defining aspect of the Tasmanian 
identity. To some this island status is seen as a double-edged sword indeed Callaghan 
stated that "the major disability facing the people of Tasmania (although many 
residents consider it an advantage) is that Tasmania is an island." 189 
Economically, Tasmania contributes less 2 per cent of the country's gross product. I9° 
The State's major industries are manufacturing; retail trade; construction; and 
agriculture, forestry and fishing I91 . There are subtle but none-the-less significant 
differences in the composition of the Tasmanian economy compared with the national 
economy. The following table indicates the contribution of industry sectors in 
Tasmania and in Australia as a whole. 
187 James Jupp, "Does Australia, Need a National Identity", in Day (Ed) Australian Identities, p 226. 
188 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. No. 3101.0, December 
2003, published 4/6/04. 
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Table 1 - Contribution of Industry Sectors to Tasmanian Economy — 2001-2002 
Sector Share of Tasmanian 
Factor Income (%) 
Share of Australian 
Factor Income 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 6 4 
Mining 2 5 
Manufacturing 14 12 
Electricity, Gas & Water 6 2 
Construction 5 6 
Wholesale Trade 4 5 
Retail Trade 6 5 
Accommodation, Cafes and 
Restaurants 
3 2 
Transport & Storage 5 5 
Communication 3 3 
Finance & Insurance 6 7 
Property & Business Services 6 12 
Government Administration & 
Defence 
5 4 
Education 5 5 
Health & Community Services 9 6 
Cultural & Recreational Services 2 2 
Personal & Other Services 3 2 
General Government 3 2 
Ownership of Dwellings 9 9 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts — State Accounts 2001- 
2002 , Cat. No. 5220.0, 13/11/02. 
In December 2002, the Australian Bureau of Statistics stated that the long-term trend 
for the industry contributions to factor income had seen a "shift from goods producing 
industries to service providing industries." 192 Furthermore, 
The main industries contributing to the relative decline in goods producing industries 
have been: agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing; and electricity, gas and 
192 Ibid. 
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water supply. Service industries, except for wholesale and retail trade, have increased 
in relative importance to most states. 193 
The above table shows that Tasmania had higher than the national figure for the 
industry contribution of those industries which the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
noted were in relative decline. Conversely, 'growth' sectors such as property and 
business services were less significant in the Tasmanian economy than the national 
economy. 
In 1997-98, major exports from Tasmania were zinc, woodchips, ships and boats, 
aluminium, seafood products, and base metal ores and concentrates. Other items such 
as copper, beef, and dairy products were important contributors to overall Tasmanian 
exporters. Tasmania also exports crops such as poppies, onions, peas, carrots and 
pyrethrum. 194 Tasmania exported $294 million in woodchips in 1997-98, mostly to 
Japanese pulp and paper producers. 195 Efforts to increase the amount of downstream 
processing of the Tasmanian wood resource during the 1980s and 1990s were 
unsuccessful, with two proposed pulp and paper mills being abandoned, and the 
Burnie mill of Australian Paper being shut down. The establishment of the Starwood 
Australia medium-density fibreboard plant at Bell Bay, which opened in 1998, was an 
exception to this trend. Exports of high-speed catamarans have also been a major 
contributor to Tasmania's exports since the early 1990s, but by the end of 2002 hotel 
and casino operator Federal Hotels had replaced International Catamarans as 
Tasmania's largest private employer. 196 
Tasmania has historically a higher level of unemployment, and a lower participation 
rate, than other Australian States. In February 2004, the unemployment rate in 
Tasmania was 6.8 per cent - the lowest level since 1980, but still above the national 
193 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts — State Accounts 2001-2002, 
Catalogue no. 5220.0, published 13/11/2002. 
194 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Tasmanian Yearbook 2000, p 284 
195 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Tasmanian Yearbook 2000, p 284. 
196 International Catamarans has played an important role in the defining the Tasmanian identity — see 
3.3 Progressive Tasmania. 
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unemployment rate of 5.8 per cent. 197 In May 2003, the total average weekly earnings 
for adults in Tasmania were $627, while the national figure for Australia was 
$725.40. 198 Tasmanians also tend to stay in their jobs for longer. In February 2002, a 
total of 28.1 per cent of employed Tasmanians had been in the same job for 10 years 
or more, compared with 24 per cent of employed persons across the nation. 199 
3.2 	Tasmanian Identity 
Since the first European settlement in Tasmania in 1803, the Tasmanian identity has 
not only undergone significant change, it has also been subject to contested 
interpretations. As Richard White noted, initially the colony was depicted a 
"Prisoner's Hell."200 This identity changed however, as the colony moved from a 
penal settlement to a base for whaling and agriculture. Images of Tasmania from 
artists'such as John Glover began to depict the colony as an antipodean arcadia, and as 
such more free settlers were drawn to Van Diemen's Land in order to start a fresh new 
life. The name of the colony was then changed from Van Diemen's Land to 
Tasmania is a further effort to distance the new regional identity from its earlier 
incarnation as penal colony. 201 
Significantly, Stephen Alomes, citing Michael Roe, identified a tradition of radicalism 
in Tasmania, stretching from the anti-transportation groups of colonial times to the 
anti-dams movement of the 1970s and 1980s. 2°2 Alomes places this tradition in the 
context of a 'romantic' tradition within Tasmanian society, and romantic image of the 
island from without. Alomes also identified a 'progressive' tradition in Tasmania 
offered a counter-point to the 'romantic' image. These two traditions provide insight 
into the ideas that underpin the Tasmanian identity, and also explain its often 
197 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia, Cat. No. 6202.0, February 2004, published 
11/03/04. 
198 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings, Cat. No. 6302.0, May 2003, published 
14/08/03. 
199 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Mobility — Tasmania, February 2002. 
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History," in David Walker and Michael Bennett (Eds), Intellect and Emotion: Perspectives on 
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contradictory nature. 2°3 Alomes also noted the role of 'outsiders' in defining the 
Tasmanian identity. In this way, Alomes referred to both Said's `Orientalism' and the 
core-periphery model to show how the identity of regional areas such as Tasmania 
can be created from the 'centre' of the economic system, thus reflecting the operation 
of power: 
When the would be cultured denizens of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide sought to 
distance themselves from backward colonial culture they in turn looked down on 
convict Van Diemen's Land and later 'genocidal' Tasmania. A metropolitan-provincial 
variant in Edward Said's `Orientalism,' the superior attitude of the 'urbane' citizens of 
the mainland capitals towards 'backwards' Tasmania, was already evolving in the 
colonial era.204 
3.3 	Progressive Tasmania 
According to Alomes, the 'progressive' tradition had its roots in the 18th century 
enlightenment period in Europe and the industrial revolution. The tradition could be 
defined as a (teleological) belief that society benefits from continual scientific 
discovery and the application of science to everyday life. 'Progressive' thinking rests 
on the notion of the primacy of man, or reason, over nature. Alomes stated that 
"although the tapestry of ideas is a rich one, the ruling ideology of Australian and 
Tasmanian life has been the belief in progress."205 
Iconic representations of this view of Tasmania, according to Alomes, include the 
State's academic and business leaders. Alomes cited the Hare-Clark electoral system, 
and the Henry Jones IXL company, as examples of the State's progressive heritage. 206 
Perhaps the most iconic example of progressive Tasmania, however, has been the 
Hydro Electric Commission (HEC). Roger Lupton, in his corporate biography of the 
Australian History, Essays in Honour of Michael Rowe (Geelong, Vic: Centre for Australian Studies, 
Deakin University and University of Tasmania, 1998), p 207. 
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HEC, noted that hydro-electric power was looked upon from the early 1900s as "an 
engine for the industrial development of the whole State."207 
From the beginning, the development of hydro-power was dependent on parallel 
industrial development. The first major hydro-electric scheme was the Duck Reach 
power station in Launceston, which enabled the city to prosper as an important 
manufacturing centre. The establishment of the EZ Risdon zinc smelter north of 
Hobart was crucial to the viability of the Waddamana power station, and from then on 
new hydro projects were invariably predicated on meeting increasing industrial 
demand for power. Equally, Tasmania's industrial development was greatly 
dependent on the availability of relatively inexpensive energy supplies. 
In 1931 then Labor front-bencher, and later Premier, Robert Cosgrove reportedly 
stated that "the power scheme was the brightest light in Tasmania today and would 
eventually help the state to become an industrial and manufacturing centre." 208 By 
1932, the HEC 
was retailing directly to factories, shops and offices, farms and homes in 30 of the 
State's 40 municipalities ... At 731 kilowatts hours per head of population, its per capita 
consumption of electricity was still well above the mainland average.209 
The State Government pursued the expansion of the HEC with almost religious 
fervour during Australia's post-war rebuilding phase. Professor Geoffrey Blainey 
stated that 
during the quarter century after the end of the Second World War, the Labor 
governments of Cosgrove and Reece made hydro-electricity the symbol of Tasmania. 21° 
The central position of the HEC in Tasmanian life became apparent in the State 
election campaign of 1946. As election day drew nearer, then Premier Robert 
207 Roger Lupton, Lifeblood: Tasmania's Hydro Power (Edgecliff, NSW: Focus Publishing Pty Ltd, 
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Cosgrove's optimism about the future of hydro-electric development grew. Based on 
commitments that the Government had secured from existing and new industries, the 
hydro-electric system's installed capacity would have to be expanded to at least 
245,000 horsepower, Cosgrove stated that "I am sick of exporting Tasmanian boys 
and girls, and will put industries where they should be put."2 " 
The expansion of the hydro system required unprecedented numbers of construction 
workers, and the post-war industrial boom had put labour in short supply. To solve 
the problem, migrant workers from Poland were brought to the State, setting in train 
long-term changes to the cultural face and ethnic composition of Tasmania. By 1952 
Cosgrove's rhetoric had moved from prophesising about Tasmania's hydro-powered 
future, to proclaiming its hydro-powered present. Lupton stated that with more dams 
being opened, Cosgrove was able to: 
boast about the way in which hydro-electric development had transformed Tasmania's 
industrial expansion in the 18 years since Labor took office. In 1934, Tasmania's 
population had numbered 231,000 and its products had been worth £5, million. Now 
the State had 302,000 and its products were worth £59 million. 212 
Alomes noted that the pioneering spirit of hydro-industrialisation was expressed in the 
construction of the HEC's art-deco headquarters in Hobart: 
From the 1940s to the 1970s there was no greater symbol of progress than the Hydro 
Electric Commission headquarters in Davey Street ... The HEC head office building ... 
symbolised this progress in a State which had become, in HEC advertising terms, 
'Hydro-happy'. The building's illumination, consuming 15,000 watts of power per 
hour and with an output of 500,000 lumens, was seen as making Tasmania a world 
leader in this field.213 
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Cosgrove's clear enthusiasm for hydro electricity was surpassed, however, by his 
successor as Premier, Eric Reece, who became known simply as 'Electric Eric'. The 
HEC itself had earned the popular abbreviation of 'the Hydro', and together Electric 
Eric and the Hydro became a formidable combination in Tasmanian politics. 
While Tasmania enjoyed relative prosperity under Reece's premiership, it was during 
this period that the activities of the HEC became a flashpoint in the tension between 
the 'romantic' and 'progressive' Tasmanian identities. The catalyst for this conflict 
was the announcement of plans to dam Lake Pedder in Tasmania's south west. 
Lupton stated that 
On 10 December 1962, Premier Reece and the Hydro announced plans for a power 
scheme which would spark a social and political upheaval more bitter than any the 
close-knit island community had endured since colonial settlement 160 years before. 214 
Tasmania's economic decline during the 1980s coincided with the decline of the 
importance of the HEC. Tasmania's energy costs were no longer cheaper than other 
States', and the State Government was running out of rivers to dam. During this 
period, however, several other symbols of industrial progress emerged. The most 
significant icon of Tasmania's manufacturing base in the 1990s was International 
Catamarans, run by local ferry builder Robert Clifford. From inauspicious beginnings 
during the 1970s, when Clifford transported Hobartians across the Derwent River 
after the Tasman Bridge collapsed, International Catamarans grew to become, at one 
point, the biggest private employer on the State. The company's enormous 
aluminium ferries, sold in the world market, make a striking visual impact on the 
Derwent River during sea-trials. Robert Clifford himself rose from being a local ferry 
builder and driver to be one of the most powerful business figure in the State, and 
something of a controversial industrial hero. Clifford's disregard for regulation and 
aggressive approach to human resource management were well-known, yet he was 
given a position on the Board of the State's primary economic development agency, 
and even granted an honorary doctorate from the University of Tasmania. In short, 
Clifford has become regarded as a local champion for 'progress'. The ship-building 
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industry has also become an integral component of the State economy, and a 
significant contributor to total exports, although in recent times International 
Catamarans has run into financial trouble from declining international sales. A 
number of smaller firms have become major suppliers to International Catamarans, 
creating a successful maritime industry cluster. 
3.4 Romantic Tasmania 
While the contemporary political protest movement in Tasmania can be traced 
directly to the Lake Pedder controversy, historians such as Michael Roe 2I5 have 
argued that Tasmania has had a strong tradition of political activism since British 
colonisation. Furthermore, many of the themes espoused in Tasmanian protest 
politics are consistent with the tradition of 'romanticism'. As Alomes stated, 
The other side of the coin of 'progress' and the Industrial revolution, and the 
urbanisation and materialism of 19th century society in Britain and by derivation in 
Tasmania and Australia, was romanticism. 216 
According to Alomes, romanticism's stress on 
emotions over the rational mind, on nature over civilisation and the folk roots of a 
society in its region over the world of urban rush (Arnold's 'buried life') reflect a 
reaction against the endless change which also characterises the modem world. 217 
An important part of Alomes' definition, in this context of this discussion, is 
romanticism's "reaction against change". The focus on nature, and rejection of urban 
materialism, is also reflective of the Rousseau-inspired revision of industrialisation. 
The romantic view of Tasmania has been clearly evident in the state's artistic output. 
Alomes cited the work of painters such as John Glover and WC Piguenit as capturing 
214 Ibid, p 214. 
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the romantic sentiment. 218 The arts have also provided romantic icons such as the 
Tasmanian Symphony Orchestra (TS0), which has epitomised the notion of Tasmania 
as a place of cultural excellence. Established in 1948, the TS0 is promoted as "one of 
the world's great small orchestra's."219 The place of the TSO in the Tasmanian 
community was recognised by the State Government in 1999 when it was named as a 
"State icon", and provided with an annual funding grant of $500,000. According to 
the TS0 website, the orchestra is regarded as "the pre-eminent cultural identity for the 
State." Furthermore, 
The central position of the TSO in the Tasmanian community was highlighted in 1995 
when, as the ABC was looking at options for cost cutting, over 35,000 signatures were 
collected on petitions to save the TS0.22° 
Tasmania has also developed a major bi-ennial arts festival — Ten Days on the Island 
— which was first held in 2001. Australia's oldest working theatre, the Theatre Royal, 
is located in Hobart. Tasmania, however, only has a limited number of venues that 
support live contemporary musicians. Few Tasmanian musicians have achieved 
commercial success, with singer Monique Brumby and former Launceston-based 
band Oscar Lima having moderate success within Australia, while 1970s pop outfit 
The Innocents / Beathoven also achieved some (minor) international recognition. 
Over recent years the public face of the 'romantic' Tasmanian identity has been the 
rise of the green political movement. Tasmania's green party has achieved a strong 
national profile, and has had a considerable impact on the way Tasmania is viewed by 
Tasmanians and by the rest of the world. The 1977 Callaghan Report noted the 
strength of the 'conservation lobby' in Tasmania as one of the State's distinguishing 
features. In his summary of the forestry industry, Callaghan stated that 
The (possible) conflict between conservation and the development of forest and mineral 
resources is one to which attention must be directed. Tasmania has for some time been 
the subject of very strong conservation lobbying and the Australian Mines and Metals 
218 Ibid, p 195. 
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Association (for example) claim that there is no element of compromise within 'the 
environment lobby ' P221 
Alomes also identified examples of the tensions between the progressive and romantic 
'dialectic' in Tasmania. These conflicts included 
a continuing one, between the Hydro Electric Commission (or HEC) as a symbol of 
progress and the rise of the conservation movement with its roots in romanticism, in a 
contemporary rationality in a finite world and, sometimes, in apocalyptic 
messianism. 222 
The Tasmanian green political movement has successfully focused on key issues to 
consolidate and mobilise public support. In the early 1990s the Tasmanian green 
movement shifted its focus from protesting against hydro-electricity projects to the 
forestry industry, and this has remained an icon issue for the green movement. 
During the 2002 State Government election campaign, for example, a key policy issue 
for the Tasmanian Greens was logging in 'old growth' forest. During the summer of 
2003-2004 forestry was again being touted by the green movement as a significant 
election issue — this time for the upcoming 2004 Federal election. 
3.5 Tasmania Together 
A State Government project initiated in 1999— Tasmania Together - stimulated a 
considerable amount of community discussion and debate about the Tasmanian 
identity. The Tasmania Together program sought to define a comprehensive vision 
for the State, encompassing issues of economy, governance, social and physical health 
and environment, within a set of objectives for the State to achieve by the year 2020. 
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Although not an explicit goal of the program, Tasmania Together effectively 
attempted to redefine Tasmania's regional identity. 
Initially carriage of the Tasmania Together project was given to a 'Community 
Leaders Group', chosen 
on the basis of an even gender and regional representation, with a tilt towards younger 
people who had not necessarily been the 'public faces' of their organisations or 
sectors.223 
The role of the Community Leaders Group was to prepare a document outlining a 
vision for the State in the year 2020 encapsulating a set of objectives representing the 
common aspirations of Tasmanians. The process of defining these aspirations 
involved a series of public forums, meeting with community groups, and an invitation 
for written submissions. Alongside the database of submissions, a public on-line 
forum was held during 2000 seeking input into a draft vision and goals statement 
published by the Community Leaders Group. The responses posted on the on-line 
forum contained a variety of opinions relating to the type of place people wanted 
Tasmania to become in the future, along with observations about Tasmania as it is 
today. 
The Tasmania Together process thus prompted Tasmanians to think about how they 
perceived themselves as a community. The submissions gathered by through the 
Tasmania Together were collated in a Summary of Data document, and submissions 
were also made publicly through the on-line forum. These submissions and the 
conclusions reached by the Community Leaders Group can also be used to shed light 
on a number of aspects of the Tasmanian identity. 
3.6 	Competitive Advantages 
The Australian Government's Taskforce on Regional Development in 1994 listed five 
'major strengths' of the Tasmanian economy — `agrifood', forestry, manufacturing, 
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mining and tourism. 224 The first four of these strengths relate to capitalising on the 
State's natural resources, while the fifth, tourism, also depends largely on the State's 
natural environment. The Taskforce stated that "geography, colonial heritage, and 
wilderness areas underpin a growing tourism industry that already contributes around 
eight per cent of the region's economy."225 
The Nixon Report listed what it found to be Tasmania's competitive strengths under 
four headings — environment, resources, manufacturing and services. In relation to 
'environment', Nixon stated that: 
Much of the natural heritage of Tasmania has been preserved for future generations. A 
large proportion is pristine wilderness of recognised world significance. 226 
Beyond the wilderness areas, however, Nixon noted the importance of the State's 
environment to industry sectors such as agriculture and aquaculture as well as its 
significance for lifestyle amenity: 
Aside from these areas of pristine wilderness and naturally protected heritage, 
Tasmania generally possesses a clean land and marine environment, which has 
sustained and been shaped by Tasmanians over the years. This includes rich farmland 
and clean waterways in close proximity to urban centres, providing a style of living 
which will be increasingly sought-after as the pace of our lives increases and 
technological advances reduce the physical barriers which have isolated Tasmania in 
the past.222 
Nixon stated that Tasmania had "abundant natural resources," including 
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Natural renewable resources such as the State's forests, fisheries, waterways and 
agricultural land, as well as finite resources such as metallic and non-metallic 
minerals.228 
While Tasmania's isolation and island status led to extra costs and challenges for 
industry looking to process these resources, Nixon recognised that island status could 
also be an advantage. 
Tasmania's disease-free status is one such benefit of island environment, especially for 
agricultural production and food processing industries. 229 
Nixon also argued that access to natural resources and a clean environment both play 
a role in the State's competitive advantage as a manufacturer, along with Tasmania's 
historically low power prices, although this last element of competitive advantage had 
been largely eroded. Furthermore, Nixon believed that the presence of entrepreneurs 
in Tasmania was also a strength of the State's manufacturing sector: 
Tasmania is fortunate to have a number of skilled entrepreneurial business people who 
have a real commitment to the State. I have met with many of these people during the 
course of my Inquiry, and I believe that they will play a very important part in 
Tasmania's economic future. 
Finally, Nixon believed that the first three competitive advantages combined to 
provide opportunities for the services sector, especially in industries such as 
information technology, research, education, tourism and communications. 
Furthermore, he argued that Tasmania's small size made it easier to form industry 
clusters around these advantages. Nixon stated that 
The State's other competitive advantages can reinforce and interact to allow real 
competitive advantage to be developed in these export service industries... These 
export service industries, in responding to market pressures and building upon 
228 ibid9p 13. 
229 Ibid, p 13. 
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competitive advantage, often will form alliances or clusters within the economy. In a 
small State like Tasmania, these alliances form more readily to great advantage. 230 
Another State Government initiative, the Brand Tasmania Council, has sought to 
provide support for Tasmanian exporters by developing stronger 'brand recognition' 
of Tasmanian products. The Council stated that its principal objectives are 
to heighten the profile, quality and value of Tasmanian products and services in the 
marketplace and to encourage a broad-based ownership of the Tasmanian brands by 
Tasmanian enterprises and the community. 231 
The Brand Tasmania Council has sought to identify Tasmania's competitive 
advantages and raise awareness of them through a range of marketing programs. 
Those competitive advantages were summarised on the Brand Tasmania web site in 
the following way: 
Tasmania is an island of difference. A resourcefulness abounds in its people and is 
encapsulated by their creativity and design whether it be artistic endeavours, scientific 
research or aquacultural prowess. 
Tasmania's competitive edge is its ability to produce some of the world's most superb 
wines, finest foods and exotic fare from one of the cleanest natural environments in the 
world. Quality is premium. 
It is the innovation and resourcefulness of Tasmanians that makes Tasmania a place 
beyond imagination.232 
Creativity and innovation thus are considered central to the Brand Tasmania image of 
the State, while key industry sectors related to the Tasmanian 'brand' include food 
and beverage production — especially wine and aquaculture. 
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_Contributors to the Tasmania Together on-line forum tended to focus on agriculture 
(particularly 'organic' agriculture), information technology and tourism as industries 
in which Tasmania was considered to have advantages, although there were a number 
of conflicting opinions raised. The uptake of new technology as means of achieving 
greater employment was a theme echoed by many submissions, but the notion of 
capitalising on Tasmania's 'clean, green image' was more widely accepted. The 
Summary of Data document listed a range of industries "that we should develop" 
including 
ship-building, agriculture, aquaculture, tourism, software and information technology, 
fine furniture, services, environmental technologies, multimedia, biotechnology, but not 
GMOs." 3 . 
A romantic image of Tasmania as a producer of 'organic' crops came through 
strongly in many submissions. While organic producers in Tasmania have struggled 
against limited demand and high marginal costs, the public perception of organic 
agriculture as expressed by submissions to Tasmania Together was quite different. 
For example The Summary of Data document noted the following comment about an 
overall vision for Tasmania: 
My picture of Tasmania is of a sophisticated, cultured, and safe place to live with a 
highly educated society, clean vegetation and organic farming. 234 
A similar comment on this issue on the Tasmania Together on-line forum, from Nick 
Flittner, stated 
There is a huge international demand for clean food - not genetically modified, organic 
as [sic] possible. We have the climate, the soils, the water, the human resources. But at 
the moment we ignore all these and go for destructive and dirty low value forestry / 
woodchipping / plantation industries. These have been shedding jobs for 50 years and 
233 Community Leaders Group, Community Consultations - Summaries of Data, October 2001, p 49. 
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will continue to do so. Destruction of native forests and plantation forestry is also 
destroying potential industries such as tourism. 235 
The pro-organic farming and anti-plantation forestry argument was also raised by M 
Allen: 
An opportune way to create jobs and wealth in Tasmania is to provide support to 
organic farmers. We are facing a critical time, with the widespread use of pesticides 
and herbicides in chemical agriculture and particularly with the spread of monoculture 
tree plantations. It is at this junction that Tasmanians could make the choice to support 
food production without the use of synthetic chemicals, which could improve the health 
of the people, and the soil, water and air that we all depend upon. 
Organic farming is more labour-intensive than chemical agriculture, thereby creating 
meaning jobs for people. The promise of readily available organic produce is one that 
would bring many health-seeking people into Tasmania, there is currently an enormous 
demand in this area. 236 
M Allen's reference to 'meaning jobs', and its implication that other jobs, such as 
those in conventional agriculture were therefore not 'meaningful', was echoed in a 
number of comments regarding employment in Tasmania. The Summaries of Data 
document noted that 
All Tasmanians will have access to employment and training appropriate to make them 
job ready. Not just any job. All Tasmanians have a means of meaningful income 
generation. 237 
Some submissions were specific about what constituted non-meaningful employment, 
and usually they targeted call centre employment, with the phrase "dark satanic mills" 
235 Nick Flittner, www.tastogether.asn.auffeedback, submitted 2/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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used by several correspondents in reference to this type of employment. For example, 
an on-line submission from Shaun Cans stated 
There are plenty of countries were English is spoken. Anyone can buy the equipment 
and set up call centres if they want to. The physical assets are relatively inexpensive. It 
is labour to answer the calls which is the major cost. If some other State or country has 
lower taxes, wages or some other cost advantage then we know what is going to 
happen. Call centres are quick to get up and running in Tasmania and they are equally 
quick to relocate elsewhere.238 
The same correspondent was also dismissive of the potential for information 
technology to bring growth to the Tasmanian economy, for similar reasons: 
IT related industries do overcome the distance problem. There is no reason why they 
couldn't locate in Tasmania. Likewise there is no fundamental reason why they need to 
remain here or even come here in the first place. 239 
Shaun Cans received enthusiastic support from an anonymous correspondent to the 
on-line forum a few days later: 
Shaun Cans is so right! ... It is refreshing to read someone questioning the huge furphy 
that IT is our future. When every country and state thinks the same thing, guess what 
happens? Exactly what has always happened: Tasmanian is the first to fall in the 
competition stakes [sic]. And as for call centres! In today's paper we learn that people 
are already being sacked because of loss of a contract. Just wait until India etc takes all 
the contracts because they will accept even lower wages than the miserable pittances 
offered here ... Do you really want your children to grow up to work in a chicken coop, 
for miserable money, and wired up to a computer? Dark satanic mills yet again. 240 
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Not all submissions were quite so negative about the Information Technology and 
telecommunications sector. For example, Brian Beswick made the following 
suggestions: 
1) Continue and strengthen the information technology/economy state development 
initiatives 
2) Provide monies for both information services and new economy industries (and not 
just call centres) 
3) Provide tax haven for on-line financial services ... 
4) Improve information highway infrastructure to provide low entry costs to further 
help local business and attract others. 241 
Similarly, Cohn Kitto stated that 
the advent of the Internet means that there are no longer any real restrictions OR 
LIMITATIONS to communication or e-commerce! Which means that Tasmania need 
not necessarily be an island! 242 
A common theme among submissions was the romantic ideal of 'high culture' over 
the perceived crassness of mass-consumption, and a rejection of resource-based 
industries on the basis of their `unsustainability.' This theme was borne out in 
comments such as: 
Tasmania celebrating and promoting to the world a culture that still values 
craftmanship, creativity, excellence, individual artistry and above all integrity. 243 
Thriving on what naturally is on offer without exhausting resources beyond their limit 
is the key. 2" 
and 
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Wholesome values attributed to ecologically based industry can not only deliver 
lifestyle and profit but peace of mind an, most importantly the assured pre
\
servation of 
bio-diversity and life. 245 
The 'progressive' voice however was always present in contributions on the subject of 
jobs and industry. For example, one un-named submission called for the State to: 
Focus on new technologies: 
1) Information Technology 
2) Biotechnology 
3) Nano technology 
4) New Materials Technology 
These areas must be a part of our future industry policy. The destruction of 
manufacturing industries and the loss of jobs in service based industries means we must 
create new industry. 246 
The final set of Tasmania Together goals was not specific about building growth in 
any particular industry sectors. Instead, the Tasmania Together goals relating to the 
economy were left broad and open to interpretation. Goal 16, for example, aimed to 
"increase job and meaningful work opportunities in Tasmania," 247 while Goal 17 
aimed to "maximise the opportunities available through information and other 
technologies."248 
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3.7 	Innovation / Thick Labour Markets 
The size of Tasmania's labour market is constrained by its population of around 
480,000.249 Nevertheless, the need for encouraging innovation has been recognised 
by a number of State and Federal Government initiatives — such as the Intelligent 
Island program, and the State Government's Innovations Centre program. The $40 
million Intelligent Island program was a joint State/Federal government initiative that 
aimed to: 
promote employment growth and wealth creation throughout the Tasmanian economy 
by accelerating the growth of the State's information and communications technology 
(ICT) industries. By 2010 Tasmania's ICT industries will have a significant role in the 
State's economy. 25° 
Furthermore, the Intelligent Island vision of the information and communications 
, technology sector was for the sector, by 2010, to: 
• Have significantly grown in terms of employment and financial turnover 
• Be externally focussed and achieve most of its profit from sources outside Tasmania 
• Underpin innovation and growth in other sectors, both in Tasmania and elsewhere, by 
working in close partnerships with other organisations in other sectors 
• Produce a wide range of products and services including a number of world-class 
products exported internationally 
• Include a dynamic and large number of small, dynamic and rapidly growing firms 
able to work alone and in consortia, a fair proportion of robust and innovative 
medium [sized] firms and a number of national or international firms that have 
established significant bases in the state. 25I 
Similarly, the State Government's Innovation Centre program was established in 
1999 to help "Tasmania's innovators and entrepreneurs, especially those in small to 
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medium-sized companies and start-ups, to commercialise their intellectual 
property."252 The Innovation Centre website states that the program 
targets businesses and individuals seeking to commercialise innovative products, processes and 
services that have the potential to generate employment, investment and exports. 253 
A range of business assistance grants are available through the program, and industry 
'networking' seminars are also held to promote social interaction between 
entrepreneurs and, marketers and investors. The Innovation Centre has also provided 
support for an Entrepreneurship Major at the University of Tasmania and an 
entrepreneurship program at Tasmanian secondary colleges. 254 
Peter Nixon found that there was a perception in Tasmania that bureaucratic process 
stifled change, and he argued that the State's system of Government contributed to 
this perception. Nixon stated that 
Tasmania's poor performance can be traced to the inability of past Governments to act 
decisively when addressing the problems facing the State. Many people who have 
made submissions to me have stated that the Parliament and the Government are very 
risk-averse. This surfaces within Tasmania as an overwhelming inertia against 
change. 255 
Feedback to the Tasmania Together process indicated overwhelming support for the 
statement that "We will have a world class reputation for innovation, imagination and 
intelligence."256 For example, one comment stated "the vision is excellent. It is more 
important than many of the other vision statements."257 Beyond the affirmations of 
the innovation and technology, however were different interpretations of what 
'imaginative' actually meant, and how the vision could be achieved. Many comments 
expressed a positive view of change, for example "A place of innovation, excellence 
252 The Innovations Centre, www.develoument.tas.gov.au/innovate.html,  accessed 2/3/2004. 
253 thid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 49. 
256 Community Leaders Group, Community Consultations - Summaries of Data, p 11. 
257 ibid, p 1 1 . 
89 
and vibrance,"258 and "Tasmania needs more science based industry. 59259 many 
submissions supported greater emphasis on science and technology in general, but 
were suspicious of the adoption of genetic modification technology. For example, 
comments along these lines included "Tasmania can endeavour to become a world-
class centre for biotechnology as long as that does not include genetically engineered 
crops.5,26o 
Significantly, a strong theme that emerged through these submissions was the need 
for cultural change, particularly in relation to the adoption of science and technology 
throughout the community, and especially in business. In this regard, a number of 
comments were received that suggested "we must establish a culture of innovation 
where to fail is OK." 261 
Similar comments included: 
We must recognise that you can't necessarily plan for innovation but that the culture 
provided by business and government must be able to recognise innovation and allow it 
to flourish,262 
and 
Tasmania should create an innovation culture that involves doing new things first and 
best. We must nurture whatever talent we have and try to develop ideas through to 
commercialisation in the State. 263 
While these comments demonstrated a positive attitude to change and innovation, 
they all argued that Tasmania needed to develop an innovative culture, thus implying 
that the State does not have such a culture. There was also a broad consensus in 
submissions that an improved education system was crucial to Tasmania's future. 
258 Ibid, p 12. 
259 Ibid, p 48. 
260 Ibid, p 48. 
261 /bid, p 50. 
262 	• p 50. 
263 Ibid, p 50. 
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This conviction was consistent to submissions coming from both the romantic and 
progressive perspectives. Some differences, however, were evident in assertions 
about the nature of the 'problem' with the Tasmanian education system. While some 
submissions identified a link between the education system and innovation and 
entrepreneurship, others argued that education should be broader than focussing on 
'business' imperatives. For example, one anonymous submission stated: 
To truly influence the long-term economic future of this State, a priority must be given 
to a full review of education in Tasmania. The interdependence between the best 
possible outcomes from the public education sector and future employment 
opportunities is fundamental. 
Life skills in addition to a progressive curriculum supported by a healthy profession 
[sic] must be a priority objective. In addition, the University of Tasmania needs full 
support as a leader (wherever the niche lies) in a field. It needs to be seen as an 
institution of excellence ... 
If our education system is a reflection of 'best practice', these standards will translate in 
the development of new industry, lift standards in existing sectors etc. 264 
Submissions such as the above touched on the economic function of the University of 
Tasmania, not just in providing people with skills and knowledge, but also in earning 
income through education services. For example, Community Leaders Group 
member Gerard Castles made the following submission relating to the economic 
impact of the State's education sector: 
I would like to see us grow service sector industries (education and health) as major 
drivers of our economy ... but they will need to get a Bunsen burner under them to get 
there.'" 
264 Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 1/2/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
265 Gerald Castles, www.tastozether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 8/2//00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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A number of submissions suggested that the Tasmanian education system did not 
place enough emphasis on business skills or entrepreneurship. For example: 
I want to see a Tasmanian education system that has more emphasis on the links 
between individual actions and the State economy. I would like to see more emphasis 
placed on educating our youth in economics, business skills, finance, 
entrepreneurialism, satisfying the customer, etc. etc. This is of primary importance. 266 
A similar comment expressed a concern for a 'cycle of underachievement': 
We must break the cycle of underachievement which is passed on from parent to child_ 
This can only be done by leadership. We must focus our education on achieving the 
economic outcomes which are important to the State. Economics, finance, what is a 
company, how to make money, entrepreneurship, where is the State headed, how the 
individual fits in to this vision, these are important issues which are currently neglected 
in education. Perhaps the most important thing that is needed is some sort of rebuttal of 
the 'we can't do it' mentality which seems to permeate the State (the cycle of 
underachievement). Surely education is an important factor we can use to eliminate 
this most debilitating of social ills. 267 
Another submission linked the education system with a perception of apathy and 
mediocrity. The tone of this unnamed submission clearly communicated a negative 
view of Tasmania's present economic and social situation: 
Teaching reading without phonics, creativity at the cost of content ... have all created 
the inevitable result: vast numbers of people who are incapable of excellence or of 
sustained thought. These people are not going to lift Tasmania out of the mire of 
mediocrity, in which the State has not always been sunk. 
Why do our young people leave? Because they no longer want to be associated with 
the majority who are incurious, uncritical and apathetic. 268 
266 Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.auffeedbacic, submitted 28/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
267 Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 13/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
268 Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 13/3/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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Innovation was, however, a central theme in the final Tasmania Together goals. Goal 
11, for example aimed to "have Tasmania recognised nationally and internationally 
for its innovation, pursuit of excellence and creativity arts and culture." 269 Similarly, 
Goal 19 aimed to "have an internationally focused business culture that creates 
business investment and growth and encourages enterprise, innovation and 
excellence,"27° while Goal 18 again highlighted the nexus between education and 
innovation, aiming to "ensure education and training provides our workforce with the 
skills to support our business and industry. 1,271 
3.8 	Lifestyle 
Tasmanian economic development promotional literature frequently promotes the 
State's 'relaxed, friendly lifestyle'. The Department of Economic Development 
website, for example, states that: 
Tasmania offers an enviable lifestyle. It is the smallest Australian state, but it has all of 
the services and facilities needed to make it a safe and relaxing home. 
Tasmanians enjoy the benefits of a city lifestyle, combined with easy access to beaches, 
rivers and lakes and nationalarp ks.272 
Peter Nixon also identified the State's lifestyle as one of the State's main advantages 
as a place to live: 
Nothing is ever very far away. In the morning I can be shopping in the city, while by 
early afternoon I can be casting a few flies in virtual wilderness surroundings. Heaven 
on earth. 273 
269 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, 2001, p 15. 
270 rbid, p 23. 
271 Ibid, p 22. 
272 Department of Economic Development, Tasmanian Lifestyle, 
www.development.tas.gov.au/lifestyle/living.html,  accessed 2/3/04. 
273 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 7. 
93 
While these aspects of Tasmanian lifestyle are often seen as selling points, they have 
also been seen by some as disadvantages. For example, Callaghan argued that young 
people in particular tended to move away from the state for reasons "other than 
employment."274 Callaghan stated that: 
Young people, especially, leave in search of higher education and /or more urbanised 
life styles. The relaxed pace of Tasmania ... does not suit all, and it is unrealistic to 
assume that it would. 275 
Nixon also noted the absence of popular music culture in Tasmania, despite the 
presence of a "strong arts community." 276 Nixon argued that Tasmania had a 
flourishing arts scene that attracted to people to live in the State. For example, Nixon 
stated that 
The skills and talents of Tasmania [sic] are well recognised and I am aware that people 
with a creative background are attracted to Tasmania. This includes performers, artists, 
writers and crafts persons. 277 
Nevertheless, Nixon also found a level of discontentment in regards to 'popular 
culture' as opposed to 'high culture': 
While there are a number of funding sources which support traditional arts and culture, 
a number of the young people who have spoken to me raised the issue that cultural 
activities for young people are limited. These young people have expressed their 
concern that bands touring Australia frequently leave Tasmania off their agenda.278 
Submissions to Tasmania Together generally were supportive of the notion that 
Tasmania's lifestyle was a strength, however, there was also a theme expressed that 
274 Sir Bede Callaghan, Inquiry into the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in 
Tasmania, p 29. 
275 thid, p 29. 
276 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p20!. 
277 Thid, p20!. 
278 Ibid, p201. 
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the State was 'backward'. For example, Alex Tewes was positive about the potential 
of new technology, but felt that the Tasmania needed to adapt to the changing world 
around it: 
To participate in the global economy and attract people that live in that economy (for 
example those who have been tagged the 'e-generation') Tasmania needs to act as if it 
is part of that economy. This means committing to a 24/7 economy and understanding 
that, for example, restrictive shop trading hours are a symbol of 19th century thinking 
and a symbolic barrier to participation in the global economy. 279 
The role of the arts in Tasmanian culture was also a popular theme for discussion. 
Feedback on the statement that Tasmania would have a "an international reputation 
for excellence in arts and culture" was overwhelmingly positive, with many 
submissions referring to the Tasmanian Symphony Orchestra as an example of 
Tasmania's cultural life.280 Essentially, the major points of conflict in relation to this 
topic were over the level of Government subsidies and assistance that should be 
directed to artists, and the potential value of the arts to the State economy. For 
example, one statement on the on-line forum drew this comparison between Tasmania 
and Ireland: 
There are many similarities between Tasmania and Ireland as regards being the 
despised anchor or 'rust bucket' lying off the coast. Everyone knows that Ireland has 
completely reversed its position within the UK (sic) and the world and has done so 
through the arts and uniqueness of its culture and people. This is what makes money 
and employment opportunities, not digging holes, cutting down trees and turning 
valuable people into battery hens in the modem day dark satanic mills of call centres. 28I 
These sentiments where echoed in another submission focusing on the value of the 
arts to the State economy: 
279 Alex Tewes, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 8/2/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
280 For example - Caroline, www.tastogether.as.au/feedback,  submitted 9/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
281 Peta, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback, submitted 14/3/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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Tasmanians are passionate about the arts and we certainly have the basis for the 
creation of a living, thriving cultural epicentre ... The Government would be wise to 
commence a community arts sponsorship initiative which would see businesses 
rewarded for financial support of arts organisations. 282 
A dissenting view argued that the discussion on arts funding was 
a low priority. How can a commitment to arts and sports compare to, for example, a 
commitment to ensuring that all Tasmanians are healthy - in the broadest sense. Arts 
and sports have functions within health and education but I do not believe they should 
be of equivalent priority.283 
The lifestyle-related goals in Tasmania Together tended to relating to focus on issues 
of public health, encouraging and encouraging higher levels of participation in civic 
activities — especially in rural areas and in younger people. For example, Goal 5 
aimed to "develop an approach to health and wellbeing that focused on preventing 
poor health and encouraging healthy lifestyles."284 Goal 7 aimed to "foster and value 
vibrant and diverse rural, regional and remote communities that are connect to each 
other and the rest of the world,"285 while Goal 8 aimed to "provide a valued role in 
community life for Tasmania's young people now and in the future." 286 
3.9 	Diversity 
The issue of ethnic diversity in Tasmania was also picked up by the Callaghan Report 
in 1977. Callaghan stated that a distinctive feature of Tasmania's population structure 
was relatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity when compared to other states. 
Callaghan observed that 
282 Caroline, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback,  submitted 9/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
283 Name not provided, wvvw.tastogether.asn.au/feedbacic,  submitted 23/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
284 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 11. 
285 ib • •, p ict 	12. 
286 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 13. 
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The limited ethnic diversity that does exist is largely attributable to the post World War 
II international recruitment of labour by the Hydro Electric Commission at the time of 
construction work on the Upper Derwent schemes. 287 
Callaghan, therefore, found that Tasmania had a relatively small population of people 
with Mediterranean European and Asian backgrounds, but stronger ties with migrants 
from the United Kingdom, Poland and the Netherlands. Callaghan argued that this 
lack of ethnic diversity had a potentially negative effect on economic growth: 
Thus it seems that labour force growth in Tasmania received little impetus from 
overseas immigration. It is also likely that the lack of ethnic diversity within the 
population has inhibited some of the social and economic changes that have occurred 
on the mainland. 2" 
This observation was reinforced by Nixon, who noted that Tasmania receives only 0.4 
per cent of Australia's total overseas migrant intake. Furthermore, Nixon stated that 
Tasmania has a much lower proportion of non-Australian born citizens (13 per cent) 
than the nation as a whole (23 per cent), while the proportion of Tasmanians born in 
Asia was only half the proportion of people born in Asia for the nation as a whole.289 
Gay rights activist Rodney Croome has noted that attitudes towards homosexuality 
have changed significantly in Tasmania over recent years — from intolerance to 
liberalism. In a speech in Launceston during September 1999, Croome referred to the 
effect of legislative change on attitudes towards homosexuality in Tasmania 
through a combination of intense community education, sometimes very confronting 
direct action and the exploitation of every available avenue for legal appeal we turned 
Tasmania from a jurisdiction with one of the worst lesbian and gay human rights 
regimes in the western world to one of the best. 
As well as achieving complete equality for homosexual and heterosexual people within 
the criminal law, we now have an Anti-discrimination Act that prohibits discrimination 
287 Sir Bede Callaghan, Report Into the Structure of Industry and Employment Situation in Tasmania, p 
32. 
288 /bid, p 33. 
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and vilification on the grounds of sexual orientation without exception, as well as a new 
Education Department anti-homophobia policy, the implementation of which is 
mandatory for all schools. 
Even more satisfying is the fact that these changes have the endorsement of the people 
of Tasmania. According to opinion polls, community attitudes in Tasmania, once so 
negative towards homosexuality, are now some of the most tolerant in the country. 290 
Submissions to the Tasmania Together project relating to diversity exhibited an 
acceptance of diversity as a positive and worthy goal. Some feedback, however, 
expressed an opposition to a proposed goal relating to 'inclusiveness' and the rights of 
minority groups. For example, the following submission indicated a 'backlash' 
against the gay rights and green movements: 
It worries me that in this vision you have the option of including 'minority' groups in 
the decision-making process. For too long already Tasmanians would have been 
badgered by the loud and vocal minority groups in our community! I'm especially 
referring to those groups which the 'majority' of Tasmanians would agree are not 
benefiting our society, economy or moral values. Groups which block development of 
all kinds - hampering economic growth; groups pushing for relaxation of laws 
protecting our young from drugs or sexual abuse and thereby encouraging their illegal 
behaviour. 
No I don't agree that it is right to allow minority groups to have a greater say in the 
decision making process. 291 
The final Tasmania Together goals did not make reference to minority groups, but did 
included a specific reference to diversity in Goal 9 — "foster an inclusive society that 
acknowledges and respects our multi- cultural heritage, values diversity and treats 
289 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 36. 
290 Rodney Croome, Address at the launch of "A Just Society", 10/9/1999, transcript on International 
Lesbian and Gay Association website, www.ilga.org/Information/asia pacific, accessed 2/3/04. 
291 Alex, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback,  submitted 15/5/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
98 
everyone with compassion and respect."292 Furthermore, benchmarks connected to 
this goal included: 
• Double the number of multicultural events by 2015; 
• Increase the number of schools integrating multi-cultural perspectives in the 
curriculum; 
• Halve the percentage of lesbian and gay people who experience verbal abuse 
and physical assault on the basis of their sexual orientation by 2015; and 
• Increase the percentage of teachers who have received professional 
development training in racial, gender, disability and sexuality related 
discrimination and harassment. 293 
3.10 Authenticity 
When considering what was most 'authentic' about Tasmania, the feedback to the 
Tasmania Together process indicated that most Tasmanians seem to associate 
'authenticity' with the State's natural environment. Even Callaghan, who felt that the 
conservation lobby was having a negative impact on Tasmania's economic progress, 
recognised the central role that the State's natural environment played in the 
Tasmanian identity. Callaghan stated that a significant aspect of the "quality of life" 
of Tasmanians, which was "obvious to all who have visited Tasmania," was 
the natural beauty of the island, and the accessibility of that natural environment to both 
resident and tourist. For example, both Hobart and Launceston are situated on rivers 
that offer extensive aesthetic and recreational pleasures for those sc) inclined. For 
others, the wilderness areas which cover much of the State provide far greater 
opportunities for enjoying nature than are available in many mainland areas ... What 
value inhabitants of any area place on their environment is difficult to judge, but many 
Tasmanians obviously appreciate the advantages they have in this respect. 294 
292 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 13. 
293 /bid, p 13. 
294 Sir Bede Callaghan, Report Into the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in 
Tasmania, p 77. 
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Nixon also identified Tasmania's natural and cultural heritage as a defining aspect of 
the State. Nixon stated that 
Tasmania's environment is world class. It offers considerable potential for the State. 
All Tasmanians who I have spoken to have expressed a liking for the environment and 
the need for its careful management. 
As well as the natural environment, Tasmania has the best collection of colonial 
heritage left anywhere in Australia. 295 
Nevertheless, the environment can be seen as a 'touchstone' issue that led to the most 
heated and at times vitriolic debate in the Tasmania Together process. For example, 
while the goal of having an 'ecologically sustainable future' received broad support, 
opinion on what this goal meant in practice, and to achieve it, was polarised. The on-
line argument between Tony Smith and Wal Wright, for example, epitomised the 
debate, and struck on several key issues central to the romantic / progressive divide in 
Tasmania. The issue of organic agriculture compared to GMO agriculture epitomised 
the debate between people who saw traditional agricultural practices as 'authentically' 
Tasmanian, and those who argued Tasmania should keep scientific pace with the rest 
of the world. Tony Smith began the proceedings with this comment on the issue of 
genetically modified organisms and food production: 
On the GMO thing: why is it that the very groups that are rallying against third world 
poverty are all the same ones which are resisting the new technologies (genetic 
engineering etc) which show some glimmer of hope of mitigating the problem (by 
increasing yields and pest control and drought resistance)? 
With these people in charge we would never had advanced beyond treatment of disease 
by leaches and poultices. 
And another thing, how do we stop the media giving such lunatic fringes so much 
attention, to the point where the man / woman in the street is so confused by their 
295 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 8. 
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deliberately misleading babble that they begin to believe it, eg GMO = bad, industry = 
bad, organic = good. 296 
Mr Smith's statement was rebutted by Mr Wright several days later: 
Maybe, just maybe Tony, people are becoming a bit more careful (cynical?) with what 
science tells us we need. Especially when it is paid for and driven by huge 
agrichemical companies like Monsanto. If only we'd had more testing or trials with 
some of the other 'advances' science has given us, eg asbestos, DDT, agent orange, 
PCBs, organochlorides, thalidomide ... the list is endless. 297 
Mr Smith then accused Mr Wright of "throwing the baby out with the bath water." 
The baby in this case being the uncountable number of advances which science has 
made to the great benefit of society, the bathwater being a vocal minority's irrational 
fear of 'something going wrong'. ... Should Tasmania in this enlightened age really 
subscribe to such a Luddite approach?298 
Mr Wright responded again: 
Tony, I realise science has been of great benefit to society. I use a mobile phone would 
you believe. If the markets for our produce don't want GE foods, why should we go 
down that path? Tasmania has a growing, labour intensive organic industry that is 
KIND to the earth, unlike intensive chemical reliant soil destroying farming. 
Introducing GE crops into the State has the potential to wipe the industry out. We don't 
want diseased salmon here, which is a one-way trip?299 
296 Tony Smith, www.tastogether.asn.auffeedback,  submitted 28/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
297 Wal Wright, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback  submitted 3/5/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
298 Tony Smith, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback,  submitted 5/5/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
299 Wal Wright, www.tastogether.asn.auffeedback,  submitted 9/5/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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Other submissions echoed the Tony Smith / Wal Wright argument. For example, 
Nick Flitter reiterated Wall Wright's argument relating to agriculture, while also 
touching the iconic green issue of forestry: 
Tasmania is on its way to destroying one enormous advantage it has over most of the 
rest of the world - the 'clean green' image. Current forestry, logging and plantation 
practices clear felling of native forest, the poisoning of native wildlife, monoculture 
plantations, and a continual round of spraying herbicides and pesticides over large areas 
of the State. This is totally incompatible with 'clean' food production, and against all 
the goals in this vision statement. 30° 
The debate at times degenerated into little more than a slanging match, demonstrating 
the divisive nature of this debate in the Tasmanian community: 
The green lobby tend to be hysterical in their approach, and to bend facts to their own 
ends. They have destroyed informed debate about the environment in this country by 
distorting the truth and in some cases telling outright lies. We must get back to a point 
where environmental issues kept in perspective with social and economic benefit. 301 
The passions evoked in this debate also show the depth with which Tasmanians 
associate themselves with their environment. The final Tasmania Together goals 
reflected the importance of the environment to the Tasmanian community and to the 
Tasmanian identity, with four separate goals relating to protecting the Tasmanian 
environment. For example, Goal 20 aimed to "promote our island advantages 
including our 'clean-green' image, natural resources, location and people."302 Goal 
21, which linked the environment with Tasmania's colonial history, aimed to "value, 
protect and conserve our natural and cultural heritage." 303 Goal 22 aimed to "value, 
protect and maintain our natural diversity," 304 while Goal 23 aimed to "ensure there is 
3® Nick Flittner, www.tastogether.asn.auffeedback,  submitted 2/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
301 Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedbacic,  submitted 10/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
302 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 23 
303 Ibid, p 25 
3°4 Ibid, p 26. 
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a balance between environmental protection and economic and social 
development."305 
3.11 Identity / Status 
Neither the Callaghan Report nor the Nixon Report explicitly discussed the issue of 
Tasmania's status as a place to live. Nixon remarked that the State was seen as an 
attractive place to live for artists, and that people were also attracted to the State for 
its "pace of life,"306  however he did not make mention of Tasmania's overall status 
compared to major urban centres. 
In a reflection of the metropolitan/provincial power relationship that Alomes saw at 
play in historical definitions of the Tasmanian identity, economics commentator 
Bruce Felmingham noted what he called a "time-honoured Australasian pastime 
known as 'Tasmania Bashing' ."3°7 Felmingham argued that the commercial media 
played a central role in spreading myths and untruths about the State, and that there 
was an economic imperative driving the media's agenda — which resulted in the 
presentation of negative images of Tasmania to the rest of the world: 
Tasmania is accustomed to being knocked by Australia's commercial media because we 
are a cheap option. The business operations of commercial television are dominated by 
a simple objective: to maximise advertising revenues. In chasing advertising dollars the 
commercial networks must be careful not to offend their major markets in Sydney or 
Melbourne. Who cares if you put the Tasmanian market offside by exaggerating or 
sensationalising a Tasmanian story when Tasmania represents only 2 per cent of the 
total Australian market? Sydney and Melbourne's commercial TV producers have 
much to answer for in the creation of sensational caricatures of Tasmania. 308 
Indeed, Stephen Alomes also found the media to be a central player in the 
dissemination of condescending and patronising mythologies about Tasmania: 
305 Ibid, p 26. 
3°6 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 8. 
3°7 Bruce Felminghatn, "Offensive Effects of Poisoned Minds," in The Sunday Tasmanian, 6 October 
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Typical media expressions of the metropolitan prejudice about Tasmania abound, 
focussing on eccentrics and scandals in stereotypical stories which gratify the 
imagination of metropolitan suburbanites from Canterbury to Lindfield. 309 
Feedback to the Tasmania Together process indicated that there was a recognition that 
Tasmania did not have a high status as a place to live. Indeed, the following 
submission summed up these negative feelings about the Tasmanian identity: 
I want to see a society where the handout mentality is definitely considered uncool. 
Where Tasmania stands on its own two feet, without having to be propped up with 
welfare gifts and subsidies; where the rest of Australia looks to us with pride and (a 
little) awe rather than pity; where Tasmanians are proud of their contribution to society; 
where Tasmania is considered a focal point for economic and societal development 
rather than an irrelevant backwater. 31° 
The issue of Tasmania's status was a clear point of concern in the final set of 
Tasmania Together goals. In fact, improving Tasmania's status became integral to 
the overarching Tasmania Together vision statement: 
Together we will make Tasmania an icon for the rest of the world by creating a proud 
and confident society where people live in harmony and prosperity. 311 
3.12 The Tasmania Together Identity 
The outcome of the Tasmania Together process presented a Tasmanian identity that 
was, superficially, both romantic and progressive. Inevitably, this too raised public 
308 Ibid. 
309  Stephen Alomes, "Lands of Ideas: Progress and Romanticism in Tasmanian (and Australian) 
History," p 199. 
31° Name not provided, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback,  submitted 28/4/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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criticism for appearing to be contradictory. For example, in a letter to the editor in the 
Mercury newspaper, Lia St John stated: 
Tasmania Together's goals will be achieved. Stopping woodchipping makes no 
poverty by 2020 easy because without a forestry industry Tasmania will be a ghost 
town. No people, no poverty. 312 
Another interpretation of the Tasmania Together vision, however, could argue that 
rather than being contradictory, the vision places 'progressive' goals and imperatives 
within the context of a 'romantic' identity. Essentially, this means defining Tasmania 
in the romantic tradition, a place separated from the crass industrialisation of 
metropolitan areas, while still maintaining a focus on industry and economic progress. 
This is to be achieved through the pursuit of so-called clean/green industry, such as 
the export of renewable energy, aquaculture, value-added agricultural products such 
as pyrethrum and wine, information technology and tourism. 
A number of submissions to Tasmanian Together seemed to hit on this compromise 
or 'hybrid' identity. Colin Kitto, for example, stated: 
I propose a lot of building and development and redevelopment. But we must also 
preserve our history (within reason!!) and (PARAMOUNT:) we must preserve our 
natural surrounds: our bush, our wildlife, manage our forests, and PROMOTE our 
tourism.313 
The Tasmania Together vision can be seen as closely aligned with the notion of the 
'New Tasmania' — a phrase coined by former State Premier Jim Bacon to convey a 
sense of social and economic progress. In a speech to the National Press Club in 
Canberra in March 2003, Bacon defined what he saw as the 'New Tasmania' in the 
following way: 
312 Lia St John, The Mercury, 18/8/01, p 19. 
313 Colin Kitto, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedbacic,  submitted 21/3/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
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Our economy is booming. There is a level of confidence and optimism in the 
Tasmanian community that hasn't been seen for decades. There is a New Tasmania 
that is more open, creative, innovative, tolerant and fair. It is a Tasmania that is on the 
move and known around the world for its disease-free status, clean air, clean water, 
quality of life and world class cultural, natural and built heritage. The New Tasmania is 
a vibrant place, confident of its place in the world and looking with optimism to the • 
future. 314 
3.13 Summary 
This chapter argued that Tasmania's regional identity has been characterised by two 
distinct intellectual traditions that have been labelled 'romantic' and 'progressive'. 
The romantic tradition has its origins in the enlightenment and in the work of writers 
such as Rousseau. In essence, the romantic Tasmania identity is based on the notion 
that Tasmania is an idyllic refuge from the aggressive, cut-throat capitalism of major 
centres. Important concepts inherent in this identity are protection of the 
environment, a 'slower pace of life', fairness and equality, and a general wariness of 
change and technology. 
On the other hand, the 'progressive' tradition had its origins in the industrial 
revolution, and has as its core values a belief in the benefits of technological progress, 
and a belief that man can control and manipulate nature. The 'progressive' 
Tasmanian identity has been characterised by a strong support of resource-based or 
manufacturing industries, especially icon organisations such as the Hydro Electric 
Corporation, and more recently International Catamarans. The 'progressive' tradition 
sees Tasmania as part of the global economy, as an economic leader rather than as a 
dissident. The Tasmania Together process has attempted to synthesize the two 
Tasmania identities into a single, cohesive regional identity. Through extensive 
public consultation, it has also attempted to create an identity from the 'bottom-up'. 
The Tasmanian identity has been the subject of intense debate and is still being 
fiercely contested in public discourse. Tasmania's relatively short history since 
314  Jim Bacon, transcript of speech to the National Press Club, 4 March 2003. 
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European colonisation has undoubtedly contributed to this situation — as there is no 
real historical tradition to guide the development of the regional identity. It is a much 
different situation, however, in Wales, where a long European history has left a more 
definite set of national characteristics which form the basis of the Welsh national 
identity. The problem in Wales, therefore, has not been to define the national identity, 
but to make that identity relevant to modern day life in Wales. The next chapter will 
discuss the historical Welsh identity and the way that identity is changing as Wales 
itself undergoes significant political change, with the establishment of a new Welsh 
Parliament and continuing regional integration in Europe. 
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Chapter 4 - Wales 
In September 1997 referendums were held in Scotland and Wales over the issue of 
creating national parliaments for the two regions, with devolved powers from the 
British Parliament in London. In Wales, just over one million people voted, with 
referendum being passed by less than 7,000 votes. 315 The referendum marked a 
watershed for Wales — after centuries of English domination the region finally was to 
receive a degree of political autonomy. The tight vote, however, also indicated that 
autonomy was not seen as a pressing issue for roughly half of the Welsh population. 
This chapter examines the Welsh regional identity, how it has changed over time, and 
how it has been affected by British political devolution. The new Welsh Parliament 
has conducted a public consultation program to draw up a set of public policy 
objectives, summarised in a plan titled Better Wales. Like Tasmania Together, the 
Better Wales plan gives a picture of Wales as it is, and also outlines a new vision for 
Wales to achieve in the future. 
4.1 	Welsh Economy and Society 
The economic comparison between Wales and England shows Wales to be at a 
disadvantage in almost every key indicator. In 1998, economic output, measured in 
GDP per head, was around 22 per cent lower in Wales than in England — at £9,664 
compared to £12,473.316 In 1999, average weekly earnings were significantly lower 
in Wales, at £354 compared to £405 in England. 317 Similarly, in 1999 unemployment 
was higher in Wales, at around 7.4 per cent compared to 5.8 per cent, while 17 per 
cent of people aged 16-24 were unemployed in Wales compared to 12 per cent in 
England. 31 8 
315 BBC, Welsh Referendum, www.bbc.co.uk/politics97/devolution/wales/1ive/index.shtml,  accessed 
2/8/03. 
316 Statistics Wales, Comparative Indicators 2000— Wales, England Scotland, 




The Welsh economy has been built around resource-based industries, especially 
mining, since the industrial revolution. With the competitive pressure from low-cost 
countries, and Welsh resources being exhausted, the mining industry in Wales has 
declined significantly over the past 50 years. Statistics Wales figures show that the 
total number of 'employee jobs' in the Welsh economy in 2001 was 1,090,700, with a 
further 156,000 people being self-employed. 319 The bulk of these jobs were classified 
as being within 'service industries'. Over the period of 1998-2001, the total service 
industry workforce rose from 751,100 to 827,400, while total jobs in production and 
construction industries declined from 270,700 to 249,500. The most significant 
growth came in the public administration, education and health sector, the banking, 
finance and insurance sector, and the transport and communications sector. 320 
Table 2 - Welsh Employment by Industry Sector 
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 
All industries 1,038,100 1,069,800 1,077,900 1,090,700 
Agriculture and fishing 16,200 15,800 12,700 13,700 
All production and 
construction industries 
270,700 268,900 268,100 249,500 
Energy and water 9,300 9,000 10,600 9,900 
Manufacturing 208,200 206,900 200,600 189,00 
Construction 53,200 53,000 56,900 50,700 
All service industries 751,100 785,100 797,100 827,400 
Distribution, hotels and 
restaurants 
247,500 247,100 245,300 259,400 
Transport and 
communications 
38,500 43,200 45,500 49,400 
Banking, finance and 
insurance 
112,100 125,300 123,600 123,600 
Public administration, 
education and health 
300,600 313,700 326,100 341,800 
Other services 52,500 55,700 56,500 53,200 
Source: Statistics Wales, Employee Jobs, By Industry, 
www.statswales.wales.gov.uk , accessed 2/08/03. 
319 . Statistics Wales, Employee Jobs, By Industry, www.statswales.wales.gov.uk, accessed 2/08/03. 
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The Cardiff Business School's summary of the Welsh economy argues that structural 
changes over the past 20 years have transformed Wales from a primarily resource-
based economy to one dominated by high-tech manufacturing and services. The 
Cardiff Business School web site states that 
Wales entered the 1980s with severe structural problems. The decline of the coal and 
metals sectors, combined with a decline in some of its older manufacturing sectors, had 
left the Principality with both the economic and social scars of structural decline. In 
particular, Wales began the decade as one of the most needy areas of the UK economy, 
scoring badly on a wide range of indicators of economic well-being. 321 
Over recent years, however, Wales has benefited from considerable foreign 
investment in manufacturing, as well as significant financial support from European 
Union and growth in the services sector: 
Indeed, for much of the 1980s and 1990s, Wales was one of the most successful regions 
in the European Union in attracting foreign capital. Old connections with basic metals 
and coal have been displaced by a set of US, European and Japanese multinationals, 
many of which are allied to the electronics, automotive and chemicals industries. The 
services sector has also come to dominate the local economy more and more — most 
recently this has been evidenced in Wales' success in attracting financial and business 
services companies in call centre investments. 322 
Agriculture has historically been an important component of the Welsh economy. 
The Welsh agriculture sector, however, has been in decline for some years. Ralph 
Fevre stated that the industry in Wales is categorised by "small-scale, low-
productivity production." 323 Competitive pressures are reducing farm incomes and 
exacerbating the trend for young people to move from rural areas to cities. 
Nevertheless, Fevre noted that 
321 Cardiff Business School, The Welsh Economy, www.weru.org.uk/economy.html,  accessed 1/3/04. 
322 Ibid. 
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employment in farming may have been declining for decades, but total employment in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing still stands at 7.3 per cent of all employment in Wales 
... and a quarter of all firms are in agriculture. 324 
Fevre has argued that the structural problems of the Welsh economy are also evident 
in the services sector, where, again, employment tends to be at the bottom-end of the 
corporate ladder, and where growth has come in the least profitable parts of the sector. 
Fevre stated that 
Far too many Welsh service sector firms are in businesses like catering and not enough 
in finance and other services, meaning that Wales has been strong in sectors which are 
declining and missing out (in comparison to the rest of the UK) where expansion has 
occurred. Even where Wales has acquired jobs in financial services, for example, they 
are the poorer quality jobs in the sector. Typically, Wales gains direct-line insurance 
brokers and financial telesales workers but loses regional bank headquarters while the 
higher-paid service sector non-manual jobs are created on the other side of the 
SeVeM.325 
According to Statistics Wales, the participation rate of people in the work force 
(called 'economic activity' in United Kingdom statistics) is lower in Wales than in 
England. Following from the higher rates of unemployment, more income is derived 
from social security in Wales than England, and more people claim income support. 326 
The proportion of people in self-employment is similar, however the proportion of 
people working in professions is lower, while the proportion of people working in 
partly-skilled or unskilled occupations is higher. 327 Fewer days are lost to industrial 
323 Ralph Fevre, "The Welsh Economy," in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson (Eds), Wales 
Today (Cardiff: University,of Wales Press, 1999), p 58. 
324 Ibid, p 58. 
325 Ibid, p 64. 
326 Statistics Wales, Comparative Indicators 2000— Wales, Scotland, England, 
www.wales.gov.uk/Icevpubstatisticsforwales/index.htm, accessed 21/6/04. 
327 Ibid. 
111 
disputes in Wales, despite the region's historical reputation for strong unionisation 
and worker militancy. 328 
In 1998, the Welsh population of 2.9 million was considerably smaller than the 
English population of around 49.5 million. Approximately two thirds of the total 
Welsh population lived in the southern region around the three main cities of Cardiff, 
Swansea and Newport. The Welsh population was, on average, older, and less 
ethnically diverse than the English population. In Wales, 59.6 per cent of the 
population was of working age, compared to 61.5 per cent in England, while 20 per 
cent of the Welsh population was of State pension age (60 for women, 65 for men), 
compared to 18.1 per cent in England. Similarly, 8 per cent of the Welsh population 
was over 75 years of age, compared to 7.4 per cent. Population density in Wales was 
141 residents per square kilometre - roughly one third the population density of 
England, (379 residents per square kilometre). Statistics also showed that women 
tended to give birth earlier in Wales, with higher rates of teen pregnancies and more 
women giving birth in their early twenties. There were also more births outside 
marriage in Wales. The total population in Wales has been rising, but more slowly 
than in England. 329 
It can be seen from these figures that Wales, like Tasmania, fits the description of a 
semi-peripheral economy. Indeed, Pierre Clavel argued that demands for political 
devolution were stronger Wales than in other British regions for a number of reasons, 
including its status as an economic periphery. Clavel stated that 
Wales had many of the characteristics of peripheral regions: poor communications, 
cultural distinctiveness, a common rural background, and a combination of some 
national institutions with a pervasive penetration by central institutions. 330 
328 ibid. 
329 ibid. 
330 Pierre Clavel, Opposition Planning in Wales and Appalachia (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1983), p 86. 
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4.2 	Welsh History and Identity 
Despite English political domination over hundreds of years, Wales has managed to 
maintain a sense of difference and national identity. A National Statistics survey in 
2001 found that 60 per cent of Welsh residents considered their national identity to be 
'Welsh'. A further 7 per cent "described their national identity as Welsh but included 
another identity, most commonly British, in their answer." 331 The survey found that 
the strongest association with Welsh national identity was, unsurprisingly, found in 
Welsh-born residents, while southern Wales recorded stronger associations with the 
national identity than other regions. 332 
Nevertheless, the Welsh national identity has not always been particularly 
complementary, or sympathetic to the Welsh people. The fragmented political 
landscape of the Welsh region, and perceived differences between areas of Wales, has 
complicated the definition of a single regional identity. Evans and Rhys cite a 
common perception of Wales as being that it has "no history apart from strikes, split 
chapels, a rugby team and a handful of short-winded boxers." 333 
Teri Brewer notes that the Welsh identity, like all regional identities, is a social 
construct. In the case of Wales, the construction of an identity has been especially 
apparent, as Wales has not undergone the usual process of nation-building associated 
with the creation of political and civic institutions. Nevertheless, constructed regional 
identities must be based in some form of physical and social reality: 
Historian Gwyn A. Williams and others have suggested that, as a nation, Wales is the 
creation of the collective imagination — an imagined nation. While he was making a 
serious point about institutionalised power and regional self-determination, it is worth 
reflecting on the idea of an imagined nation. To a certain extent, all nations, 
communities and regions are indeed imagines, dreams and ideas undergoing a process 
331 National Statistics, Wales: Its People — Welsh National Identity, www.statistics.gov .ulc, accessed 
1/3/04. 
332 Ibid. 
333 G Evans and I Rhys, "Wales", in Owen Dudley Edwards et al, Celtic Nationalism (London: 
Routledge and K Paul, 1968), p 214. 
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of realization into sought, imposed or accepted social institutions which become part of 
the means of bringing new social and cultural identities to life. 334 
While the advent of the Welsh Parliament has strengthened the position of Wales as 
single political entity, historically Wales has rarely been politically unified. The 
modern Welsh nation and its origins lie in the Celtic communities of Britain in the 
first millennium. Evans and Rhys stated that "The idea of Welsh nationality has from 
the very beginning been bound up with Christianity."335 Brought to Britain by the 
Romans, the Christianity displaced the indigenous Druid religion as the primary 
religious movement in Britain. After the Romans left, The Celts developed their own 
Christian Church independent of Rome. The departure of the Romans also enabled 
the "barbarian" Saxons to assert control over much of what is now England, with the 
Celtic Britons establishing a series of kingdoms in Wales. These kingdoms were 
united by language, religion and culture, but otherwise competed against each other. 
According to Evans and Rhys, "The Wales that emerged in the seventh century was 
... 'a chessboard of small independent kingdoms'." 336 Furthermore, this political 
fragmentation "may have been the reason why ultimately, the Britons failed to hold 
South Scotland and North West and South West England, in that fantastic three-front 
war against the Saxons, the Picts and the Irish. 337 
Evans and Rhys stated that Wales first approached a state of political unity in the 
ninth century, with Rhodi Mawr exerting control over much of the region through a 
diplomatic marriage. According to Evans and Rhys, Rhodi Mawr and became a 
European statesman of some note. Following his death, Rhodi Mawr's mission to 
unify Wales was continued by his grandson, Hywel Dda, 
who struck the first Welsh coins, bearing the legend Hwyel Rex, made peace with 
Wessex, visited Rome and is traditionally given credit for first codifying the Laws of 
Wales, a task which would have been pointless and impossible had not the Welsh been 
334 Teri Brewer, "Heritage Tourism: A Mirror for Wales?" in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson 
(Eds), Wales Today (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p 155. 
335 G Evans and I Rhys, "Wales," p 224. 
336 Ibid, p 226. 
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conscious of an underlying unity - a unity of language and history and custom as well 
of place. 338 
The invasion of Briton by the Normans brought a new enemy to the Celtic Kingdoms, 
and as a result the kingdoms closed ranks to fight against the common Norman 
enemy. Northern Wales became united under Owain Gwynedd, while southern Wales 
united under Rhys ap Gruffudd, and the two forces joined together to fight the 
Normans at Corwen in 1165. 
Two more attempts at establishing Welsh unity occurred during the 13 th century, 
firstly by Llewellyn Fawr and secondly by his grandson Llewellyn Ein Llyw Olaf (or 
Llewellyn Gruffudd). The two Llewellyns sought to "obtain formal recognition as 
feudal overlords of their fellow Welsh rulers and of the Norman marcher lords," 339 
thereby bringing Wales together under one figurehead who alone paid direct homage 
to the King of England. The latter Llewellyn succeeded in being anointed as the 
Prince of Wales by Henry III through the Treaty of Montgomery in 1267. The 
conquest of Wales by Henry III's successor, Edward I, however, brought an end to the 
political leadership of the Prince of Wales, and brought all of Wales under the direct 
control of the English for the first time. 
The final major attempt at achieving independence for united Wales occurred at the 
beginning of the 15 th century. Owain Glyn Dwr (Shakespear's Owen Glendower) 
proclaimed himself Prince of Wales and waged a short but spectacular campaign 
against the English. Evans and Rhys state that Owain Glyn Dwr 
called parliaments, sought aid from Scotland and Ireland, concluded an alliance with 
France and recognised the Avignon Pope instead of the one at Rome. 34° 
After the support from Scotland and France faded, however, and internal Welsh 
rivalries again destabilised his campaign, Glyn Dwr disappeared without a trace. 
338 Ibid, p 226. 
339 Ibid, p 226. 
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With the ascension of Henry Tudor to the English throne following the War of the 
Roses, the Welsh effectively abandoned the notion of independence. Evans and Rhys 
describe the Welsh attachment to the new English kings as a case of "if you can't beat 
them, joining them,"34I as Henry Tudor was the grandson of a Welshman and had 
cultivated alliances with Welsh nobility. 
The Act of Union in 1536 fully assimilated Wales into the English governmental 
system under Henry VIII, established the borders between Wales and England that 
persist today, and established full equality for Welsh people before English law. If 
Wales had accepted itself as part of England, however, it did so to at the cost of its 
language and Celtic heritage, for the only official language under English law was 
English. 
Under English domination, Welsh nationalism was kept below the surface of Welsh 
society for another 250 years until the so-called "Welsh revolution" of the late 18 th 
and early 19th  centuries. A major contributor to the survival of the Welsh language 
was the translation of the bible into Welsh. Evans and Rhys stated that 
The Welsh bible — a whole literature in itself — probably saved the self-respect of the 
Welsh language and ensure that, when a new Wales emerged unpredictably in the 18th 
century, it would be a Welsh-speaking Wales and a literate Wales. 342 
The revival of religion in Wales was inspired by the non-conformist religious 
movement. 343 By 1851, over 80 per cent of Christians in Wales were non-conformist. 
The revival of Welsh nationalism thus became strongly identified with religion, ore 
more specifically with Welsh religious independence from Canterbury. The non-
conformist religious revival encouraged theology and forms of academic study in 
poor, rural Wales, and inspired new generations of Welsh people to read in their 
mother tongue, and to think of themselves as apart from their English counterparts. 344 
34° Ibid, p 226. 
341 Ibid, p 232. 
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The 20th century saw the beginnings of a new political movement for Welsh 
independence. The Welsh politician Lloyd George advocated 'home rule' for Wales 
as early as 1891, although his views had tempered by the time he became Prime 
Minister. A significant milestone was the creation of Plaid Cymru in 1925 - 
originally an organization concerned at the preservation of the Welsh language, but 
one that grew into a political party spearheading the movement towards political 
autonomy. Plaid Cyrmu won its first seat in the British House of Commons in 1966, 
and in the coming 15 years gradually extended its political influence within Wales at 
local Government leve1. 345 In 1948 the then Labour Government created the Council 
of Wales, but the role of the council was limited to advising the Government on 
matters pertaining to Wales. In 1958 the Welsh Grand Committee was established, 
comprising all 40 Welsh members of the House of Commons, plus an additional five 
members appointed by a selection panel. The committee had the power to give a 
second reading to bills of specific relevance to Wales. The Welsh Office and the 
position of Secretary of State for Wales were created in 1964. 346 
Impetus for Welsh autonomy continued to grow, and in 1978 the British Government 
introduced the Wales Act, proposing to set up a separate Assembly for Wales. Large 
sections of the British Labour Party were opposed to the bill, however, the Welsh 
people were unconvinced of the benefits of a separate assembly. The proposal was 
put to a referendum in Wales, were it was convincingly defeated by a margin of four-
to-one. 347  After disappearing off the political agenda under consecutive Conservative 
Governments, Welsh and Scottish political autonomy returned as a mainstream issue 
with the election of the Blair Labour Government. In 1998 a referendum was 
narrowly passed, and new national assemblies were established in both Cardiff, 
Wales, and Edinburgh, Scotland. 
It can be argued there are three key components of the Welsh identity that have 
withstood, or arguably have been forged by, the history of Wales under English rule. 
Firstly, the industrial heritage of Wales has been an important marker of Welsh 
345 Pierre Clavel, Opposition Planning In Wales and Appalachia, pp 104-105. 
346Ibid, p 89. 
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difference since the industrial revolution, while also having a significant impact on 
the Welsh environment. Secondly, Welsh culture has maintained an emphasis on , 
egalitarianism, and a rejection of class distinction. Thirdly, rural Wales has played a 
vital role in defining the Welsh identity and in fostering the Welsh language. The 
Welsh language is discussed in more detail later in this chapter in regard to 
'authenticity'. 
These three elements are also important in the context of Denis Balsom's 'three 
Wales model' of Welsh identity. 348 Balsom's model, as its name suggests, identified 
three distinct Welsh political identities — Y Fro Grymraeg, Welsh Wales and British 
Wales — based on an analysis of voting patterns. 349 Essentially, the model divided 
Wales into the largely Welsh-speaking rural areas (Y Fro Grymraeg); the industrial, 
strongly nationalist, labour-voting Welsh Wales; and the more conservative urban 
British Wales, where people were more likely to consider themselves 'British' rather 
than `Welsh'. 35° 
4.3 	Industry 
Clavel noted that the industrialisation of Wales played an important role in the 
development of Welsh nationalism. Clavel stated that 
Industrial development did occur early in Wales. Coal and iron ore production began in 
the South Wales valleys around 1750, and latter day politicians could make at least half 
a claim that the industrial revolution 'began' in Wales. 
Clavel also noted that the process of industrialisation in Wales was driven by 
'outsiders': 
347 Alys Thomas, "Politics in Wales: a New Era?" in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson (Eds), 
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It is often noted that the industrial revolution came to Wales in a way different to what 
happened in other parts of the British Isles. Wales was developed by outsiders. It 
remained a country of villages, interspersed with estates and towns controlled by 
Anglicized gentry and administrators ... Development was largely financed from 
London or by merger with English firms, industries were often owned in England, 
particularly after 1900, and the managers often came form England or, following the 
pattern of the gentry, found that the way to success was through a British rather than 
Welsh ladder of upward mobility. 3" 
The dominance of heavy industries such as coal reinforced a stereotyped image of the 
Welsh as rugged and provincial. The most popular embodiment of this stereotype is 
Welsh rugby player, and the Evans and Rhys noted that the most outward displays of 
Welsh nationalism usually occur at Welsh rugby internationals. As Evans and Rhys 
stated, "the industrial Welshman looks on the English as pansies."352 The negative 
side of this stereotype however extends to the nature of the countryside itself, 
presenting an image of Wales as being poor, and a "grimy country, irreparably scarred 
by industry." 353 To Evans and Rhys, the mountains often thought to be barren and 
ravaged by industry in reality "have a beauty of tint and scent and atmosphere seldom 
seen in the Alps outside the Upper Engadine."354 Nevertheless, Evans and Rhys also 
noted that Wales' industrial output, spearheaded by its mining industry, made Wales a 
major player in the world economy: 
... as the industrial revolution proceeded, Wales must have become for her size one of 
the richest countries in the world. Even now, with the coal industry in decline, and all 
iron ore having to be imported, the heavy industry of Wales compares in output, not 
with that of the small or medium-sized economies of Europe, but with that of England, 
West Germany and Japan. 355 
351 Pierre Clavel, Opposition Planning in Wales and Appalachia, p 76. 
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4.4 	Class Structure 
According to Evans and Rhys, the absence of class distinction has been a major 
historical component of Welsh culture and difference, with the medieval Welsh social 
system "more tolerable" than the feudal system of neighbouring England: 
There were serfs in Wales, but three out of four Welshmen were free, as opposed to one 
out of four Englishmen. Amongst free Welshmen, Welsh law recognised no superior 
classes apart from each royal family. According to the German scholar Ferdinand 
Walter, 'right and justice, based upon the laws of Hywel Dda, blossomed in Wales into 
a perfection of beauty such as is to be found among no other people of the Middle 
Ages' 356 
Furthermore, Evans and Rhys state that the status of women in Welsh society was 
well above other societies of that time. 357 
The theme of egalitarianism has recurred in Welsh history under a number of different 
guises. One of those has been a 'liberal' notion of the primacy of the individual and 
individual rights, which has been expressed through the Welsh tradition of political 
radicalism. Evans and Rhys noted the distinguishing features of Welsh as opposed to 
English radicalism: 
One is, not so much a belief in equality in the abstract as the doubly important capacity 
to behave as if everyone was in fact equal; and this tends to ease the tension between 
cultural sets and between regions as well as between social classes. 358 
It has also been argued that the traditional Welsh rejection of social hierarchy was a 
factor in the rise of radicalism as a distinguishing feature of radicalism in Welsh 
politics over the past 200 years. Evans and Rhys stated that 
356 Ibid. p 227. 
357 Ibid, p 228. 
358 Ibid, p 236. 
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Radicalism found a ready soul in Wales, where the old laws and literature had so 
emphasised the importance of the individual person and in practice had demonstrated 
that lack of class consciousness which always seemed to have been a Welsh 
characteristic ... Giraldus Cambrensis noticed in the 12 th century how the lowest as 
well as the highest amongst the Welsh were "devoid of the servility of the English, 
were unabashed in the presence of the great and spoke their minds with delightful 
frankness' .359 
This style of liberal individualism has coexisted, however, with a general desire for 
social cohesion and cooperation. Tom Ellis suggested that both goals were equally 
relevant to the Welsh identity, and that the Welsh have not traditionally seen these 
goals as being mutually exclusive: 
Though Wales in modem times is largely individualist, we cannot feel that it has been 
the land of ... social cooperation, of associative effort. 36° 
Radicalism came to the fore in Welsh politics towards the end of the 19 th century with 
the rise of non-conformism, and the creation of a liberal political elite in Wales 
determined to push for disestablishment of the Church of England. Liberal 
radicalism, however, gave way to new brand of radicalism in the rise of working-class 
consciousness and the rise of the Labour Party to political ascendancy in Wales. The 
radicalism that first appeared as religious non-conformity, and was pursued 
vigorously by Welsh Liberal politicians such as Lloyd George, evolved into a social 
radicalism, working class consciousness and support for a Welsh nationalism that 
focused on the rights of the working class. Evans and Rhys, however, argued that 
Welsh nationalism has traditionally been focussed on a more broad-based anti-
imperialism, rather than set in a Marxist conception of class conflict: 
The authentic voice of Welsh radicalism has been anti-imperialist, pro-national 
freedom, pacific, if not pacifist, and consciously Welsh if not often Welsh nationalist. 361 
359 Ibid, p 236. 
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	4.5 	Rural Wales 
Graham Day argued that rural Wales has been long considered the Welsh 'heartland', 
and the epitome of the 'true Wales'. As such, rural Wales is seen as the essence of the 
Welsh identity — "the very centre of what is distinctly Welsh, and therefore a 
repository of essential values and patterns of social organization." 362 
The qualities ascribed to rural Wales, and therefore ascribed to the Welsh national 
identity, have included: 
the centrality of agriculture, and a way of life that was adapted to the demands of the 
natural environment in Wales, a relatively poor and marginal upland region; the social 
integration of the rural community, which revolved around the social networks of 
family and kinship, of chapel, and of cooperation in farming; and the linguistic and 
cultural values of Welshness, such as a non-materialistic ethos and a lack of concern 
with questions of class and social division.363 
Day argued that in-migration has also highlighted the differing images attributed 
contemporary rural Wales. The new residents leaving the cities tend to see rural 
Wales as a peaceful, tranquil and gentrified escape. This view is not necessarily 
consistent or even compatible with the traditional farming way of life. Furthermore, 
the decline in agriculture has been to some degree economically offset by the 
establishment of manufacturing industries in some sections of rural Wales, also 
changing the social fabric of these areas. 
4.6 	Better Wales 
The creation of the Welsh National Assembly in 1998 led to the development of the 
Better Wales plan. The plan claimed to set out a "long-term vision for a better 
362  Graham Day, "The Rural Dimension", in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson (Eds), Wales 
Today, p 76. 
363 Ibid, p 77. 
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Wales,"364 and effectively was developed to guide the policy direction of the new 
Welsh Assembly. First released in draft form in 2001, the plan took into 
consideration submissions from a wide range of business and community interest 
groups. The Better Wales plan provided a description of "The State of Wales" - a 
vision for Wales in the future, and program for action to make the vision a reality. 
In the forward to the plan, the First Secretary of the Welsh National Assembly Rhodri 
Morgan said the document was "new and radical:" 
Its vision and values have been endorsed by the Assembly as a whole to impart a real 
direction for Wales. For the first time we say in detail what we aim to deliver and by 
when. The plan has been developed in consultation with local government, business 
and the voluntary agencies and made full use of the opportunities provided by new 
technologies, with 17,000 visits to the special website. 365 
4.7 	Competitive Advantages 
As this chapter has already noted, the Welsh economy has been built on competitive 
advantages in two industry sectors — agriculture and manufacturing. Fevre noted that 
agriculture was more important to Wales that any other region in the United 
Kingdom, with a quarter of all Welsh firms in the agriculture sector. 366 In terms of 
manufacturing, Fevre stated that 
Manufacturing provides jobs for 30 per cent of men and 12 per cent of women in 
Wales. Some of these jobs require skilled workers and pay high wages, but many of 
the better jobs are actually in the automotive and electronic sectors which expanded 
rapidly in Wales before the recession which began in 1979 and grew much more 
slowly thereafter, or even declined. 367 
364 Better Wales, p 1. 
365 Rhodri Morgan, in Better Wales, p i. 
3" Ralph Fevre, "The Welsh Economy", in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson (Eds) Wales 
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In describing the "State of Wales," Better Wales stated that 
as a people we have a reputation for resilience, hard work, tolerance and for seeing 
clearly the benefits of education. 368 
Better Wales identified music and the arts as areas in which Wales had advantages: 
there have always been people from Wales who have made a major contribution in all 
walks of life in the UK and internationally — in politics, business, the arts, the media 
and the professions. We have a passion for music and sport. We have musicians with 
world-wide reputations for everything from rock to opera. As a nation of only 3 million 
people we are more than pulling our weight. 369 
The traditional Welsh value of community cooperation was also highlighted as an 
advantage, and Better Wales argued that this value had become entrenched in Welsh 
society through its institutions. Moreover, the plan 're-badged' this value as a 'Team 
Wales' approach to managing public affairs: 
We have one of the best-developed institutional infrastructures in the UK. We have a 
directly elected Assembly with strong partnerships with the business, voluntary and 
local government sectors — the Team Wales phenomenon. 37° 
The Better Wales plan also highlighted the 'Team Wales' approach as a benefit to 
industrial relations and as a "cohesive approach to economic development." 371 
Better Wales described the Welsh economy as being in transition from an old-style 
resource producer, to a modern, information-based economy. The plan stated that 
Wales has a small economic base with too few large home-grown companies. This 
limits our ability to generate growth from within. 372 
368 Better Wales, p 13. 
369 Ibid, p 13. 
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The relatively small size of the financial services sector, and the reliance on "low-end 
manufacturing," both characteristics of semi-peripheral economies, were highlighted 
as problems in the Welsh industrial structure. Likewise, the plan stated that Wales is 
under-represented in significant high added-value growth sectors such as Information 
Technology, pharmaceuticals and other science and knowledge-based activities. 373 
The Better Wales benchmarks set a number of overall goals for the economy. For 
example, Benchmark 8 stated: 
Output per head must have risen from around 83% of the UK average in the mid-1990s 
to at least 90% generating an additional £5 billion at 1997 prices. 374 
Benchmark 11 set the following objective for the agriculture sector: 
Excluding direct subsidies, the added value for every person employed in agriculture 
should have risen faster than productivity in the economy as a whole and the number of 
jobs in the dairy, lamb and beef processing sectors should have grown by at least 10 per 
cent. The area of agricultural land covered by an agri-environmental scheme, registered 
as organic or in conversion to organic status must have increased significantly. 375 
4.8 	Innovation / Thick Labour Markets 
According to Ralph Fevre, the level of entrepreneurship and innovation in the Welsh 
economy has been affected by the region's dependency on firms based outside the 
region. Furthermore, Fevre argued that Wales' relative economic decline over the 
past 20 to 30 years has heightened its economic dependence on both externally-
controlled companies and British Government subsidies. 376 Fevre stated that 
373 Ibid, p 14. 
374 Ibid, p 20. 
375 Ibid, p 20. 
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This dependence on outside companies means that Wales does not always get the best 
type of jobs, and dependence on government intervention means that the Welsh 
economy is subsidized. 377 
Fevre argued that much of the industry attracted to Wales over the past 20 was 
attracted for what he saw as the 'wrong reasons': 
Wales has a problem attracting, and keeping, the right sort of jobs. It has had the most 
success (in the 1980s, for example,) in attracting the wrong sort of jobs, namely jobs 
with employers who are attracted to Wales to take advantage of low labour costs. 
These firms "are unlikely to be at the leading edge of their industry or even in the sort 
of sector that prizes skills and innovation." 378 Moreover, the jobs these firms create 
tend to be poorly paid and at the bottom end of the corporate ladder, with managerial 
and technical positions remaining centred in company headquarters. Fevre argued 
that 
For the most part manufacturing firms do not relocate their headquarters or research and 
innovation department to Wales. Instead they move routine assembly operations here. 
Often the Welsh operation is only a part of the process the firm controls and important 
decisions are made elsewhere. 379 
Furthermore, Fevre argued that Welsh employees, therefore, are themselves are on the 
peripheries of the companies they work for: 
Wales ... has too few professional managers and scientists and too many manual 
workers (and too many of these are in repetitive assembly and construction). 
Although the numbers of professional engineers, scientists and technologists have 
grown, these sorts of jobs are still less common in Wales that they are elsewhere in 
the UK, even within the same industry. 380 
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Another structural aspect of the economy that contributes to dependency, according to 
Fevre, is the level of inward or foreign direct investment. While inward investment 
creates new employment opportunities, especially when the subsequent output is 
exported, inward investment also brings foreign ownership of domestic assets. This 
reinforces dependency relationships, with profits flowing outwards and decision-
making taking place outside the region. Fevre thus sees inward investment in Wales 
as a 'double-edged sword': 
Foreign-owned companies have been responsible for many of the better jobs created in 
Wales and foreign direct investment (FDI) has generally been the success story of 
Welsh manufacturing. This success, however, simply underlines the failure of the 
Welsh economy to create enough jobs without outside intervention. FDI does not alter 
the fact that Wales has a dependent economy ... For many commentators FDI is a sign 
of weakness and dependence. 381 
Fevre noted that another significant factor in attracting inward investment to Wales, 
along With lower labour costs, has been the use of government subsidies and 
incentives. The effect of these programs is similar to the effect of lower wages, as 
firms tend to move cost-sensitive, non-core parts of their business to regions where 
they will attract subsidies. Fevre argued that this type of investment attraction does 
not attract managerial or research and development roles to the region, and again adds 
another layer of dependency (to Government subsidies) on the economy. 
Welsh reliance on government is not restricted to industry assistance, however. The 
relative importance of the public sector in the economy has increased significantly in 
recent years, and the sector now employs a larger considerably proportion of the 
Welsh workforce. Lovering, for example, noted that 
The public-spending-dominated employment categories of Public Administration and 
Defence, Health, Social Services, and Education account for a higher proportion of both 
381 	• p 60. 
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GDP and employment in Wales than in any mainland UK region. In the last decade and 
a half these sectors created 22 times as many jobs as the manufacturing sector. In no 
other UK region was the public sector the greatest contributor to job creation. 382 
This form of dependency has been highlighted by a number of commentators, such as 
Brand et al, who stated that 
Wales has replaced its dependency on Coal and Steel with a Public Sector dependency. 
This inherent structural weakness will continue to undermine Wales' prospects in the 
new regional competitive arena. Public sector jobs make relatively low contributions to 
GDP." 3 
The rise of public sector employment has also seen a shift in the nature of 
employment away from the blue-collar, male-dominated sphere of the coal and steel 
works, to a stronger white-collar sector with more jobs for women. Fevre noted that 
"these jobs are the most important reason why, by the end of 1996, female employees 
outnumbered male employees in Wales."384 Fevre also argued, however, that while 
public sector employment is generally well paid, and involves managerial-level 
employment, "the public sector is no better at spending money on R&D [sic] in Wales 
than the private sector." 385 
Wales' economic dependency was also raised by Professor Phil Cooke, Director of 
Advanced Studies at the Cardiff University, in late 2003. Professor Cooke argues that 
financial transfers from the UK Government and the European Union to address 
Wales' economic disadvantages were simply reinforcing dependency relationships, 
and failing to address innovation and entrepreneurship. Professor Cooke stated that 
"Wales is becoming more dependent, not less, on London for the underwriting of its 
economic future."386 
382 J Lovering "Celebrating Globalisation and Misreading the Welsh Economy: the 'New 
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Wales, www.neswales.co.uk, published 24/11/2003, accessed 1/3/04. 
128 
The 'flip-side' of the dependency on foreign investment and Government support is a 
relatively weak domestic business sector, and a lack of entrepreneurship. As Fevre 
noted, 
Wales is not very good at growing successful companies from small beginnings and in 
the 1990s the rate of company failure in Wales exceeded the rate elsewhere in the 
u-K .387 
Fevre argued that even the local Welsh companies that have succeeded have failed to 
export, and have not provided dynamic business leadership: 
There are a handful of home-grown success stories, of which the best-known are all 
retail enterprises which sell at the cheaper end of the markets for groceries and apparel. 
For the most part successful Welsh companies do not create jobs which demand highly 
skilled workers and pay high wages. 388 
Better Wales identified the links between investment, research and development and 
innovation. Benchmark 9 stated that 
Inward investment should have been maintained at late 1990 levels. Welsh companies 
must make full use of a world class telecommunications infrastructure. Welsh 
representation in the knowledge-based sectors must be far higher. Business R&D [sic] 
should have grown faster than in the UK as a whole over the decade. The level of 
innovation throughout the diversified Welsh economy must be among the best in the 
uK .389 
Benchmark 7 focused on issues of civic participation and voluntary activity, along 
with encouraging greater levels of entrepreneurship: 
387 Ralph Fevre, "The Welsh Economy," pp 57-58. 
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More people should be actively participating in voluntary and community action. 
Turnout at local and Assembly elections should typically exceed 505. As a result of 
greater awareness and wider opportunities, more of our young people will pursue self-
employment and entrepreneurship. 3" 
Several other goals also made reference to the need to build a stronger education 
system, and a system that aids the development skills relating to innovation and 
entrepreneurship through the Welsh education system. For example, Benchmark 2 
stated that 
There must be a strong extra-curricular prospectus for every child covering cultural, 
volunteering and enterprise activity. Excellent services should be available for children 
and young people with special needs or at risk of social exclusion. 39 ' 
Benchmark 5 recognised the role of further education in addressing 'skill bottlenecks' 
in the labour market: 
there must be no important skill bottlenecks; most members of the workforce, 
including those excluded today, must have the basic competencies required to prosper 
in a knowledge-based economy and the opportunity to refresh them regularly through 
lifelong leaming. 392 
Furthermore, Benchmark 6 also recognised the significance of further education to the 
Welsh community: 
Further and higher education must make a greater contribution to the creation of wealth, 
community and cultural development and the achievement of an inclusive society. 
Higher education should command research funding twice as large as the average for 
the 1990s. Graduates and others with higher education qualifications should make up at 
least the same share of the workforce as in the rest of the UK. 393 
390 Ibid, p 20. 
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4.9 	Lifestyle 
The Welsh lifestyle is often viewed in terms of its cultural icons such as the annual 
Welsh eisteddfod. Popular Welsh art and culture, however, can be seen as an 
important component of the Welsh national identity. In his overview of modern 
popular culture in Wales, Steve Blandford asked if there is "currently a minor Welsh 
cultural renaissance that is genuinely shaking perceptions of the country, both in the 
rest of the UK and internationally?" 394 Blandford noted that Welsh popular music, 
film, television and theatre have all achieved a level of commercial success in recent 
years, and have made significant contributions to the general discussion of what it 
means to be Welsh. 
The high profile of Welsh popular culture is perhaps most clearly evident in the realm 
of contemporary music. Blandford argued that a number of Welsh bands such the 
Stereophonics, Catatonia, The Manic Street Preachers and Super Furry Animals have 
achieved worldwide commercial success, raising the cultural profile of Wales in the 
process. Moreover, the explicitly political and nationalistic lyrics of the Manic Street 
Preachers, and the Welsh language vocals of Catatonia and the Super Furry Animals 
have furthered awareness of both Welsh political issues and the Welsh language.395 
Blandford argued that the use of the Welsh language in popular music has been a 
significant symbolic boost for both the language and the Welsh identity. Blandford 
stated that 
The importance of the implicit stance taken on the language by some of the new Welsh 
bands (for example, the Super Furry Animals have a clause in their contract with 
Creation that allows them to record in Welsh) is that it is yet another dimension to the 
way that the cultura is moving forward. They refuse to render the language invisible, 
even in an industry as dominated by English as the music business; but nor is it an 
entrenched purist position. Instead bilingualism becomes a layer of complexity in a 
394 Steve Blandford, "Aspects of the Live and Recorded Arts in Contemporary Wales," in David 
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culture, to be embraced as richness (as it is in a lot of Europe) with a life in 
contemporary art forms, rather than the subject of divisions. 396 
Apart from defending the national language, Blandford argued Welsh rock bands have 
also stimulated as sense of pride within Wales. For example, Blandford stated that 
many would say the most important thing that they collectively give to Wales' identity 
is simply youth itself. To a culture used to seeing itself represented abroad as the land 
of Harry Secombe, Shirley Bassey, Tom Jones or even Max Boyce, the success of 
Catatonia and the Manic Street Preachers is, to say the least, an injection of energy. 397 
Indeed, Gruff Rhys of the Super Furry Animals has stated that collectively the Welsh 
bands are linked by the struggle to overcome Welsh stereotypes: 
I suppose the one thing we're all fighting against is this romanticised, comedy view of 
Wales. 398 
Blandford also noted that Welsh rock bands have helped to redefine the image of 
modern Wales, citing a music critic who stated "Goodness me, perhaps it's finally 
cool to be Welsh." 399 
Better Wales identified a number of goals relating to the Welsh lifestyle. These goals 
covered issues such as health and well-being and quality of life. For example 
Benchmark 14 stated that: 
People should accept even greater responsibility for their own health and our lifestyles 
must be healthier, particularly in the poorest communities: 75% of adults should be 
non-smokers; the growth in the number of overweight people and obesity should have 
levelled off as must the level of substance misuse by young people. Underage 
pregnancies should not exceed the UK rate. 4w 
3" Ibid, p 114. 
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Benchmark 21 identified transport infrastructure as an important component of quality 
of life in Wales: 
Much improved public transport and cycleway provision, including community 
transport, should enable about a quarter of commuting to work to take place by these 
means rather than by car, compared to about a fifth in the late 1990s. A higher 
proportion of freight should be carried by rail. 401 
Benchmark 22 refers specifically to the quality of life in disadvantaged communities: 
The quality of life in most disadvantaged communities, as judged by their residents, 
must have improved sharply. Most communities across Wales should have worked out 
what they want, and many more people should be taking action in their communities to 
meet those needs.402 
Similarly, Benchmark 23 refers to the provision of basic services to communities, and 
also refers to access to leisure facilities, particularly for young people: 
High-quality social housing must be readily available for those who cannot afford to 
buy. A flourishing private rented sector should enhance choice and labour mobility, but 
must be effectively regulated to prevent serious risk to health and safety. The need for 
people to sleep rough must have been eliminated. There should be better leisure 
facilities for children and young people, particularly in our most deprived communities. 
Access to the benefits of up to date information and communications technologies and 
systems must be available to all. People must feel safer on the streets and in their 
homes.4°3 
401 Ibid, p 22. 
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4.10 Diversity 
Charlotte Williams noted that cultural diversity has been considered "part and parcel 
of Welsh society"404 since the 19 th century. In particular, Cardiff, Swansea and 
Newport have been regarded as ethnically and culturally diverse, with strong migrant 
populations being established around the port and trading activities of the three cities. 
Williams stated that in the 1911 census, Cardiff was the second-most ethnically 
diverse city in the United Kingdom behind London, in terms of the number of citizens 
born overseas: 
By far the majority were Europeans, Italians, Russian Jews, Spaniards, but a 
significant group of these, some 700, were Africans and West Indians, in the main 
seamen.405 
Despite the presence of ethnic nationalities in the port areas, Williams noted that 
"rural Wales was relatively homogeneous, predominating in the table of counties for 
the whole of Britain with the highest proportion of native born residents." 406 
This cultural chasm between urban and rural Wales has persisted. Census statistics 
gathered in 2001 found that "religious and ethnic minorities in Wales formed a small 
proportion of the population, although Cardiff was considerably more diverse." 407 
Furthermore, 
People from ethnic backgrounds other than White were concentrated in the three 
biggest cities in Wales. In Cardiff they made up 8 per cent of the population, in 
Newport 5 per cent and in Swansea 2 per cent... Around half of the Black and Asian 
groups and a third of the Mixed and Chines groups lived in the capita1. 408 
404  Charlotte Williams, "Race and Racism: What's Special About Wales?" in David Dunkerley and 
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A significant factor in the ethnic and racial composition of the Welsh population that 
is not readily apparent in official statistics is the number of second and third-
generation Welsh residents from migrant ancestors. For example, 2001 Census 
figures showing 17,661 people of 'mixed' ethnicity (0.61 per cent of the total 
population)409 indicated the level of inter-marriage between migrants from different 
countries. Williams also noted that Welsh-born people with migrant parents or grand 
parents tend to consider themselves as indigenous Welsh, and therefore do not list 
themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority. 
The traditional Welsh concept of the `gwerin' can also be seen as an important in the 
context of diversity and tolerance in the Welsh community. According to Williams, 
the concept of the `gwerin' is 
almost an untranslatable term which refers to a type of community built on mutual 
understanding, harmony, and tolerance amongst a highly-cultured, moral and upright 
people. The gwerin is a historical concept but remains central to ideas of the Welsh 
national character as hospitable, open minded and essentially internationalist in 
outlook.410 
In this sense, the `gwerin' underpins the Welsh image of openness and tolerance, 
based on shared culture rather than race. Williams argued, however, that this concept 
was problematic, as it rests on an idea of cultural homogeneity: 
Further, it reflects a type of ethnic absolutism that cannot be sustained; that is a notion 
of Welshness that is rigid, and relates to highly specified attributes that are somehow 
seen to be immutable.4 " 
Williams, in fact, suggested that the image of Welsh tolerance was something of a 
myth, and was not supported by empirical evidence, particularly given the high-levels 
of ethnic homogeneity in rural Wales and numerous examples of violent racial 
conflicts in Wales: 
4°9 Ibid. 
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Evans's (1991) examination of the treatment of immigrants in Wales over a period of 
150 years finds two parallel accounts: one appealing to the harmony of the gwerin and 
the other a hard document of intolerance, racial animosity and overt violence in the face 
of multiculturalism.412 
R Merfyn Jones also discussed the Welsh reputation for tolerance, although he 
suggested that it Wales was actually a more tolerant society than it has been given 
credit for. Jones argued that while Wales has a reputation for intolerance of 
homosexuality, community attitudes towards homosexuality are relatively liberal. 
Homosexuality was illegal in Wales until 1967, however Jones stated that prejudices 
had diminished over the post war period: 
It was often assumed that Wales was particularly prejudiced, and there were certainly 
problems in some rural areas. Nevertheless, the response of the Welsh public and 
media to the alleged behaviour of Ron Davies in 1998, when polls demonstrated only a 
minority had reacted negatively to his behaviour, suggested that attitudes in Wales were 
in fact as open and tolerant as elsewhere, if not more so.' 
The Better Wales vision made specific reference to diversity as marker of Welsh 
identity. The vision stated that 
We want Wales to be — committed to fostering its unique and diverse identity, and the 
benefits of bilingualism, while looking confidently outwards and welcoming new 
cultural influences:414 
The Better Wales benchmarks, however, made just one reference to diversity — in 
relation to the functioning of government agencies. Benchmark 27 stated 
412 /bid, p 277. 
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The policies and actions of all public sector bodies, including the Assembly, its 
sponsored bodies and agencies and local government must take full account of the 
needs and views of all parts of society. As organisations and at all levels they must be 
as diverse as the populations they serve. The result should be better decision-making 
and better use of the talents of the people of Wales, with all this implies in terms of 
economic benefit and greater social justice. 415 
4.11 Authenticity 
Arguably the most striking component of the Welsh regional identity is the Welsh 
language. The very existence of the Welsh language, after centuries of English 
domination, can be seen as a testament to the resilience of Welsh culture. As a 
marker of authenticity, the Welsh language is a cultural symbol that is unique and sets 
Wales apart from other regions of the United Kingdom. 
Evans and Rhys stated that English has been tacitly accepted as the only official 
language of Wales since 1536, "if not indeed 1282.' 416 Nevertheless, in 1995, 
500,000 people considered themselves Welsh speakers, and only one per cent of 
secondary schools in Wales did not teach Welsh to their students. In recent years the 
total number of people speaking Welsh has risen, with the number of primary school 
students speaking the language having doubled from 31,000 to 62,000 between 1980 
and 1995.417 The 2001 Census found that 21 per cent of the Welsh population could 
speak Welsh, while 20 per cent could read and 18 per cent could write Welsh. 418 
The Welsh language is integral to Welsh identity for several reasons. Firstly, it is the 
major point of difference between the Welsh and the English, signifying the existence 
of a distinctly Welsh cultural tradition. Symbolically, it is the embodiment of that 
cultural tradition, and a potent link between modem day Wales and Welsh history. 
Evans and Rhys stated that 
415 Better Wales, p 22. 
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above all, the language remains the toughest element in the national personality, the 
rallying cry of the most stubborn defenders, the springboard of the most successful 
counter attacics.419 
John Aitchison and Harold Carter also argued that the language is crucial to Welsh 
identity: 
Much of the emotional attachment to the language derives form its role as the key 
constituent of Welsh ethnic identity. 420 
Aitchison and Carter argued that, historically, language has been particularly 
important to Wales because of a lack of other political and institutional ethnic 
signifiers. In the absence of political unity or any specific Welsh civil institutions to 
denote Wales a separate and distinct entity, any shared sense of Welshness has been 
based around the shared language. This situation changed dramatically however in 
the 20th century, with both the creation of a number of Welsh civil institutions. The 
creation of the Welsh assembly is possibly the most significant of these institutional 
and political changes and has established an institutional 'flag-bearer' for Welsh 
nationalism.42I 
Moreover, Aitchison and Carter found that using Welsh as a central component of 
Welsh ethnicity or nationalism has been a dividing force — dividing the principality 
along a roughly north/west and south/east axis - as the Welsh language has been 
historically stronger in the north and west. The Welsh Assembly and other 
institutions are, however, inclusive, as they represent and are accessible to all Welsh 
people: 
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Through these institutions, and other developments such as the progress of national 
sports teams, especially in rugby and soccer, a sense of identity has been built which is 
not immediately tied to language. 422 
Secondly, the Welsh language represents an important tool in the social reproduction 
of Welsh customs, traits, and values. By defining these things in Welsh, as opposed 
to defining them in English, the original Welsh meanings are retained, and not 
reinterpreted in the language of another culture. Evans and Rhys had this in mind 
when they argued for the retention of the Welsh language: 
A language is also far more than a means of expression: it is a way of thinking and 
feeling, even a way of life: most Welshrrien, for example, are largely free from 
awareness of class and rank when speaking Welsh, but seldom so free of it when 
English is the language. 423 
Trends in the usage of the Welsh language not only underscore traditional internal 
divisions in the broader Welsh community, but highlight how social and demographic 
changes are affecting rural Wales in particular. Essentially, the traditional Welsh-
speaking heartland of north and western Wales has seen the most severe decline in 
native Welsh speakers. On the surface, this appears to augur badly for the future of 
the language, however the loss of language skills in the north and west has been 
counter-balanced by an upswing in Welsh language skills in the south and east, where 
traditionally the Welsh language has been weakest. Significantly, Aitchison and 
Carter noted that the greatest levels of increase in Welsh language skills are also 
taking place in younger age groups due to the introduction of Welsh into more 
schools.424 
Aitchison and Carter argued that the problems facing the Welsh language in its 
traditional heartland areas in the north and west are due to a number of factors. Most 
significantly, economic decline in the agriculture sector is forcing many younger 
422 	• 9 p lot 	105. 
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people to move away from the country and into the cities in search of employment. 
While younger Welsh people are moving out there has also been a rising trend on in-
migration of older people seeking to find a rural idyll. Generally, these new arrivals 
are older, from metropolitan areas, English, and do not speak Welsh. Aitchison and 
Carter noted that the influx of non-Welsh speaking migrants to these areas has 
provoked a nationalist backlash of people rallying around the cause of the declining 
Welsh language. 425 
Graham Day has also noted the significance of these demographic trends in rural 
Wales to the maintenance of the Welsh identity. 426 Day states that the traditions of 
rural Wales have been considered to be under challenge from 
the forces of modernization, especially the impact of urban society and the spread of 
English influences and values, which threatened to destroy Welshness, including the 
Welsh language. 427 
Teri Brewer argued that the tourism industry is crucial in presenting a 'face' of Wales 
to the rest of the world, and also is important in defining what is considered to be 
'authentically' Welsh. In particular, Brewer, argued that the emphasis on heritage 
tourism in Wales has contributed to the continuing development of Welsh identity: 
The focus on heritage tourism, though, is not about bringing visitors' cash in and job creation 
... A revalued and revised representation of Wales continually affects the internal dialogues 
of identity, regionalism and nationalism. 428 
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According to Brewer, the origins of tourism in Wales during the early 19 th century 
was important in developing emerging notions of Welsh nationality, and particularly 
in distinguishing the Welsh concept of the `gwerin': 
During this same era, discussions about priorities and identity were also going on inside 
Wales, the extension of antiquarian concern to culture saw its parallel in the elaboration 
of the concept of the gwerin (folk, or people). In Welsh this term has been integral to a 
historical discourse on Welshness form the late 18th  century onwards. 429 
Brewer argued that the contemporary focus on heritage tourism encapsulates retains a 
focus on the `gwerin', but also encapsulates other aspects of Welsh history, culture 
and environment. Brewer states that, in this context, heritage 
is not about just sites and monuments, it includes forms of expressive culture and expert 
knowledge like Welsh fiddling, modern Welsh rock bands, Valleys choirs, language 
traditions, styles of public speaking influenced by traditions of chapel and eisteddfodau, 
farm auctions, allotment gardening and local boxing rings, but also the skills of passing 
industries and occupations.43° 
The iconic images that are most relevant to the Welsh identity promoted through the 
tourism sector are therefore associated with this expanded concept of heritage: 
Heritage markers, taken out of context of everyday life, continually shape the way 
visitors perceive Wales, whether as a land of daffodils, song and druids, as a contested 
frontier, pony-trekking, rock-climbing and rambling paradise, a Celtic Fringe, a 
wellspring of spirituality, a post-industrial landscape — to name just a few of the images 
of Wales promoted for tourism. 431 
Taken collectively, Brewer suggested that these markers present an 
image of Wales as a place in which the processes of history [are] made apparent. 
Apparent in the dramatic geology and consequent scenery of the Welsh uplands, 
429 Ibid, p 151. 
430 ibid, p 155.  
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apparent in the survival of the Welsh language with its traditions of oratory and poetry, 
apparent in the daily life, housing and customs of the Welsh people themselves. Not as 
a timeless land, but a place where change and tradition are both viewed positively. 432 
The Better Wales benchmark most directly related to the concept of 'authenticity' was 
Benchmark 24, which identified a desire to increase the number of people able to 
speak Welsh, and while also seeking to increase awareness of Welsh cultural icons: 
International knowledge and appreciation of Welsh music, film, art drama and sport 
should have increased substantially. The proportion of the total population who can 
speak Welsh should have grown, with the sharpest rise having been among young 
people.433 
4.12 Identity / Status 
As noted in Chapter 2, the way a region is portrayed in the media is extremely 
important in defining regional identity and in establishing a sense of 'status'. Kevin 
Williams highlighted the significance of the media in this context for Wales: 
Often discussion of our national and cultural identity is made without reference to the 
quality of the daily life of many of our fellow women and men. It neglects the real 
problems that exist in the streets and fields of Wales. But the importance of the mass 
media is the crucial role they play in how we make sense of these problems and 
understand our plight and that of our fellow citizens. 434 
Allen and O'Malley noted that the commercial newspaper media in Wales is 
dominated by London-based publications. In the television and radio sector, however, 
government intervention has created a playing field much more sympathetic to the 
431 Ibid, p 160. 
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needs of the Welsh community. In particular, the national broadcaster, the BBC, has 
a number of specifically Welsh production divisions and stations. Allen and 
O'Malley stated that "the BBC was forced at an early stage to acknowledge the status 
of Wales as a distinct nation with its own traditions and aspirations." 435 As a result of 
this recognition from the early days of public broadcasting has formed the basis 
for a public service ethos which continues to inform the institutions with which we are 
familiar today, such as BBC Radio Cymru, BBC Radio Wales, BBC Wales TV, 
Harlech TV (HTV) Wales and the bilingual (Welsh and English) S4C. 436 
With a number of avenues for Welsh news and programming on broadcast radio and 
television, these media have become important conduits for discussion about Welsh 
nationality, and for promoting indigenous Welsh language and culture. According to 
Allen and O'Malley, however, more local content in the Welsh media is required, to 
combat the dependence on commercial and public media based in London. 437 Allen 
and O'Malley cited Kevin Williams to argue that there is a need for more indigenous 
Welsh media: 
Mass media of our own are not only important in combating the stereotyping of Welsh 
identity by others but also vital ingredients in the building of collective solidarity and 
understanding inside Wales, and addressing the problems that we face as a 
community. 438 
Conversely, Graham Day suggested that images of rural Wales had worked in favour 
of its acceptance as an attractive place to live, and this has been evidenced by the 
level of in-migration. Day argued that 
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Given the pervading attractiveness of rural locations for many people in Britain, rural 
Wales is widely perceived as among the more desirable places to live. 439 
Furthermore, Day argued that rural Wales has been 'marketed' specifically to urban-
dwellers as an example of the 'rural idyll', and therefore as a peaceful alternative to 
city life. Day stated that 
One of the tasks the [development] agencies faced was to reposition rural Wales in a 
kind of marketing exercise, presenting it to potential investors not as a declining region 
of old-fashioned communities and quaint types of behaviour, but as desirable places to 
live and work, with excellent scenery and environment, and a high quality of life. For 
example, the Development Board tried to 'brand' rural Wales as the 'British Business 
Park', proposing that it was possible to combine up-to-date business activity with all the 
advantages of life in the countryside. This appealed to a growing sentiment among 
sections of the British population that they would like to participate in the 'rural idyll', 
but if possible without sacrificing the benefits of urban living." ° 
While it has been argued that a stronger local media would promote a stronger sense 
of Welsh nationalism, on the political level it can be argued that Wales is already 
forging a stronger national identity. Two factors can be seen to be acting on the 
development of Welsh identity at the political levels. Firstly, Welsh political 
devolution is highlighting the distinction between England and Wales, giving Wales 
its own political voice and structure. In his annual 'State of the Nation Address' in 
2004, Welsh Secretary Peter Hain emphasises the role of the new political 
arrangements in building 'confidence' within Wales. Hain stated that 
Our objective with Westminster and Cardiff working in partnership through devolution 
is to build a world-class Wales, with a high-skill, high-quality economy and top-class 
public services. A Wales which looks to the future not the past, and is confident and 
outward-looking. A Wales which people are increasingly attracted to not just because it 
has a strong economy and a high quality of life — but because they know through 
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devolution that their views will be listened to and acted upon. And a Wales which both 
learns from the rest of Britain and teaches the rest of Britain."' 
Secondly, Wales is integrating with a larger political and cultural entity — the 
European Union. This parallel political process is also having an impact on the Welsh 
identity, in particular by realigning notions of Wales as a principality of the United 
Kingdom towards a recognition of Wales as a region of Europe. 
Wales is represented in the European Parliament by five local members. As a region 
rather than a sovereign state, however, Wales does not have direct representation to 
the Council of Ministers. Andrew Thompson noted that 
In the Council of Ministers, the chief legislative institution of the EU, Wales is 
represented by the appropriate central government minister. Thus in matters of defence 
or general economic affairs, for example, Wales, like the rest of the UK, will be 
represented by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
respectively.442 
Nevertheless, the growing public association with Europe is driven by a desire within 
Wales to establish new political and economic alliances. This is partly motivated by a 
sense of Wales "growing up", and becoming a more prominent member of the 
international community. For example, Thompson cited the then President of Plaid 
Cymru, Dafydd Elis Thomas, alluding to this new sense of national maturity in a 
newspaper column in 1988: 
New Year can be the opportunity when we think of ourselves more clearly as Welsh 
Europeans, ready for the challenges of the wider world, and their impact on the world 
of Wales. 443 
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According to Thompson, commentators have argued for the new Welsh to take a 
stronger role in the European Union. For example, it has been argued that a 
powerhouse Parliament will put Wales at the heart of a new Europe of the Nations and 
historic Regions — no longer left on the furthest edge of the UK listening to the Euro-
squabble of middle England.444 
A secondary impetus behind Wales' enthusiasm for Europe has been the dispersal of 
European Union regional economic assistance, through which Wales has received 
considered financial benefit. For example, according to Thompson, 
one commentator has remarked that, if Wales is 'unrecognisable from the industrial 
hulk drifting onto the rocks in the 1970s and 1980s', it is partly due to the 'not 
insignificant part played by the European Union in helping shape this economic 
miracle' . 445 
Better Wales made specific reference to Wales' status as a region of Europe. For 
example, Benchmark 12 stated: 
We must be far more international in outlook. Wales must have a higher profile, 
clearer national identity and greater influence than today. The tourist industry must 
attract a much higher share of overseas visitors and more students coming to the UK 
should attend our higher education institutions. The number of Welsh companies 
exporting and having links with businesses worldwide must have grown. EU and UK 
policies must be better tuned to our needs and surveys of opinion makers and the 
business community abroad must show that our market profile is higher. Made in 
Wales branded products must be associated in the international marketplace with high 
quality, advanced technology, reliability and good design. 446 
Furthermore, Benchmark 3 also made specific reference to Wales' status in regard to 
its education system: 
444 Andrew Thompson, "Wales in Europe" p311. 
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Wales should be recognised as an outstanding place to teach as well as learn. 
Robust quality assurance and professional development systems must have led 
to higher standards in classes and further and higher education courses than in 
the rest of the UK. 447 
4.13 Better Wales Identity 
The introduction to the Better Wales document is titled A Common Vision: Getting 
Down to Business. The phrase 'getting down to business' in one sense refers to the 
establishment of the Welsh Parliament, but also places 'business' (and hence 
economy) at the centre of the vision for a 'better' Wales. The Better Wales vision 
stated that 
We want Wales to be: 
• United, confident and creative; 
• Committed to fostering its unique and diverse, and the benefits of bilingualism, while 
looking confidently outwards and welcoming new cultural influences; 
• Prosperous, well-educated, skilled, healthy environmentally and culturally rich; 
• Served by modern, effective, efficient and accessible public services; 
• Active in its local communities, where the voice of local people is heard; 
• Fairer — a place where everyone is valued and given an opportunity to play a full part; 
• A place which values its children and where young people want to live, work and 
enjoy a high quality of life. 448 
There are a number of key themes evident in this vision. Firstly, the vision is of a 
Wales where intra-regional differences are encouraged but are not divisive, and do not 
detract from a stronger Welsh identity that is more confident and embraces creativity. 
The broad goals of Better Wales also reflect the focus on building a more innovative 
and entrepreneurial community. Better Wales stated that 
446 Better Wales, pp 20-21. 
447 1bid, p 19. 
147 
Our aim is to fashion a business environment where job creators, innovators and 
entrepreneurs can flourish, where jobs are created in areas of most need and best used is 
made of the talents and motivation of a highly educated, skilled and adaptable 
worldorce.449 
Secondly, the Better Wales vision sought to incorporate hallmarks of the traditional 
Welsh identity, such as the centrality of the Welsh language. Better Wales also 
retains the traditional Welsh emphasis on strong local communities and fairness — or 
the `gwerin'. For example, Better Wales stated that 
we are one of the oldest nations in Europe with our own language and rich and 
diverse cultural inheritance, both urban and nira1. 45° 
In this sense, the Better Wales plan reinforced the historical Welsh identity derived 
from the image of the strong, hard working Welshman, and also the rural intellectual 
tradition that was inspired by the non-conformist revival. 
Better Wales also sought to pursue a 'communities first' approach: 
The Plan emphasises our deep commitment to developing better communities: places 
where people want to live, work and play; where people have access to economic 
opportunities, a pleasant an safe environment and active and inclusive social 
networks.45I 
The emphasis on community is also evident in a number of 'social' benchmarks. For 
example, Benchmark 19 called for greater community involvement in determining 
priorities for health care: 
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We must have an NHS (National Health Service) which is better attuned to the needs of 
people by ensuring that more decisions are taken locally and that better informed 
citizens more actively engage in planning their health services. 452 
Benchmark 19 is also an example of how Better Wales sought to couple an emphasis 
on community with an individual's responsibility to participate actively in the 
community. This can be seen as a continuation of the values associated with the 
tradition of Welsh radicalism. 
Thirdly, the Better Wales benchmarks consistently make reference to protecting and 
improving Wales' physical environment. The focus on environmental issues can be 
seen in a number of the Benchmarks already cited in this chapter. In its summary of 
the State of Wales, the Better Wales plan highlighted that national parks cover around 
one fifth of Wales. Furthermore, Better Wales stated that 
Some 5001cm of the Welsh coastline has been designated as Heritage Coast. Our 
landscape and our historic environment are a major asset, making Wales not only a 
first-class place to visit but also an exceptional location for business. Our country is an 
essential ingredient in the quality of our lives. 453 
Better Wales also made reference to the damage has heavy industry has done to the 
Welsh environment, and to the continuation of remedial actions on degraded areas: 
"Areas scarred by our industrial past are being repaired and restored to their former 
glory. ,1454 
4.14 Summary 
This chapter has identified a number of consistent themes inherent in the Welsh 
regional identity. These themes include the concept of the `gwerin', the Welsh 
historical traditions of religious non-conformism and radical individualism, the 
centrality of the Welsh language, and the importance of rural Wales and the Welsh 
452 rbid , p 19. 
453 Ibid, p 13. 
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environment, and the unique Welsh cultural history — with its strong tradition in music 
and sport. While these themes have been common to Wales as a region and can be 
traced historically, it is also acknowledged that Wales does not have a strong political 
tradition of regional unity. Prior to the English political domination which has ruled 
Wales since the 15 th century, Wales was mostly a loose collection of separate 
principalities with no overarching political structure. Regional cultural differences 
between parts of Wales are well-established, and are usually described in terms of a 
north west / south east axis. These cultural differences are also apparent in a urban / 
rural divide, with, for example, greater concentrations of overseas-born residents in 
the urban areas of Cardiff, Swansea and Newport. 
The establishment of the Welsh Parliament created a new Welsh political structure, 
and led to a greater level of interest in the question of what it means to be Welsh. In 
attempting to answer this question, The Better Wales plan has sought to build on the 
traditional elements of the Welsh identity and place these national characteristics in 
modern-day context. For example, Better Wales tries to position Wales as an 
outward-looking and confident region of Europe, rather than as a disadvantaged 
corner of the United Kingdom. 
The next chapter analyses the changing regional identities of both Wales and 
Tasmania in terms of the six criteria derived from Florida's work and examined in 
Chapter 2. The six criteria will be used to determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
the respective identities of the two regions. Furthermore, application of the 
framework will also enable an assessment of the utility of the 'creative class' 
approach in the analysis of regional identity and regional development policy. 
454 mid, p 13. 
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Chapter 5 -Analysing the Tasmanian 
and Welsh Regional Identities 
As economic peripheries, Wales and Tasmania share a number of regional 
characteristics. For example, both regions are physically close to major western 
economic centres, are English-speaking and share the same western culture. Both 
regions are also economically disadvantaged compared to their wealthy neighbouring 
regions, and suffer from socio-economic problems such as relatively high 
unemployment. 
The two regions, however, have developed significantly different regional identities. 
Wales has developed and maintained its identity over a period of around 1,000 years, 
despite centuries of political and cultural dominance by England. Wales has also had 
a separate language, separate religious traditions and a Celtic heritage that has clearly 
defining it as a distinct cultural entity. Chapter 4 noted a number of themes that are 
central to notions of the Welsh regional identity. For example, traditional Welsh 
culture emphasised the idea of community, but also incorporated a strong respect for 
individual rights. The cultural domination of England, however, has seen the cultural 
differences between the two societies erode, and today the differences can best be 
described as subtleties. 
While the rise of religious non-conformism in Wales during the nineteenth century 
saw a surge in nationalism based around religious difference, that form of nationalism 
subsided in the latter part of the 20 th century. In fields such as music and sport, 
however, Wales has retained a sense of independence. The establishment of the 
Welsh National Assembly in 1998, furthermore, has added considerable impetus to a 
resurgence in Welsh nationalism, and has led to a renewal in public discussion and 
debate about the nature of the Welsh regional identity. Nevertheless, Alys Thomas 
argued that Welsh identity "remains elusive: 455 Denis Balsom identified three 
distinct Welsh identities: Y Fro Grymraeg, Welsh Wales and British Wales, reflecting 
455 Alys Thomas, "Politics in Wales: A New Era?" p 288. 
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the political and social differences between the rural, urban and industrial regions of 
Wales. 456 
Tasmania, conversely, has been developing its regional identity for less than 200 
years, and hence does not have a long historical tradition to refer to. While a number 
of themes have emerged, defining a cohesive identity has been problematic. Whereas 
Wales has struggled to stay culturally distinct from its neighbour, Tasmania has 
struggled to define just what its cultural differences are. Two different trends have 
emerged in the expression of Tasmania's regional differences. Chapter 3 described 
these trends in terms of a 'romantic' Tasmanian identity and a 'progressive' 
Tasmanian identity. The 'romantic' identity essentially sees Tasmania as a pastoral 
idyll, where nature takes precedence over man and where high culture takes 
precedence over the wheels of industry. Tasmania's physical isolation is an integral 
element of this identity, as are the values of harmony, peace and stability. The 
'romantic' identity can also be seen as a reaction against the notion of a 'progressive' 
Tasmania that values industry, science and the human mind over nature. The most 
potent symbol of the 'progressive' Tasmanian identity has been the Hydro Electric 
Commission, which has traditionally been a major employer and has underpinned the 
development of industry in Tasmania through the provision of relatively cheap hydro 
electricity. 
Recently, however, both Wales and Tasmania have attempted to redefine themselves 
to meet the challenges faced by regional areas coming into the 21' century. In 
Tasmania, the Tasmania Together program has involved an exhaustive process of 
community meetings, submissions, and planning documents, ultimately producing a 
vision of Tasmania in the year 2020. The Better Wales plan arguably has a stronger 
sense of purpose, as it is aims to establish broad objectives, and a framework for 
decision-making, for the nascent Welsh Assembly. 
This chapter analyses the strengths and weakness of the regional identities discussed 
in the previous two chapters. This chapter also considers how successful the Better 
Wales and Tasmania Together programs have been in redefining the regional 
456 Dr Denis Balsom, "The Three Wales Model," in J Osmand (Ed), The National Question Again? 
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identities of the two regions. The criteria to be used in this evaluation are those 
outlined in Chapter 2, as adapted from Richard Florida's 'creative class' approach: 
• Well-defined competitive advantages in key 'growth' industries, and have 
developed clusters around those advantages; 
• High levels of innovation and business start-ups, leading to thick labour 
markets, employment opportunities, and the development a strong local 
business culture; 
• Openness to diversity and tolerance of difference; 
• A lifestyle that provides '24/7' recreational opportunities, and has a strong 
local cultural scene, such as live music; 
• An 'authentic' local culture, as opposed to generic cultural icons, which make 
the region in some way unique; 
• An identity that confers status as a desirable place to live. 
The task of applying these criteria to Tasmania has been made somewhat easier by the 
completion of a benchmarking study using creative class indicators by the Australian 
Local Government Association (ALGA). The ALGA's State of the Regions Report 
2002 -03457 examined regional development in Australia by comparing economic 
statistics for 64 regions around the country. The report, which is commissioned 
annually, broke new ground in 2002 by including comparative data on 'creative class' 
indicators for each region. For example, employment in each region is broken down 
according to the categories of 'agriculture', 'creative class', 'working class', 'service 
class', and 'super creative core'. A series of indicators or indices were also given to 
demonstrate a region's credentials as a creative centre, including: 
• Innovation Index — given as the number of patents per 100,000 people in the 
region; 
• High tech Index — which measures the output of designated high-tech 
industries; 
Welsh Political Identity in the 1980s (Llandysul: Gswag Gomer, 1985). 
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• Diversity Index — measured as a proportion of same sex couples in the local 
population; 
• Talent Index — which measures the proportion of people in the region aged 25 
and over with a bachelor degree or higher; 
• Creativity Index — which combines the Innovation, High-tech, Diversity and 
Talent Indices; 
• Bohemian Index — which measures amenities such as "a local music scene, 
vibrant street culture, small art galleries and so on"; 
• Melting Pot Index — measured as a the proportion of people in the region who 
are born; and 
• Composite Diversity Index — which combines the diversity, melting pot and 
bohemian indices. 458 
For the purposes of the report, Tasmania was divided into three regions — Southern, 
Northern and North West. This delineation of Tasmania into three regions is useful as 
there are significant social and economic differences between each area. 
Unfortunately no similar study is available for Wales, however, the six criteria will be 
applied to the qualitative data gathered from literature on the Welsh identity in 
Chapter 4. 
5.1 	Competitive Advantages 
Chapter 2 noted that Tasmania's 'progressive' has been predicated on the 
development of Tasmania's natural resources, rather than intellectual or human 
resources. The symbols of Tasmania's 'progressiveness', therefore, tend to involve 
forestry, mining, and other resource-intensive industries. Notably, the most potent 
icon of progressive Tasmania, the HEC, achieved prominence through the 
construction of dams to harness the State's natural water resources. 
The reliance on resource-intensive industry, and the export of commodities to larger 
458 National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report 2002- 
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economic centres, is a central component of the definition of an economic periphery. 
It can be argued that the progressive identity reinforces the essential elements of 
Tasmania's economic dependence on core or metropolitan regions by linking 
Tasmania's perceived 'progressiveness' to its utilisation of natural resources rather 
than intellectual capital resources. Implicit in the progressive vision is therefore a 
notion that Tasmania is a supplier of materials, rather than a transformer of materials. 
This view of the State is borne out by the statistics cited earlier in this chapter that 
showed Tasmania to have a relatively small professional services sector, but relatively 
strong resources and manufacturing sectors. In terms of Florida's 'creative class' 
analysis, these industries involve largely 'working class' occupations, and do not 
support high number of jobs that fit into Florida's classifications of the 'super creative 
core' or 'creative professionals'. 
The competitive advantages that can be linked to Tasmania's 'romantic' identity, 
however, can be viewed in the context of the Brand Tasmania project. According to 
Brand Tasmania, the State's advantages include its clean environment, natural 
wilderness and reputation for producing high-quality products, especially in the food 
and beverages sector. Brand Tasmania also identified creativity and innovation as 
being characteristics of Tasmanian society. Furthermore, the Nixon and Callaghan 
Reports both highlighted the importance of the Tasmanian environment to its 
competitive advantage. In particular, Nixon noted the relationship between the 
Tasmanian natural environment and cultural heritage and the State's marketing 
advantages in industries such as agriculture, aquaculture and tourism. The Brand 
Tasmania focus on the State's 'clean/green' image provides Tasmanian producers 
with a potential marketing advantage that can lead to price premiums. For example, 
there are opportunities for Tasmanian products , to be processed or value-added locally, 
especially in the agriculture, aquaculture and forestry sectors. 
Tourism is another industry sector that is consistently nominated as an area in which 
Tasmania has advantages, particular in the Brand Tasmania vision of the State. The 
Nixon Report stated that 
Tourism is the State's highest value export ... The tourism industry provides 
Tasmanians with the ability to use the State's recognised natural environment, 
155 
combined with its significant colonial heritage, to generate wealth and employment for 
the community. This can be done with little or no adverse environmental impact. 459 
The tourism industry is also subject to market fluctuations, particularly given 
Tasmania's reliance on air and sea transport links. Events such as airline strikes, and 
the collapse of Ansett Airlines have in the past had serious short-term consequences 
for the Tasmanian tourism industry. The tourism industry is also seasonal, with 
significant peaks and troughs, and many jobs in the sector are casual or part-time. 
Furthermore, the tourism sector supports mostly 'service class' jobs. Florida warned 
against regions placing too much emphasis on the tourism industry to create jobs: 
Some Service Class centers — mainly tourist destinations like Las Vegas — are attracting 
people and creating jobs rapidly. But many of these are low-wage dead-end jobs. A 
job cleaning hotel rooms or even dealing cards in Las Vegas does not offer much Of a 
ladder up into out economy's jetstream. I suspect the Service Class centers too will 
become increasingly separated from the economic engine of our society. 460 
Tasmania Together identified similar themes when it alluded to the State's economic 
strengths. For example, Goal 20 reflected the Brand Tasmania themes of capitalising 
on the State's reputation for having a 'clean/green' environment and for producing 
high-quality products: 
Promote our island advantages including our 'clean-green' image, natural resources, 
location and people. 46I 
The 'challenges' listed under this goal included increasing visitor numbers, and 
increasing exports of renewable energy. 462 This indicates that Tasmania also has a 
comparative advantage in the area of renewable energy production - building on the 
historical role of the HEC and its iconic status for the 'progressive' image of the State. 
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The importance of stimulating competition within industry clusters, however is 
something which Tasmania Together appears to overlook, as it does not specifically 
identify competition as part of its vision for the future. Possibly, it may be considered 
that the nature of competition does not fit well with the vision of Tasmanians "living 
in harmony."463 Porter's work on the importance of competition to stimulating 
innovation and regional development, however, indicates that the Tasmania Together 
goals relating to healthy business environments and increased entrepreneurship are 
unlikely to be achieved without appropriate levels of competition in the economy. 
Tasmania Together's use of progressive themes also moves away from the resource 
processing symbolism which has dominated the 'progressive' Tasmanian identity. 
Even in the contentious area of forestry, which remained a focus of dissent, references 
to it in the Tasmania Together goals focused on downstream processing, or value-
adding, rather than on continuing the practice of exporting raw materials such as 
woodchips. The affirmation of information technology and other service-related 
industries as being crucial to regional economic growth reiterated the rhetoric of the 
Intelligent Island program, and continued to reposition the State's 'human capital' at 
the centre of the 'progressive' identity. 
Chapter 4 showed that, historically, Wales has developed its comparative advantages 
around the exploitation of its natural resources and agriculture. In particular, large-
scale coal mining and the steel industry dominated the post-industrial revolution 
Welsh economy. These industries were not only resource-based, but were driven by 
large companies based outside Wales. Fevre noted that the major industry sectors in 
the Welsh economy are now agriculture and manufacturing, with a growing service 
sector aided by a particularly high proportion of Government sector jobs. Tourism, 
and particularly 'heritage tourism' has also been identified as a sector in which Wales 
has advantages. 
Better Wales does not define Wales' competitive advantages in terms of industry 
sectors or clusters, and only three industry sectors are mentioned specifically. Firstly, 
463 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 1. 
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tourism is identified as a potential source of growth and a beneficiary of policy goals 
to improve and promote the Welsh environment. Secondly, the information 
technology sector is highlighted as an important driver and facilitator of growth. 
Thirdly, growth in the agriculture sector is set as a benchmark, with a stated goal of 
increasing employment in the dairy, lamb and beef processing sectors by 10 per cent. 
An increase in the number of farms certified as being 'organic' is also set down as a 
benchmark, indicating that Wales is perceived to have a competitive advantage in 
organic agriculture. 
The Better Wales plan, however, identified the concept of Brand Wales as important 
mechanism in its attempt to redefine Welsh competitive advantages in the modern 
global economy. As noted in Chapter 4, Better Wales stated that 
Made in Wales branded products must be associated in the international marketplace 
with high quality, advanced technology, reliability and good design. 464 
In this respect Brand Wales aims to make 'high-quality' recognised as a Welsh trait or 
value - in a similar way to Germany's international reputation for producing high 
quality goods in the automotive sector. 
Welsh competitive advantage can therefore be seen as similar to that of Tasmania, 
with a focus on resource processing industries (especially agriculture) and an 
emphasis on tourism as a growth sector. Brand Wales, like Brand Tasmania, seeks to 
establish a 'premium' brand for Welsh-made products that will negate the impacts of 
commodity market fluctuations. Again however, the focus of these industries is on 
working class or service class occupations, therefore the competitive advantages of 
the Welsh regional economy do not support the development of a stronger 'creative 
class'. 
464 Better Wales, p 21. 
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5.2 	Thick Labour Markets / Innovation 
The 'romantic' and the 'progressive' images have significantly different implications 
for the criterion of innovation and thick labour markets. The 'romantic' view of 
Tasmania provides a counterpoint to the artificiality of city life, and has been ascribed 
the qualities of tranquility, nature, harmony and peace. By implication, therefore, the 
romantic image of Tasmania is also sleepy, unproductive and lacking the industrious, 
productive and fast-paced qualities of metropoles. The establishment of the romantic 
Tasmanian identity has parallels with the pastoral identity of the French Quebeckers. 
The romantic identity also confers a sense of conservatism and comfort in the "old 
ways". This was recognised by Callaghan, who stated that 
Tasmania carmot live forever on its natural beauty and its history. The citizens of today 
need to think of the future. I have no doubt the great majority of the people of 
Tasmania realise this. On the other hand, the observer senses, among many, a 
resistance to change.465 
The Nixon Report was written some 20 years after the Callaghan Report, but reiterated 
many of the same themes. Nixon also found a evidence of a general "resistance to 
change" in the Tasmanian community. Nixon reported that 
comments have been made to me also about the general attitude to development in the 
State and how this is promoted through Government decision making. Concerns have 
been raised about the community attitude to large developments in Tasmania where the 
approach is to actively seek out and promote what is wrong with a suggested 
development rather than trying to make the development work. It has been suggested 
that this approach arises from a fear of change within the community. 466 
It can be argued, therefore, that the 'romantic' Tasmanian identity fosters a general 
resistance to change in the Tasmanian community, and a rejection of innovation. 
Conversely, the 'progressive' Tasmanian identity, with its emphasis on industry and 
465 Sir Bede Callaghan, Report Into the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in 
Tasmania, p 78. 
466 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 21. 
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science, would appear to be more supportive of change. The Intelligent Island and 
Innovations Centre programs, for example, can be seen as taking the 'progressive' 
identity and placing it in the context of Tasmania's information technology-based 
service industries. These programs promoted an image of Tasmania that was 
supported of innovation and promoted the development of industries that support the 
creation of 'creative class' jobs. 
The State of the Regions Report 2002 used the high-tech index as a proxy 
measurement for labour market 'thickness'. According to the report, 15.5 per cent of 
the Southern Tasmanian workforce were 'creative professionals', below the national 
figure of 16.3 per cent, and 9.6 per cent of the workforce were classified within the 
'super creative core', above the national average of 8.9 per cent. In total, the size of 
Southern Tasmania's 'creative' labour force was exactly equal to the national average 
of 25.2 per cent. In terms of the high-tech index, Southern Tasmania was rated 28 th of 
the 64 regions measured.467 
In Northern Tasmania, 13.7 per cent of the workforce were classified as 'creative 
professionals' and 7.1 per cent were classified as being within the 'super-creative 
core', for a total of 20.8 per cent of the workforce being in the 'creative class'. 
Northern Tasmania was ranked 41 st on the high tech index. In North West Tasmania 
the results were among the lowest in the nation, with just 12 per cent of the workforce 
classified as 'creative professionals', and 6.9 per cent in the 'super creative core' for a 
total of 18.9 per cent in the total creative class. North West Tasmania was ranked 50 th 
on the high-tech index.468 
The State of the Regions report figures therefore indicated that the Tasmanian labour 
market as a whole was below the national average in relation to 'thickness' for 
creative professionals. This placed Tasmania at a disadvantage compared to other 
regions, with a labour force of insufficient critical mass to provide the breadth of job 
opportunities that is required to attract members of the 'creative class', especially 
those who are involved in the information technology sector. Within the State, 
467 National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report 2002, 
pp A5.118-123. 
468 Ibid, pp A5.118-123. 
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however, regional differences exist, with the labour market being considerably thicker 
in the South than in either the North or North West. 
Chapter 4 showed that Tasmania Together supported the notion of creating a 'thicker' 
labour market by encouraging the development of a more entrepreneurial culture and 
expressing support for the continued development of the State's small to medium-
sized enterprise sector. For example, the Tasmania Together vision statement that 
"We will have a world class reputation for innovation, imagination and 
intelligence"469 pointed directly to the establishment of a more 'creative' economy. 
This was again borne out in Goal 19, to "have an internationally focused business 
culture."47° 
Tasmania Together also highlighted a need for increased investment in research and 
development. For example Tasmania Together set a goal of increasing investment in 
research and development, and a target benchmark of becoming the leading 
Australian State in terms of investment in research and development as a proportion 
of Gross State Product. Furthermore, Tasmania Together also identified the adoption 
of new technology as a priority for the community, with Goal 17 aiming to "maximise 
the opportunities available through information and other technologies." 47I 
Like Tasmania, Wales suffers in comparison to larger centres in that its labour market 
is by definition smaller, and therefore options for people are more limited. 
Nevertheless, the Welsh labour market is considerably bigger than Tasmania. 
Chapter 4 noted that Wales has been described as lacking a culture of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, Better Wales stated that 
We have a long-standing tradition of self-employment, but the innovator and the 
entrepreneur culture required to create a truly dynamic small and medium enterprise 
sector is not as strong as we would wish. We are also under-represented in significant 
high value-added growth sectors such as Information Technology, pharmaceuticals and 
other science and knowledge-based activities. Within our company structure, there are 
469 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 1. 
470 Ibid, p 23. 
471 Ibid, p 22. 
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too few decision-making departments, units and occupations in finance, research and 
development, marketing and product design. 472 
Ralph Fevre argued that Wales also suffers from a cycle of dependency, with reliance 
on inward investment and government assistance acting to further discourage the 
development of entrepreneurship. A Winning Wales, the national economic 
development strategy of the Welsh Assembly Government, recognised this pattern 
stating that 
Wales lags behind the UK both in terms of the business birth rate and the number of 
extant businesses per head of population. 473 
Similarly, Better Wales stated that 
Although our service sector, including financial services, is growing rapidly, it is small 
and we continue to rely on the low-value end of manufacturing. Or small and medium 
sized enterprise sector is relatively under-developed and relatively few of our small 
businesses make the crucial transition to larger, dynamic enterprises. Fewer still gain 
stock market status. The rate of new business start-ups is lower than that in England 
and Scotland. 474 
With relatively fewer businesses in the small to medium-sized enterprise sector, the 
Welsh labour force must therefore be considered relatively 'thin'. 
The relative lack of research and development activities in Wales was identified in 
Chapter 4 as a contributing factor to Wales' economic dependency. For example, 
Better Wales set benchmark targets for greater levels of research and development and 
for increased funding further and higher education. Chapter 4 also showed that 
Better Wales supported the adoption of new technology, and in particular 
telecommunications and information technology. Better Wales also calls for the 
development of an 'Information Age' strategy to ensure "that Wales takes full 
472 Better Wales, p 15. 
473 A Winning Wales — The National Economic Strategy of the Welsh Assembly Government, Cardiff: 
January 2002, p 21. 
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advantage of the Information and Communications Technologies revolution: 475 
Furthermore, a number of benchmarks cited in Chapter 4 (such as Benchmarks 2, 5 
and 6) specifically point to the creation of new businesses in order to create new 
employment opportunities, and to the role of promoting innovation and use of 
technology through the education system. 
5.3 	Lifestyle 
Chapter 3 found that the main 'selling points' of the Tasmanian lifestyle are often 
considered to be its easy pace of life' and clean, unpolluted environment. Florida's 
assessment of 'creative class' values, however, suggested that these lifestyle factors 
may not be the ones of most interest to the 'creative class'. Florida suggested that 
members of the 'creative class' seek locations that offer a variety of experiences and 
activities, or "ready access to recreation on a just-in-time basis: 476 In this context 
Tasmania — and certainly the major population centres of Hobart and Launceston — 
does have much to offer in terms of parks, beaches, and other areas for outdoor 
activities such as bike riding, jogging, surfing or bush walking. 
Chapter 3 noted Tasmania can also be seen to have a relatively small but flourishing 
arts and culture scene. Florida cited Erica Colsor's research on the 'nightlife' 
preferences of people in their 20s and 30s, which found that the most desired nightlife 
options were: 
cultural attractions (from the symphony and theatre to music venues) and late night 
dining, followed by small jazz and music clubs and coffee shops. 477 
Given these preferences, the promotion of the Tasmanian Symphony Orchestra as a 
State 'icon', as discussed in Chapter 2, can be seen as a valuable drawcard for the 
creative class. 
474 Better Wales, p 15. 
475 Better Wales, p 2. 
476 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, p 224. 
163 
The State of the Regions Report 2002 ranked Southern Tasmania 18th out of 64 
regions in relation to the 'Bohemian Index', which measured the availability of 
lifestyle amenities such restaurants, cafes and live music venues. Northern Tasmania 
was ranked 36th, and North West Tasmania was ranked 42' 1 .478 
The availability of lifestyle amenities in the North and North West is increasing, 
however, with the development of 'café cultures' and cultural precincts. Indeed, the 
editor of the local newspaper in Launceston made the following observation in a 
newspaper column on the city's cultural and economic progress: 
Launceston took the strategic path to give itself a new future, particularly with its 
innovative search conference which tapped into community views about what sort of 
city its residents wanted in the future. The footpaths were widened; the café culture 
thrives and has created the climate that the supports the high quality dining that has 
given the city national note as a place to eat... The rediscovery of the city's river edges 
and the investment in their improvement has provided the most dramatic change for the 
city — not just its physical environment but, on the basis of anecdotal evidence, making 
people feel more positive about their city. 479 
Creative class lifestyle values appear in some ways to sit more comfortably with the 
'romantic' Tasmanian identity than with the 'progressive'. The romantic emphasis on 
art and culture, and the notion of Tasmania being a haven for artists, certainly 
resonates well with Florida's notion of the creative community and the creative 
economy. Furthermore, it can be argued that the physical markers of Tasmania's 
romantic identity — its parks, wilderness and natural environment — provide a perfect 
setting for the active recreational experiences preferred by the 'creative class'. 
Florida argued, however, that the 'creative class' lifestyle is also about access to a 
range of amenities and services on a just-in-time' basis. Furthermore, Florida's 
suggested that certain types of recreational activities are more important to members 
of the 'creative class' — that is activities that involve participation, and can be engaged 
477 Ibid, p 225. 
478 National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report 2002, 
pp 118-123. 
9 Rod Scott "It's Strategies that Win Goals", in The Examiner, 15 June 2003, p 22. 
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in at any time to fit around busy, flexible personal schedules. Florida also noted that 
many younger 'creative class' members sought an 'around the clock' nightlife — not 
because they are 'party animals', but because they had flexible and demanding 
working hours. 48° The blurring of the separation between work and recreation time 
means that creative people tend to require the lifestyle amenities of modern city. The 
tranquil, isolated and pastoral virtues of the romantic identity are, therefore, not 
particularly conducive to the new, fast-paced creative class lifestyle. This was 
recognised by the on-line submission to Tasmania Together cited in Chapter 3 that 
stated: 
To participate in the global economy and attract people that live in that economy (for 
example those who have been tagged the 'e-generation') Tasmania needs to act as if it 
is part of that economy. This means committing to a 24/7 economy and understanding 
that, for example, restrictive shop trading hours are a symbol of 19th century thinking 
and a symbolic barrier to participation in the global economy. 481 
Tasmania Together highlighted the arts sector as playing an important role in the 
development of a creative culture. According to Tasmania Together, Tasmanians 
wanted 
increased participation in the arts and cultural activities — [because] active involvement 
stimulates community interest in the arts and creates an environment conducive to 
creativity. 482 
Goal 11, therefore, aimed to "Have Tasmania recognised nationally and 
internationally for its innovation, pursuit of excellence and creativity in arts and 
culture."483 In this respect Tasmania Together goes some way towards addressing the 
lifestyle issues raised identified by Florida. While Tasmania Together set a goal of 
"encouraging healthy lifestyles,” 484 it did not, however, identify the provision of 
480 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, pp 224-225. 
481 Alex Tewes, www.tastogether.asn.au/feedback,  submitted 8/2/00, accessed 24/9/00. 
482 Community,   Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 15. 
483 /bid, p 15. 
484 ib • a  p i 	11. 
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active recreational facilities as a priority, or address the issue of providing services 
and recreational activities on a '24/7' basis. 
Better Wales identified both sport and music as being important components of the 
Welsh national identity and lifestyle: 
We have a passion for music and sport. We have musicians with world-wide 
reputations in everything from opera to rock. 485 
Better Wales also successfully identifies an imperative to increase participation in 
sport and recreation, setting a goal to "increase the number of adults taking part in 
sporting activities by 45 by supporting the work of the Sports Council'486 by March 
2003. 
As with Tasmania Together, however, Better Wales only dealt with the issue of 
participation, not with the more basic issue of provision of recreational opportunities. 
No reference is made in the plan as to how participation objectives would be 
achieved, or what type of recreational activities should be promoted. Better Wales, in 
this sense, fails to identify the provision of infrastructure for recreational activities as 
an important measure for encouraging a more creative community. 
Better Wales did acknowledge a need to provide an environment and culture more 
conducive to attracting and retaining young people. This was explicitly stated in 
Benchmark 14: 
Wales must be able to retain a far higher proportion of its young people. It must be a 
place where young people want to live, work and enjoy a high quality of life."' 
Again, however, Better Wales did not provide any detail on how this would be 
achieved, nor did it recognise the role of 'nightlife' in retaining and attracting creative 
people. 
485 Better Wales, p 13. 
486 ibid, p 32. 
487 v. • 1 , p 21. 
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5.4 	Diversity 
Chapter 3 showed that Tasmania's cultural and ethnic diversity is steadily increasing 
due to continued international migration. The State experienced considerable 
immigration from Europe during the 1950s, especially from Poland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Greece. In more recent times, Tasmania has experienced an influx of 
migrants from South East Asia and Africa. Both Callaghan and Nixon found that 
Tasmania's ethnic diversity was limited in comparison to other Australian States, and 
Callaghan noted that this lack of diversity could have economic consequences for 
Tasmania. 
Richard Florida highlighted the 'gay index' as a measure of diversity and as an 
indicator that a place is open to outsiders and to people who are `differene. 488 
Attitudes to homosexuality have slowly been changing in Tasmania, nevertheless, 
Chapter 4 noted that issues relating to homosexuality invariably raise vigorous debate 
in Tasmania. 489 
The State of the Regions Report 2002 found significant differences in the 'Diversity 
Index' results for the three Tasmanian regions. Southern Tasmania was ranked 18 th  
on the list of Australian regions for this indicator, while Northern Tasmania was 
ranked 44th and North West Tasmania was ranked 57 th• The 'Melting Pot Index', 
which measures the proportion of a region's foreign-born population, is another 
indicator of diversity. Results for this indicator in the State of the Region Report 2002 
showed that Southern Tasmania was ranked 38 th with 0.11 per cent of the population 
being classified as foreign-born, Northern Tasmania was ranked 45 th (0.09 per cent) 
and North West Tasmania was ranked 55 th  (0.08 per cent). In the 'Composite 
Diversity Index', which is a combination of the Diversity and Melting Pot Index 
results, Southern Tasmania was ranked 38 th, Northern Tasmania was ranked 42 nd and 
North West Tasmania was ranked 47 th . 490 
488 Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, pp 255-258. 
489 Rodney Croome, Address at the launch of "A Just Society," 10/9/99, transcript on International 
Lesbian and Gay Association website, www.ilga.org/Information/asia pacific, accessed 2/3/04. 
49° National Economics / Australian Local Government Association, State of the Regions Report 2002, 
pp A.5.118-123. 
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These results indicated that Tasmania was relatively less diverse than most Australian 
regions. Moreover, North and North West Tasmania were among the lowest one third 
of Australian regions for diversity. Southern Tasmania, however, was in the top 20 
regions in relation to the gay index, which indicated a relatively high level of 
acceptance of other cultures and sexual orientations, but was close to the national 
average in terms of the proportion of people born in foreign countries. 
Themes related to tolerance and diversity are central to Tasmania Together. While 
the overarching vision refers to people 'living in harmony,' Goal 9 specifically deals 
with the issue of promoting cultural diversity in the community: 
Foster an inclusive society that acknowledges and respects our multicultural heritage, 
values diversity and treats everyone with compassion and respect.49I 
While the Welsh population is predominantly of European background, Chapter 4 
noted that a wide range of ethnic backgrounds are represented in Wales. Indeed, 
racial tolerance is regarded as a marker of the contemporary Welsh identity - 
consistent with the historic characteristic of equality. Charlotte Williams stated that 
The Welsh have traditionally regarded themselves as a welcoming and tolerant people 
viewing with contempt the narrow racism of much of English nationalism. Popular 
images of Wales abound as a country where a melee of cultures has settled 
• harmoniously in a type of colour-blind co-operation.492 
Most parts of Wales, however, have relatively small ethnic minority populations. 
Welsh Office figures list the proportion of Welsh population considered to be part of 
'ethnic minorities' as 1.5 per cent, or 41,551 in a total population of over 2.8 million. 
The most significant concentration of the ethnic minority population is in the Vale of 
Glamorgan, which contains the capital city of Cardiff, with 6 per cent. 493 Williams 
notes that the ethnic minority population includes people classified as 'black', 'South 
491 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 13. 
492 Charlotte Williams, "Race' and Racism: What's Special About Wales?" p 114. 
493 Ibid, p 272. 
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Asian', 'Chinese' and a significant number of people with mixed ethnicity!'" 
Williams however questioned whether the idea of tolerance was genuinely a part of 
the Welsh character. Conversely, Chapter 4 also cited R Merfryn Jones, who argued 
that Wales is relatively open and tolerant of homosexuality. 495 
The traditional Welsh concept of the `gwerin' was also discussed in terms of this 
criterion. One on hand, the notion of community inherent in the idea of the `gwerin' 
can be seen as supportive of a culture of tolerance. On the other hand, however, 
Williams noted that the idea of the `gwerin' is based on a historically homogenous 
view of Welsh culture. In this sense, it can be argued that the concept of the `gwerin' 
is not particularly supportive of cultural diversity. 
The Better Wales vision highlighted diversity as a key theme, stating that 
We want Wales to be — committed to fostering its unique and diverse identity, and the 
benefits of bilingualism, while looking confidently outwards and welcoming new 
cultural influences.496 
The Better Wales vision, therefore, set a solid foundation for a culture of tolerance 
and diversity. Chapter 4 noted that a number of goals acknowledge that there is often 
a racial or cultural element involved in social disadvantage. Better Wales, however, 
did not identify the promotion of tolerance and diversity as a specific goal or 
benchmark, nor did it set out any plan for achieving greater levels of diversity — 
especially in rural areas. Furthermore, Better Wales did not identify sexuality in 
relation to diversity, and did not set any goals or benchmarks relating to the 
homosexual community. 
494 Ibid, p 273. 
495  R Merfyn Jones, "Social Change in Wales Since 1945," in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson 
(Eds), Wales Today, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p 17. 
496 Better Wales, p 1. 
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5.5 	Authenticity 
Florida asserted that creative people are attracted by places that offer 'authentic 
experiences,' as opposed to generic ones. As an island, Tasmania can be considered 
to be well-placed in terms of offering a lifestyle that is removed and distinct from 
other regions, and therefore 'authentic.' In terms of cultural heritage, however, 
Tasmania has only a relatively short history of European settlement, and the treatment 
of the local indigenous population has removed virtually all signs of aboriginal culture 
from the State. Nevertheless, when compared to the American regions examined by 
Richard Florida, Tasmania does not appear disadvantaged in terms of cultural 
heritage, so this should not be a limiting factor. 
Both Nixon and Callaghan identified the State's environment as a major component 
of the Tasmanian identity, and in itself the environment can be seen as integral to a 
sense of Tasmania's 'authenticity.' Similarly, Tasmania's well-preserved colonial 
architecture is considered to be unique in Australia, and therefore also adds to the 
picture of an 'authentic' Tasmania. 
Florida suggested that members of the 'creative class' tend to be attracted to places 
that offer a dynamic and evolving culture that embraces diversity. In this respect, 
'authenticity' can be seen as more about a place developing its own cultural 'feel.' 
Florida argued that while it is impossible for regions like Tasmania to keep generic 
multinational brands and experiences out, they can promote a sense of difference by 
supporting the development of new local experiences and protecting old ones. 
Florida also noted the significance of popular music to the creative class lifestyle. 
According to Florida, successful regions tend to be associated successful music 
'scenes' — or have an 'audio identity.' In this respect, both Callaghan and Nixon 
noted a perception in young Tasmanians that the State was often 'left off the map' in 
terms of access to popular music. As noted in Chapter 3, Nixon stated that "young 
people have expressed their concern that bands touring Australia frequently leave 
Tasmania off their agenda.”497 Furthermore, Chapter 3 noted that relatively few 
497 Peter Nixon, The Nixon Report, p 201. 
170 
Tasmanian contemporary musicians have achieved national or international success. 
In this respect, therefore, Tasmania can be seen to lack the 'audio identity' that 
Florida identified as a hallmark of 'creative' communities. 
While not using the term 'authenticity', the Tasmania Together vision can be seen as 
recognising the value of 'authenticity' through its focus on preserving the State's 
cultural and natural heritage. Goal 21, to "value protect and conserve our natural and 
cultural heritage,"498 for example, is significant in the context. Tasmania Together 
also recognised the importance of planning schemes, in protecting the State's heritage 
with a number of benchmarks addressing planning-related issues. The included 
benchmarks such as 
• To improve the planning system to value the environment; and 
• To foster innovative design of the built and landscaped environment. 499 
Goal 9 also called for State's indigenous cultural heritage to be maintained: 
Acknowledge and respect the contribution that the aboriginal community and its culture 
have made and continue to make to Tasmania and its identity. 50° 
Chapter 4 highlighted the significance of the Welsh language to notions of Welsh 
identity. The sense of regional difference that is conveyed by the Welsh language 
also fits well with Florida's concept of 'authenticity.' Visitors to Wales cannot escape 
the presence of the Welsh language on road signs and in the community, and this 
provides a visible reminder that Wales is indeed unique. Chapter 4 also noted that the 
existence of the Welsh language is also significant for other reasons. By speaking 
Welsh, the Welsh people are able to define the world around them in their own terms, 
rather than through the structure of another language. As Evans and Rhys stated, 
498 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 25. 
499 9 /bid, p 79. 
500 ibid, p 1 3 . 
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The question that troubles nationalists is the extent to which the warm and unique 
Welshness of the valleys can be transmitted from generation to generation without a 
language through which to assimilate the immense standardizing forces which are 
imposing sameness on the whole of Western Europe today. 501 
Teri Brewer also noted the role of that Welsh heritage in defining images of Wales, 
particularly in relation to the tourism industry. Brewer stated that 
Heritage markers, taken out of the context of every day life, continually shape the way 
visitors perceive Wales, whether as a land of daffodils, song and druids, as a contested 
frontier, pony-trekking, rock-climbing and rambling paradise, a Celtic Fringe, a well-
spring of spirituality, a post-industrial landscape — to name just a few of the images of 
Wales promoted for tourism. 502 
Chapter 4 highlighted some of the problems with these cultural markers, in that they 
can be used to symbolise a clichés and patronising view of Wales. This "leeks and 
rugby"503 image is used to portray Wales as being quaint and something of a novelty, 
but it also implies a lack of cultural sophistication. In turn this reinforces 
metropolitan prejudices against Wales, and is used to justify the maintenance of core-
periphery power relations. 
Florida noted that 'authenticity', to his creative class subjects, could include the 
existence inner-city industrial areas, as well as more conventional aspects of cultural 
heritage. In this sense, Wales can build on both its Celtic and post-industrial heritage 
to promote an 'authentic' Welsh lifestyle. In relation to popular music, Wales also 
appears to meet Florida's identified requirement for a region to have a thriving 
musical culture. Indeed, the success of Welsh popular music can be likened to the 
'soundtrack' that, according to Florida, accompanies other successful creative regions. 
Chapter 4 noted the comments of Steve Blandford, for example, who argued that 
" I G Evans and I Rhys, "Wales," p 247. 
502 Teri Brewer, "Heritage Tourism, a Mirror for Wales," p160. 
503  Gruff Rhys, cited in Steve Blandford, "Aspects of the Live and Recorded Arts in Contemporary 
Wales," p 113. 
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Welsh pop musicians had taken Welsh music beyond "patronising novelty status"504 
to become internationally recognised. 
Better Wales identified Wales' cultural heritage and language as a crucial element of 
the Welsh identity. The Better Wales stated that "We are one of the oldest nations in 
Europe with our own language and a rich and diverse cultural inheritance, both urban 
and rural." 505 Furthermore, Better Wales also established benchmarks for growth in 
the number of Welsh speakers, For example, Benchmark 24 stated that 
The proportion of the total population who can speak Welsh should have grown, with 
the sharpest rise having been among young people. 
The protection of natural and built heritage, however, was less visible in the Better 
Wales benchmarks. While noting that national parks cover one fifth of Welsh land, 
Better Wales did not identify any specific benchmarks relating to either natural or 
built heritage. 
5.6 	Identity / Status 
Florida argued that members of the 'creative class' tend to link their own personal 
identity and sense of self with the place in which they live, and with the 'status' 
values associated with that place. In this respect, Tasmania's image and reputation is 
vital to defining its status as a place to live, and therefore its ability to attract creative 
people. Chapter 3 noted that negative stereotypes have downplayed Tasmania's 
status, however a jump in population growth between 2001 and 2004, 506 and a real 
estate boom fuelled by interstate investors, 507 suggests that Tasmania's status as a 
location for living and working may be improving. 
504  Steve Blandford, "Aspects of the Live and Recorded Arts in Contemporary Wales," p 112. 
505 Better Wales, p 13. 
506 Tasmania's population rose by around 5 per cent between 1999 and 2004, see Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Tasmania — Regional Profile, www.abs.gov.au, accessed 21/4/04. 
507 Property Focus Tasmania (Hobart: Real Estate Institute of Tasmania, 2004). 
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On one level, both the 'progressive' and 'romantic' identities reaffirm Tasmania as a 
place worthy of status. In the case of the 'progressive' identity this comes from 
Tasmania as a regional leader in business and academia, and in the case of the 
'romantic' identity this comes from Tasmania's natural and cultural assets, and 
rejection of commercialism. Both of these identities, however, can be seen as 
reinforcing some of the negative stereotypes about the State which act against 
Tasmania being considered as a 'high-status' location. This was apparent in a number 
of submissions to Tasmania Together, such as comments which referring to Tasmania 
as an 'irrelevant backwater' and describing a 'we can't do it mentality'. 
Bruce Felmingham also noted the role of the media in promoting certain images of 
Tasmania. Felmingham's observation about 'Tasmania bashing' in the national 
media highlighted one of the problems of being a peripheral or semi-peripheral area, 
and also indicated how regional areas suffer from having limited access to the 
mechanisms of the third dimension of power. 508 While difficult to quantify, negative 
publicity about regional areas must surely affect the status that is associated with 
those regions, and therefore affect the ability of those regions to attract members of 
the 'creative class'. 
The Tasmania Together vision clearly set out to encourage a greater sense of 
community pride. Indeed, the vision statement to make Tasmania "an icon for the rest 
of the world by creating a proud and confident society" 509 can be seen as directly 
addressing this issue. Goal 11, to "have Tasmania recognised nationally and 
internationally for its innovation, pursuits of excellence and creativity in arts and 
culture,"51° also sought to improve Tasmania's status as a location for creative people. 
This interpretation of the Tasmania Together vision has a number of important 
differences from the established romantic and progressive traditions. Firstly, it was 
been achieved through a grass-roots, bottom-up approach, thus effecting a movement 
against top-down solutions applied to regional problems. Secondly, it combined the 
two existing regional identities (progressive and romantic) to form a new hybrid 
508 Bruce Felmingham, "Offensive Effects of Poisoned Minds." The Sunday Tasmanian, 6/10/02. 
509 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 1. 
51° Ibid, p 15. 
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identity. In this sense, the Tasmania Together identity subverted the negative aspects 
which were inherent in the traditional approaches, and which have been discussed in 
this chapter. For example, in terms of the 'romantic' identity, the Tasmania Together 
vision identified the negative qualities of backwardness and lack of productivity, and 
• attempted to reverse them by setting goals for economic development. The very use 
of the language of economics and 'progress' was an attempt to overcome the implied 
state of under-development inherent in the romantic ideal. 
It can also be argued that the 'status' values associated with Wales have suffered from 
negative stereotyping. Chapter 4 noted that core-periphery relationships within the 
Welsh media are perhaps most notable in the newspaper sector, where industry 
consolidation has not only reduced the proportion of newspapers published in the 
Welsh language, but also reduced the proportion of Welsh-owned publications. It can 
be argued that the lack of Welsh-owned media limits the ability of the Welsh 
community to influence the images of Wales that are presented through the media. 
Nevertheless, David Dunkerley noted that the Welsh population rose continuously 
over the second half of the twentieth century - albeit at a diminishing rate - due to 
steady inward migration. 511 Dunkerley, in fact, argued that the images of Wales 
promoted in the media mask the real state of Wales as a region beset by chronic 
economic and social disparities. In his review of social statistics for Wales, 
Dunkerley stated that 
What we see is a poor country that is deeply divided, with sharp contrasts between one 
area and another. And yet Wales is often portrayed in a kind of romantic timeless way 
as a land of mountains and lakes and beaches, of high culture and innovation. 512 
Chapter 4 also found that Wales is increasingly being defined as part of the broader 
European community, rather than as part of the United Kingdom. The Welsh 
Assembly has played an important role in redefining the Welsh identity in this 
respect. As Thompson stated, the development of a 
5"  David Dunkerley, "Social Wales," in David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson (Eds), Wales Today, 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p 39. 
512 /bid, p 39. 
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Powerhouse Parliament will put Wales at the heart of a new Europe of the Nations and 
historic Regions — no longer left on the furthest edge of the UK listening to the Euro-
squabble of middle England. 513 
The Better Wales vision also set out to develop a stronger Welsh regional identity, 
and to increase international recognition of Welsh culture. Benchmark 24, for 
example, stated that 
International knowledge and appreciation of Welsh music, film, art drama and sport 
should have increased substantially. 5" 
Benchmark 12 also referred to Wales' place in the world, stating that 
We must be more international in outlook. Wales must have a higher profile, clearer 
national identity and greater influence than today. 515 
In this sense, the Better Wales vision promoted a Welsh identity that appeals to the 
mobility and internationalist focus of the creative class, and underpins a sense of 
greater 'status'. 
5.7 	Intra-Regional Differences 
It is apparent from examining both case studies that the six criteria being used cannot 
be adequately applied uniformly across regions such as Tasmania and Wales. In both 
Tasmania and Wales there are clear intra-regional differences that make 
generalisations in regard to regional identity particularly problematic. Moreover, the 
intra-regional differences are often attributable to the urban/rural divide, and the 
cultural differences which mark city life from country life. This problem is, therefore, 
essentially a product of what can be seen as an urban bias in the 'creative class' 
approach. 
513 The Best for Wales, 1998, p 2, cited in Andrew Thompson, "Wales in Europe," p 311. 
514 Better Wales, p 22. 
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In regard to Tasmania, for example, Southern Tasmania comes out clearly ahead of 
Northern and North Western Tasmania is regard to virtually every criterion. Southern 
Tasmania has greater diversity, more university graduates, higher levels of innovation 
and more 'creative class' amenities. Intuitively, Hobart's spectacular natural setting 
and 'bohemian' districts are also more likely to be considered 'authentic', and carry 
greater weight as high 'status' locations than other parts of the State. Significantly, 
Southern Tasmania also is ahead of Northern and North Western Tasmania on most 
economic indicators — most notably in relation to employment. For example, annual 
regional unemployment rates for the three regions in 2002-2003 were 7.8 per cent in 
the south, 8.7 per cent in the north and 10.1 per cent in the North West. 516 
Tasmania Together noted the special needs of Tasmanian communities outside of the 
major metropolitan areas. Goal 7, for example, aimed to "Foster and value vibrant 
and diverse rural, regional and remote communities that are connected to each other 
and the rest of the world." 517 Benchmarks related to this goal included: 
• Double the proportion of GPs in rural and regional areas by 2020. 
• Maintain the proportion of Tasmania's population living outside the four major urban 
centres (Greater Hobart, Launceston, Devonport and Burnie). 518 
Significant regional differences are also apparent in Wales. The Cardiff Business 
School noted these differences, stating that 
On one hand there is the comparatively prosperous South East centred on Cardiff and 
Newport. On the other is the doubtful accolade conferred in the industrial South Wales 
valleys, West Wales and North West Wales, who enter the new Millennium with EU 
Objective 1 status, making them comparable with the poorest regions of the European 
Union.519 
515 Better Wales, p21. 
516 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour- Tasmanian Regional Overview, 2002-2003, 
www.abs.gov.au , accessed 1/3/04. 
517 Community Leaders Group, Tasmania Together, p 13. 
518 Ibid, p 12. 
519 Cardiff Business School, The Welsh Economy, www.weru.org.uk/economy.html,  accessed 1/3/04. 
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Unlike the 'industrial South', rural Wales remains heavily reliant on agriculture, 
although the industrial profile is changing. Graham Day stated that 
The proportion of the population engaged in or reliant upon agriculture and associated 
activities has fallen dramatically, although by comparison to average UK figures it 
remains substantial, and therefore rural Wales still has much to lose from any further 
decline in the fortunes of its farmers. The share of the population involved in 
manufacturing has grown, but continues to be only a small fraction of the total numbers 
employed. As elsewhere in Britain today, the vast majority of jobs in rural Wales are to 
be found in the various branches of the service sector — the public sector (government, 
education, health and welfare), retailing and the leisure industries, such as hotels and 
catering. 520 
Futhermore, Day noted that the labour market in rural Wales was relatively weak, 
levels of entrepreneurship and wages were lower in rural Wales than in urban Wales, 
and employment growth had come in low-paid and low-skilled occupations. 521 
Conversely, there are fewer highly paid professional and managerial posts, and fewer 
jobs in the most advanced sectors of the economy, such as financial services, than 
would be found in other parts of Wales, and so a relatively weak presence of some of 
the more dynamic fractions of the middle class. 522 
Similarly, Ralph Fevre noted an 'east -west' economic divide in Wales: 
Unemployment rates strongly illustrate the east/west divide within Wales, as do 
comparisons of earnings. Cardiff is a particularly good example of the relative success 
of east Wales... All the annual statistical profiles show Cardiff (together with smaller 
centres like Hay on Wye or Cowbridge) becoming increasingly differentiated from 
520 Graham Day, "The Rural Dimension," p 80. 
521 Ibid, p 80. 
5" Ibid, p 84. 
178 
other Welsh towns and cities and, in fact, becoming rather more like the south of 
England in terms of earnings and house prices and productivity. 523 
Better Wales also recognised the disparities between different parts of Wales. Better 
Wales stated that 
Prosperity is spread is unevenly across Wales. In the west of Wales and the Valleys, 
output per head is nearly 30% below the EU average, although in East Wales it is 
actually slightly higher. 524 
The challenges facing rural Wales, according to Better Wales, included 
The risk of isolation, poor communication links, low incomes, a relatively old 
population, pockets of severe deprivation and high unemployment and the difficulties 
of finding opportunities for economic growth which strengthen the quality of the 
natural environment. 525 
The urban bias of the creative class model was acknowledged by Florida. Indeed, he 
expressed concern that the social shifts he observed were creating a 'new divide'. 
Florida stated that 
I fear we may be splitting into two distinct societies with different institutions, different 
economies, different incomes, ethnic and racial make-ups, social organizations, 
religious orientations and politics. One is creative and diverse — a cosmopolitan 
admixture of high-tech people, bohemians, scientists and engineers, the media and the 
professions. The other is a more close-knit, church-based, older civic society of 
working people and rural dwellers. 526 
523 Ralph Fevre, "The Welsh Economy," p 69. 
524 Better Wales, p 15. 
525 Better Wales, p 15. 
526 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, p 281. 
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Florida argued that the reasons for this new divide were explained by the creative 
class approach. Essentially, Florida argued that economic growth was generated by 
certain types of cities: 
The reason is simple: these places are open and easy to enter. They are where people 
can find opportunity, build support structures and be themselves. And they also provide 
the habitat that is conducive to creativity in its many varied fortns. 527 
Gertler et al also argued that the 'creative class' approach was essentially an 
explanatory tool that could be applied to 'city-regions', rather than rural areas. For 
example, Gertler et al stated that 
A distinct advantage of city-regions is their ability to produce, attract and retain those 
workers who play the lead role in knowledge-intensive production and innovation — 
those who provide the ideas, know-how, creativity and imagination so crucial to 
\  economic success. 528  
5.8 Summary 
By evaluating the regional identities of Wales and Tasmania against the six criteria 
established in Chapter 2, it is possible to see where the two regions have strengths and 
weaknesses. These strengths and weaknesses are summarised in the following tables. 
527 Ibid, p28!. 
528 Meric S Gertler, Richard Florida, Gary Gates, Tara Vinodrai, Competing on Creativity: Placing 
Ontario's Cities in North American Context, (Report prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Enterprise, 
Opportunity and Innovation and the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, November 2002), p 
1. 
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• Brand Tasmania 
• Reputation for clean environment and colonial heritage 
• Tasmania Together goal to promote 'island advantages' 
Weaknesses 
• Reliance on 'non-creative' industry sectors - eg service class (tourism) and 





• Employment growth in 'high-tech' industries 
• Competition in ITC sector - no dominant player Government and Tasmania 
Together focus on innovation and entrepreneurship 
Weaknesses 
• Perception of community and Government 'inertia' against change 
• Relatively small labour market, lack of critical mass especially in 'high-tech' 
Lifestyle Strengths 
• Flourishing arts and culture scene, including TS0 
• 'Bohemian' culture and lifestyle amenities in Southern Tasmania 
• Access to outdoor recreation, eg national parks 
• Tasmania Together goal of excellence and creativity in the arts 
Weaknesses 
• Lack of live popular music scene 
• Lack of lifestyle amenities in Northern Tasmania 
Diversity Stren2ths 
• Changing community and legislative attitudes to homosexuality, eg Significant 
Relationships Act 
• Relatively high level of acceptance of gay community in Southern Tasmania 
Weaknesses 
• Relatively low levels of foreign-born residents across Tasmania - lack of 
cultural diversity 
• Relatively low level of acceptance of gay community in Northern Tasmania 
Authenticity Strengths 
• Colonial history and architecture 
• Reputation for natural environment and wilderness 
• Tasmania Together focus on natural and cultural heritage 
Weaknesses 
• Lack of popular music scene and 'audio identity' 
• Marginalisation of local indigenous culture 




• Increasing population and real estate values 
• Tasmania Together vision of State as an "icon for the rest of the world." 
Weaknesses 
• 'Tasmania Bashing' in the media 
• Perceptions within Tasmania of State as an 'irrelevant backwater' and 'can't do 
it mentality'. 
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• Brand Wales — high-quality, advanced technology, reliability 
Weaknesses 
• Reliance of "non-creative" industries, eg agriculture and mining 






• Better Wales focus on new businesses, take-up of technology and 
promoting innovation through the education system 
Weaknesses 
• Low levels of research and development and business start-ups, high level 
of business failure 
Lifestyle Strengths 
• Tradition for excellence and participation in sports and music 
• Better Wales goal to be a place where young people want to live, work and 
enjoy a high quality of life 
Weaknesses 
• Better Wales does not recognise role of 'nightlife' or importance of active 
recreation 
Diversity Strengths 
• History of cultural diversity, established ethnic populations 
• Traditional concept of the `gwerin' as basis of inclusive community 
Weaknesses 
• Homogenous view of Welsh culture inherent in the `gwerin' 
• Lack of diversity in rural Wales 
• Better Wales does not set benchmarks for diversity or tolerance 
Authenticity Strengths 
• Welsh language 
• Welsh cultural heritage 
• Thriving popular music scene — Welsh 'audio identity' 
Weaknesses 
• Patronising 'leeks and rugby' view of Wales 
• Better Wales does not directly address the preservation of Wales' natural 




• Stronger sense of identity associated with new Parliament Better Wales 
vision to reposition Wales as a region of Europe 
• Better Wales goal to increase international appreciation of Welsh culture 
Weaknesses 
• Lack of Welsh-owned media 
• Negative stereotypes of Wales 
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The strengths and weaknesses outlined above can be seen as having a range of 
development policy implications for both regions. The consistent message in these 
policy recommendations, however, is that image does matter. Moreover, regional 
economic outcomes can be enhanced by promoting a regional identity that embraces 
the elements of Florida's so-called 'creative' society. For example, in relation to 
lifestyle factors, Tasmania could make more of its advantages as a location for 
outdoor recreational pursuits in its generic 'lifestyle' marketing, or could place more 
emphasis on developing the local popular music culture. Wales, on the other hand, 
could look to promote its local popular music culture as a feature of the Welsh 
lifestyle. 
The emphasis on 'branding' in terms of the competitive advantages for both Wales 
and Tasmania is another indication of how and why image matters. Branding is not 
only useful for marketing products, but for regions it is useful in defining the region's 
major economic strengths, and in achieving recognition of those strengths in the 
broader marketplace. The formation of clusters around those strengths then serves to 
create formal and informal networks between members of the 'creative class', thus 
adding to the development of an environment that supports creativity and growth. As 
with any such 'marketing' exercise, however, it is essential that the strengths 
identified in the brand do reflect the genuine strengths of the region, otherwise the 
opportunity to form industry clusters will not eventuate. 
This chapter has shown that the Tasmanian 'brand' focuses more on Tasmanian's 
physical resources than the talent and creativity of its people. Considering the 
framework outlined in Chapter 2, this element of the Tasmanian identity needs to be 
addressed if the State is to break out of its role as a semi-peripheral provider of raw 
material. Neither region has a particularly strong indigenous business culture, with 
few regional headquarters based in either Hobart or Cardiff. Tasmania, however, has 
a growing information technology industry, based around small to medium-sized 
enterprises. The proliferation of smaller businesses, and the lack of a dominant single 
employer, underpins a relatively 'horizontal' labour market. Similarly, the lack of an 
entrepreneurial culture has been identified as an impediment to economic growth in 
Wales. With few major Welsh-based companies, it has been argued that Wales does 
not have a strong local business elite. 
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The Better Wales plan sought to build on what it saw as existing Welsh values — in 
particular the 'importance of community'. By labelling the importance of community 
as a specifically Welsh value, Better Wales reinforced the notion that Welsh 
communities are more close-knit and harmonious than communities elsewhere. It 
also reinforced the centrality of life in rural Wales to the Welsh identity, as close-knit 
communities are far more likely to exist in rural areas than in large cities such as 
Cardiff. Tasmania Together, however, does better in identifying the importance of 
preserving a region's natural and built heritage, and therefore capitalising on the 
region's physical claims to 'authenticity'. Tasmania Together also placed more 
emphasis on the notions of diversity and tolerance. 
The criterion of 'authenticity' is an aspect of Florida's work which raises policy 
questions implications. For example, Tasmania's treatment of its aboriginal heritage 
can be seen as weakness in terms of its 'authenticity'. In this light, therefore, there is 
an economic justification for pursuing social justice policy initiatives such as 
aboriginal reconciliation, and to adopting more aboriginal symbols such as place 
names. Florida's model would suggest that allowing the indigenous aboriginal culture 
a more high-profile role in Tasmanian life would serve to reinforce the notion of 
Tasmanian 'authenticity', thus increasing the attractiveness of the State to members of 
the 'creative class'. It could also be argued that this would increase Tasmania's 
reputation as a place were diversity is welcomed, again leading to the development of 
a more 'creative' culture. 
Similarly, this chapter identified a weakness of the Tasmanian identity in relation to 
the lack of a strong local popular music culture. This could be addressed through 
State Government policies aiming to stimulating the live music scene, such as 
providing incentives for venues to support local musicians and to promote live music. 
The State Government could also examine ways to promote careers in popular culture 
to young people, and to develop stronger career paths for people leaving school and 
looking to enter the field of popular entertainment. To a degree, the Tasmanian 
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Government already does this through existing programs, 529 however Florida's 
argument indicates that the issue may be worthy of greater attention. 
This analysis, however, has also exposed a potential 'catch-22' in the creative class 
approach relating to the criterion of 'authenticity'. This chapter, for example, 
identified a risk for both Wales and Tasmania in the further `romanticisation' of their 
respective regional identities. While on one hand, Florida's analysis identifies 
'authenticity' as a key factor in attracting human capital, the romanticisation of 
Tasmania and Welsh has contributed to the development of regional identities similar 
to that of the French Quebeckers — that is, one that idealises the status quo and rejects 
innovation and change. The quest for 'authenticity' therefore, can paradoxically lead 
to the development of symbols and myths that serve to reinforce the characteristics of 
semi-peripheral and peripheral regions, and thus deter regional economic growth. 
Furthermore, Florida's description of what makes a region 'authentic' can also be 
seen as 'city-centric'. As noted in Chapter 2, Florida stated that 
Authenticity comes from several aspects of a community — historic buildings, 
established neighbourhoods, a unique music scene or specific cultural attributes. It 
comes from the mix — from urban grit alongside renovated buildings, from the 
commingling of young and old, long-time neighbourhood characters and yuppies, 
fashion models and 'bag ladies'. 53° 
Presenting such an image is undoubtedly difficult for a small town. While rural areas 
may have some elements of such 'authenticity' in terms of historic buildings or even 
unique music scenes, they are clearly at a disadvantage in providing a 'commingling' 
of urban grit and fashion models and so forth. There are numerous other difficulties 
in applying the 'creative class' approach to rural areas. Several of the other criteria, 
such as 'thick' labour markets, diversity and lifestyle, rely on an element of 'critical 
mass' which simply cannot be sustained by a small population. 
529 For example, the Screen Tasmania and Arts Tasmania programs — see 
www.development.tas.gov.au  and www.arts.tas.gov.au . 
530 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, p 228. 
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Tasmania Together and Better Wales both address many of the issues raised in the 
Chapter 2 as being important to the definition of a successful regional economy. 
Furthermore, both Tasmania Together and Better Wales both place emphasis on 
adopting new technology, developing more successful home-grown businesses, and 
encouraging greater levels of research and development and innovation in the tertiary 
education and business sectors. 
Perhaps the most significant challenge for the two regions is to build greater diversity 
and tolerance in their respective communities. For Tasmania, this means overcoming 
traditional social prejudices and finding new ways to attract migrants. For Wales, 
however, the challenge may be to reinvigorate the traditional Welsh concept of the 
`gwerin' and to place it in a 21 st century context, thus giving the values of diversity 
and tolerance a more central role in defining the Welsh identity. 
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Chapter 6- Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the most basic problem of regional economic development 
theory — explaining the causes of regional economic disparities. For satirist PJ 
O'Rourke, this problem seemed intractable: 
It's not a matter of brains. No part of the earth (with the possible exception of 
Brentwood) is dumber than Beverly Hills, and the residents are wading in gravy. In 
Russia, meanwhile, where chess is a spectator sport, they're boiling stones for soup. 
Nor can education be the reason. Fourth graders in the American school system 
know what a condom is but aren't sure about 9 x 7. Natural resources aren't the 
answer. Africa has diamonds, gold, uranium, you name it. Scandinavia has little and 
is frozen besides. Maybe culture is the key, but wealthy regions such as the local 
mall are famous for lacking it. 531 
This thesis has argued that regional identity has a crucial role in regional economic 
development. In particular, it has been argued that a region that embraces the values 
of innovation, entrepreneurship and change as part of its regional 'identity' will be 
more likely to foster a competitive and growth-oriented business environment. 
Richard Florida's 'creative class' approach emphasised the importance of 'human 
capital' in stimulating economic growth. According to Florida, regions with high 
levels of innovators or 'creative' people tend to have higher levels of economic 
growth. This is consistent with the argument that innovation and changes drive 
growth, but switches the focus of analysis from economic grounds to social grounds. 
Florida argued that building communities that attract these creative people is essential 
to stimulating economic growth, and therefore we need to study the decision-making 
patterns of mobile creative people to see why they choose to locate in some regions 
rather than others. Critics of Florida, however, such as Steven Malanga, have accused 
the 'creative class' model of essentially being a lightweight, trendy rationale for 
maintaining 'leftist' public policies involving high-levels of government spending and 
social justice initiatives. In particular, Malanga argued that the 'creative class' 
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approach distracted policy makers from more effective regional development 
measures such as lowering levels of business taxation. 532 
This paper has placed Florida in the context of broader regional development theories. 
In particular, the 'creative class' approach can be seen as following in the tradition of 
theorists who have identified the importance of innovation, entrepreneurship and 
change as drivers of the capitalist economy. These writers have included Weber, 
Schumpeter, Veblen, and more recently Porter. Furthermore, the 'creative class' 
approach can be seen as compatible with Wallerstein's core-periphery model, in it 
serves to explain the differences between core and non-core regions. Clearly large 
metropolitan areas have advantages over regional areas in attracting human capital, 
and therefore this social pattern reinforces the economic disparities between cores and 
peripheries and prevents peripheries from developing the environment required to 
achieve growth and reduce dependency. Nevertheless, Wallerstein's model allowed 
for some movement between core and semi-periphery status, and the 'creative class' 
approach shows how this movement may occur. 
The core-periphery model also implications for the use of power and the definition of 
regional identities. Chapter 2 showed how regional identity is a constructed concept. 
Furthermore, regional identities are subject to the exercise of the third dimension of 
power. In the context of the core-periphery model, cores or metropoles can therefore 
influence the development of regional identities in peripheral regions in order to 
reinforce existing power and dependency relationships. 
By focusing on the reasons people choose to locate in certain regions rather than 
others, Florida's approach places greater significance on the role of regional identity. 
Given that regional identities are malleable, it follows that they can be challenged and 
manipulated in order to support the development of a 'creative class' values, and to 
present an image of the region that is more attractive to the 'creative class'. 
Peripheral regions can therefore challenge the power relationships that underpin and 
reinforce economic dependency and disadvantage by redefining their regional 
identities in a manner than encourages creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
531 PJ O'Rourke, Eat The Rich, p 1. 
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Seen within this broader theoretical context, Florida's arguments can be seen as being 
consistent with and complementary to a wide range of established regional 
development theories. Nevertheless, the extension of Florida's analysis to the broader 
concept of regional identity represents a new contribution to the field. 
This thesis has shown, however, that there are also significant limitations to the use of 
the 'creative class' approach. Firstly, while Florida focuses his efforts on cities, this 
paper has looked at the broader concept of regions. Chapter Five noted the problem 
of intra-regional disparities, and found that Florida's prescription offered only limited 
value to the specific problems faced by rural areas. The development of creative 
culture values is almost by definition limited to cities. For example, factors such as a 
'24/7' lifestyle, thick labour markets and social interaction are not just indicators of 
successful 'creative economies', they are also hallmarks of city life. Rural areas, 
which are by definition isolated from major population centres, have natural 
disadvantages in being to provide these factors. Florida's approach does provide an 
explanation of why rural areas continue to be economically disadvantaged in 
comparison to urban areas. For policy makers, however, the `creative class' approach 
offers decidedly bleak conclusion for rural communities, and is therefore of limited 
utility to those wishing to address rural / urban economic disparities. 
Similarly, Florida's analysis also is subject to criticism for its seemingly unwavering 
emphasis on the 'high-technology' sector. For rural areas where manufacturing and 
resource processing are the most significant industry sectors, it may not be practical in 
the short to medium term to contemplate a move towards more 'creative' industries, 
and particularly the information technology sector. Creativity still may be useful as a 
driver of economic growth for these areas, but it needs to be put in the context of the 
genuine competitive advantages that rural areas have. By refining the criteria used by 
Florida, this thesis has attempted to reconcile the insights of Florida's approach with 
the regional development objectives of regional areas (as opposed to cities), however 
it is acknowledged that the urban bias of the 'creative class' approach remains a 
difficult issue. 
532 Steven Malanga, "The Curse of the Creative Class." 
189 
Secondly, Wallerstein stated that semi-peripheries form a buffer between the core and 
the periphery. In this sense, semi-peripheries are likely to have the basic 
infrastructure necessary to assume core status. Peripheral regions, however, face 
more intractable structural problems, and are less likely to be in a position of attaining 
core status. For this reason, the 'creative class' thesis is of more utility for semi-
peripheral regions. Focusing on human capital may therefore be useful for semi-
peripheral regions, however this will not address the basic structural issues facing 
peripheral areas without basic infrastructure or the institutional support needed to 
underpin a successful regional economy. 
Peripheral regions tend to face a range of economic disadvantages, and attracting 
'human capital' will not solve all of them. The 'creative class' approach does, 
nevertheless, provide important insights into the causes behind regional economic 
disparities. Indeed, the 'creative class' approach shows that PJ O'Rourke may have 
been closer to the understanding these causes than he realised. To borrow PJ 
O'Rourke's vernacular, a region that has an image as a place that 'sucks' will not 
attract the human capital it needs to stimulate innovation and growth. Redefining the 
identities of such regions, however, can encourage higher levels of entrepreneurship 
and innovation, and therefore contribute to the development of a stronger regional 
economic base. Image does matter, and a region that has an image of being confident 
and entrepreneurial is more likely to break the 'circular causation' that keeps 
peripheral regions trapped in a cycle of economic disadvantage. 
The 'creative class' approach has already stimulated a considerable amount of 
research into regions in Australia, the United States and Canada. To date, this 
research has involved applying the findings of Florida's work to other regions, and 
formulating indices such as those used in the Australian Local Government 
Association's State of the Regions Report 2002. The application of these indicators to 
Australian and Canadian regions, however, assumes that Florida's findings apply 
equally to members of the 'creative class' in countries other than the United States. 
But while this is an acceptable starting point, we do not know if there are other 
cultural factors that influence the demands of members of the 'creative class' in 
different countries. It may well be that in Australia there are different factors at play. 
For example, Australians are renowned as sports enthusiasts, therefore Florida's 
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argument in relation to the utility of sports stadium may be less applicable in the 
Australian context. Certainly, the State of the Regions Report found that Inner 
Melbourne came second in its 'top 10 regions' in relation to most 'creative class' 
indicators. 533 Given Melbourne's reputation as Australia's 'sports capital', it could be 
argued that sporting stadia and facilities are actually seen as advantages to Australian 
members of the 'creative class'. Further research, therefore, to the preferences of 
'creative class' members in other countries, such as Australia, would provide insight 
into the effect of such cultural differences. 
Furthermore, this thesis has argued that more attention should be paid to issues of 
regional identity. Within the 'creative class' approach, Florida referred to 'status' as 
an important part of a region's identity, and argued that people seek to find places that 
reflect their own personal identity. In this respect, there is scope to conduct more 
research into the 'status' of regions such as Tasmania and Wales. The State of the 
Regions Report 2002, for example, did not include any qualitative indicators relating 
to 'status'. Surveys of people in the 'creative class', however, may be able to gather 
information about the level of 'status' associated with different regions. 
As a relatively new strand of development theory, the 'creative class' approach is 
bound to evolve as further research is conducted. Indeed, this paper has contributed 
to that evolution by expanding on the six factors identified by Florida as being 
integral to the `locational' decisions of members of the 'creative class.' Furthermore, 
it is to be expected that the preferences of 'creative' people will also continue to 
change over time, and therefore there will continue to be a need for this type of 
research into the reasons why people choose to live and work in some regions rather 
than others. 
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